A system for the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo cotainerships by Gallagher, Shawn P., S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
A System for the Detection of Concealed Nuclear Weapons and
Fissile Material aboard Cargo Containerships
by
Shawn P. Gallagher
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF
I A CLrWT7,¶b dT' C 1Td1T TILT TWTIdT V A C WILT A TY. \T7 VT~ rT T1VIAl lK I r ; N1AJ lN 1NUILLLAK J t51'N15I1 AIAND J1lN11N
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2005
© 2005 Shawn Gallagher
All ruohtc rcP.rv.A
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
¢
Signature of Author ----
Departnoifif Nuclear Science and Engineering
/ D ' Submitted on May 6,2005
Certified by .
/7
Senior Research Scienn Richard C. LanzaNuclear Science and Engineering, MIT
Thesis Supervisor
Certified by
Professor Emeritus inProfessor Emeritus in
Michael J. Driscoll
Nuclear Science and Engineering, MIT
Thesis Reader
AcceDted by
V/' / Jeffery A. Coderre
Associate Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering, MIT
Chairman of the Department Committee for Graduate Students
A C,-
'14
I... . U,.. .- . --- I __
IL__ -
v
A System for the Detection of Concealed Nuclear Weapons and
Fissile Material aboard Cargo Containerships
Submitted to the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering On May 6, 2004 in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Nuclear Science and Engineering
Abstract
A new approach to the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material
aboard cargo containerships is proposed. The ship-based approach removes the
constraints of current thinking by addressing the threat of containerized nuclear terror in a
novel way. Critical tactical misjudgments exist in currently deployed detection systems,
which expose U.S. cities to an act of nuclear terrorism. Current port-based systems
position defenses within the perimeter of each coastal city and the assumption that
terrorists would not remotely detonate the weapon while taxiing past urban areas en route
to the port is irrational. The new approach protects this hole in national security by
moving defenses outside the perimeter and onto the containership. A networked system
of radiation detectors, aboard all inbound containerships, does not allow a concealed
nuclear weapon to ever approach the U.S. homeland.
This thesis describes the ship-based system in detail, outlines its capabilities and suggests
possible deployment scenarios. The basic concept of the ship-based system is to hide
detectors in empty standard 40-foot shipping containers and send them back and forth
across the ocean alongside normal cargo. Containerized arrays of gamma and neutron
detectors are linked to small data processing and transmitting devices. Data is transmitted
to a central UI.S. location for collection, assessment, and possible dissemination to
responders in the event of threat identification. Upon positive detection, an alarm
condition is signaled and interception of the containership occurs while still at sea.
Monte Carlo based simulations suggest that due to long count times during typical two
week voyages, radiation transport is significant enough such that containerized units will
detect weapons grade uranium and plutonium in implosion-type configurations with
three-sigma confidence from distances averaging 22.0 and 23.5 meters of cargo
respectively. 'The vast majority of containerships require between 3 and 15 units deployed
on each ship depending on its capacity and degree of control over container placement.
Given the low number of units required for each ship, deployment of a containerized
detector network is practical and an initial limited deployment increases the level of
deterrence by denial against containerized nuclear terror.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard C. Lanza
Title: Senior Research Scientist in Nuclear Science and Engineering
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Foreword
I would like to instill a degree of patriotism and innovation to you, the
reader. As with any system, process or idea, the ship-based approach can
always be improved and it is through collaborative inventiveness and
ingenuity that the system described below will realize maximum
effectiveness. In the interest of national security, I challenge you to absorb
the ideas presented here with the intent of improving upon them. It is our
collective effort that will win the day.
The ultimate value of the ship-based system lies in the degree of
deterrence achieved by the simple knowledge that it might be deployed.
Once the adversary realizes that this system might be overtly or covertly
operating, he cannot overlook its implications and a level of deterrence by
denial is achieved. I therefore humbly request your cooperation in the
sharing of information presented here.
Finally, I offer a note to any terrorist group or rogue nation with the intent
of committing nuclear terror against the Unites States and who might
obtain a copy of this thesis: as I write these words, the ship-based
approach is in its infancy; as you read them, whether visible or not, it has
matured. Do not misjudge the ability of the scientific community to
provide secure solutions to all threats that might arise. And do not
underestimate the resolve of the American nation, as we stand united
against you.
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Chapter 1: The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism
1.1 Introduction
The dawn of the nuclear age fundamentally changed the United States' defense posture;
but after half a century, current strategies are outdated and incomplete. The threat from
the Soviet Union prompted the U.S. to develop a second-strike counter-value capability
to deter nuclear attack, but that capability no longer applies to the current spectrum of
possible nuclear events. A new dynamic in the form of organized global terrorism has
emerged that requires a reassessment of the nuclear deterrent achieved during the Cold
War era as non-state actors may now threaten new modes of nuclear attack. Gaps in
fissile material security following the collapse of the Soviet Union [Allison, 1996] have
now combined with the one-stop-shopping provided by the A.Q. Khan nuclear
proliferation network to ease the burden of obtaining sufficient fissile material to
construct a crude nuclear device [Bush, 2004; Slavin, 2004]. A well-funded terrorist
group could have taken advantage of extremely poor security and working conditions at
Russian nuclear facilities to obtain fissile materials and simply paid a Khan representative
to provide requisite nuclear knowledge. Without borders to defend or citizens to protect,
a terrorist group is left undeterred from using a nuclear weapon against the United States,
effectively rendering the U.S. nuclear stockpile incapable of non-state intimidation or
coercion.
The rise of organized international terrorism has thus changed the traditional nuclear
deterrence landscape. The principle that nuclear weapons would never be used against the
U.S. because of assured retaliatory destruction is no longer valid. Non-state actors and
terrorist groups may now threaten the U.S. homeland with unconventional modes of
attack by concealing a nuclear device with the intent to deliver a clandestine blow. With
no practical retaliatory option against a terrorist group using nuclear force, the mutually
assured destruction (MAD) safety net falls apart. Thus, the threat of nuclear terrorism
may now even compete with the threat of a conventional nuclear attack. This claim is
11
substantiated by a comprehensive report from the Defense Science Board Task Force
(DSBTF) for the Department of Defense, which suggests that the possibility of
clandestine nuclear terror should be treated with attention "as serious as that devoted
missile defense" [DSBTF, 2004].
The new dynamic of religiously motivated, suicidal terrorist groups operating on an
international level and targeting U.S. interests has expanded the number of possible
modes of nuclear attack. Traditional methods-such as ICBMs, submarine-launched
cruise missiles and manned bombers-are no longer the only means of delivery. A
terrorist group or rogue nation wishing to detonate a nuclear weapon on American soil
have much more insidious options available. Possible delivery methods of clandestine
nuclear attack include border-crossings with large trucks or trains as well as port landings
with small boats and airplanes. As evidenced by recent comments from top-level
government representatives, one thought that has caused particular concern in
Washington is the possibility that a terrorist group would conceal a nuclear weapon
among common cargo aboard a containership [Schumer, 2003; CNN:Ashcroft, 2005].
Identified as the most unprotected and insecure method of nuclear delivery, nearly 19,000
cargo containers enter U.S. seaports every day, any of which could be concealing an
assembled nuclear device. In the new nuclear landscape, the list of delivery options has
expanded to include the weaponization of cargo.
Since the possibility of nuclear smuggling aboard containerships appears to be the most
threatening and least secured, a new method of both nuclear defense and deterrence is
required. It is therefore of the utmost importance to national security that a new deterrent
is developed to address the rational enemy and a new line of defense is deployed to
respond to the irrational adversary. This thesis aims to address the threat of nuclear
terrorism as it has evolved and will describe a new approach to the detection of a nuclear
weapon concealed aboard cargo containerships and a system which has the ability to
mitigate the threat before it ever comes close enough to destroy an American city.
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The basic concept of the ship-based system is to hide radiation detectors in otherwise
empty standard 40-foot shipping containers and send them back and forth across the
ocean alongside normal cargo. The system is capable of detecting weapons grade
uranium and plutonium in an assembled and operational geometry. It also detects
unassembled fissile material and, while not at all a focus but certainly an added benefit,
the system can also detect material used in Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs),
commonly known as "dirty bombs". Containerized arrays of gamma and neutron
detectors are linked to small data processing and transmitting devices. Continuous or
discrete data is transmitted to a central U.S. location for collection, assessment, and
possible dissemination to responders, in the event of threat identification. Upon positive
detection, an alarm condition is initiated and interception of the containership occurs
while still at sea.
Current port-based solutions offer no deterrence against the use of an assembled nuclear
device concealed in a containership; and worse, set the final line of defense within the
perimeter of U.S. cities. Given the implicit assumption that a terrorist group has the
capability to weaponize fissile material or procure a functional nuclear weapon, it is
unreasonable to conclude that they will not have the ability to remotely detonate the
weapon. It is then a straightforward risk assessment on the part of the terrorist to opt to
detonate the device while taxiing past urban areas, not ever having reached port-based
detection systems. This could be done either by remote activation or via stowaway
suicide bomber. The ship-based system sets a line of defense offshore, outside the
perimeter, thus not ever allowing the weapon to threaten the U.S. homeland.
The new approach described in these pages makes no claim to solve the entirety of the
nuclear terrorism problem; rather, it solves the containerized nuclear terrorism problem,
the one identified as the most likely mode of attack and most difficult to defend.
Subsequent work from different parties will have to address other smuggling routes and,
once closed off, the hope is that the threat of nuclear terrorism will have been
significantly deflected from the United States.
13
The system described in this thesis achieves a dual counter-terrorism effect. It offers an
increased degree of deterrence by denial and establishes a crucial line of defense.
D)eterrence by denial requires a defense such that the enemy realizes his chances of
success are minimal and that his goals are unachievable [Mearsheimer, 1983; Bowen,
2002]. Denial is enhanced if the cost of failure is immense, and in the case of obtaining a
nuclear weapon, the cost to terrorists is assumed high and failure unacceptable [Powers,
2001]. By reducing the chances of a successful act of containerized nuclear terror
extremely low levels, the ship-based approach achieves deterrence by denial for the
rational enemy. But, for the undeterrable, non-calculating adversary, the deployment of a
ship-based network of detectors inserts an extra layer of at-sea defense. It may also be
possible to enhance the efficacy of other layers with the ship-based system. If believable
enough and if combined with other systems that protect secondary attack modes, the
deployment of a system based on deterrence by denial might deter the attempted
acquisition of nuclear weapons or even prevent it as a form of warfare [DSBTF, 2004;
Powers, 2001].
A suicidal, nuclear-armed terrorist with a motivation to inflict catastrophic damage on the
United States may now be a possibility. This thesis will describe a system, based on
currently available technology, simply rearranged in a new way, that will enhance
national security by offering an increased degree of deterrence by denial, which is backed
by a believable and capable line of defense.
1.2 Problem Definition
This brief section defines the difficulty of finding a solution that effectively addresses the
problem of containerized nuclear terror. Rather than viewing the problem as a whole, the
approach taken in the conception of the ship-based system was to analyze the problem
firom a 'top-down' viewpoint. Potential constraints in current thinking were then
identified and solutions that lie outside of these constraints were considered. A synthesis
of viable sub-solutions was then formed and the result is the system described in this
thesis. A conscious effort was made to proceed with this 'top-down' method of scientific
14
advancement, rather than working on one facet of the containerized terrorism problem
and contributing only a small piece of the puzzle. Before taking such a broad perspective;
however, a clear characterization of the threat must be made.
1.2.1 Threat characterization
One of the underlying assumptions in this thesis is that terrorists either have or could
have the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon via cargo containership to a U.S. seaport
and detonate it. There certainly are intense debates in Washington as to whether or not
this scenario is even possible, let alone likely. However, the fact that the government has
spent large sums of money on radiation detectors for port security at least indicates that
some of those with budgetary power are convinced that the threat is real [AP, 2005]. The
degree to which the government believes that a terrorist group could carry out such an
attack is not openly discussed and therefore carries an element of ambiguity. However,
given the events of September 11 th, there can be little question that terrorist groups have
the organizational and operational capability to carry out a complex attack. The question
that remains is whether or not a terrorist group has the technical proficiency to construct
or procure a nuclear device.
The question as posed is essentially unanswerable. There is no way to gauge the nuclear
competence of an organization such as al-Qaeda that has apparently eluded international
efforts to uncover all its intentions. However, the motivation of terrorist groups to
commit nuclear terrorism is evident. Osama bin Laden has stated that the acquisition of
nuclear weapons is a "religious duty" and in an al-Qaedafatwa, the group authorizes all
Muslims to use a nuclear device against Americans [Garamone, 2002; Uphoff, 2004].
Traditional terror methods have focused on committing attacks that seek to maximize
their psychological effect or kill key personnel, rather than maximize their destructive
effect and kill at random [Stern, 1999]. Conversely, the new format of terror displayed by
al-Qaeda on September 11th clearly seeks to maximize destruction and number of
casualties. It would seem that weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear, fit this
new format.
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A nuclear attack on an American city requires no description of its destructive and
indiscriminate consequences. However, considering not only the tremendous loss of life
and the political and social disruption which would be the results of such an act, it is clear
that the U.S. cannot afford the purely economic consequences that a nuclear attack would
initiate. For example, the present discounted value of Lower Manhattan is around two
trillion dollars and given the public fear and uncertainty of radiation, it is unlikely that a
post-nuclear Manhattan would be return to its current state in short order [Allison,
1996].1 Worldwide, the consequences of an attack involving the U. S. maritime shipping
infrastructure would likely halt international commerce ($1.4 billion in goods exchanged
per day) for an extended period of time [Koch, 2004]. The above scenarios are mentioned
not to overstate the consequences, because it should already be clear that nuclear
terrorism must be disallowed, but rather to highlight the need for a system that can at
least prevent containerized nuclear terrorism.
To mitigate this threat, several layers of defense are necessary including source (fissile
material) security, detection and homeland defense. Securing the source and defending
the homeland are clearly necessary and much of the available national resource pool has
been poured into these areas. In the detection layer, the unique radiation signal given off
from the fissile material inside the core of the nuclear weapon must be identified before it
is close enough to unleash any destructive power on the U.S. homeland. It is impractical
for customs fficers to perform daily hand searches of 19,000 containers [Koch, 2004];
therefore, along with some hand-held detection devices, wide-area radiation scanners
have been developed and deployed. Billions of dollars have also been spent on securing
loose fissile material in Russia and considerable national resources have been devoted to
tracking would-be terrorists, both with the idea of removing the source of fissile material
from the equation [NTI, 2005]. Cutting off the threat at the source and placing detectors
at the destination are two important layers, but these alone cannot to provide a competent
defense; an extra layer is required between the source and destination to address any
I This value was figured from an estimated $260 billion gross product, a discount rate of 5 percent and a ten
year life span. The estimate was taken from Allison, et al., page 129.
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source breaches that may already have occurred and to defend against the enemy who
will remote detonate a device just before reaching the destination.
1.2.2 Detection Constraints
Before proceeding in an attempt to solve such a difficult problem, it is important to
completely characterize the constraints and freedoms that exist. As formed, the dilemma
is simple to understand, but complex to solve. It is generally accepted that a viable
solution must include the following:
* Positive detection claims should not disrupt commerce in more than a minimal
way because the economic inefficiencies of a bottlenecked detection system might
prove vastly cost-prohibitive.
* Any solution should provide confident detection such that when false positives
occur, as they inevitably will, there is not a significant effect on the flow of
containers.
* The probability of false negatives should be vanishingly small.
* The system should be deployable without building an impractical infrastructure
that requires the rerouting of all containers.
* Detectors should be situated such that they are tamper-proof, and ideally
autonomous.
* A degree of deterrence by denial would be achieved through the demonstrated use
of any radiation detection system.
The unneeded constraints this places on a solution, as generally perceived prior to this
thesis, are the following.
* The system must be able to quickly scan only suspicious containers as they are
loaded or unloaded so as not to disrupt commerce.
* Detectors must be attached to existing infrastructure at ports such as on cranes or
near roads and railways within the port grounds.
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* The detection units must be based mostly in U.S. ports to minimize adversary
tampering.
* Layers of defense covering the source and destination are enough to address the
threat.
* Deterrence by denial is achieved with port-based radiation detectors because the
terrorist will not risk the loss of his weapon without a chance to use it.
The ship-based approach described in this thesis relieves all of these prior unnecessarily
imposed constraints and offers a new perspective with clear advantages over existing and
proposed technology by stepping beyond current thinking. The solution begins with the
observations that allow additional freedoms not previously conceived or realized.
* Every container, not just those deemed suspicious, must be checked to ensure that
there is no chance of a weapon slipping past defenses.
* The constraint that detectors should be placed at port is unnecessary and due to
their location, leave a large gap in national security.
* Deterrence by denial is achieved through believable defenses. Only a line of
defense outside the U.S. homeland is sufficient.
* Most importantly, no foreign nuclear weapon should ever, under any
circumstances, be allowed within the borders of a U.S. city.
The solution provided in this thesis achieves all the above objectives in a practical and
fully implementable manner in such an effective way that the adversary will likely be
deterred from committing containerized nuclear terror.
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Chapter 2: Current Approaches to Fissile Material Detection
The currently prevailing strategy for the detection of fissile material concealed in cargo
containers is what will be termed a port-based approach. In much the same way airplane
luggage is scanned by an x-ray machine for conventional weapons or other contraband,
U.S. seaports have installed radiation detectors to find fissile material. The port-based
approach usually involves a simple array of radiation detectors placed such that each
suspect container is scanned either while it is unloaded from the ship or when it is loaded
onto a truck or train. The method places a potential bottleneck on the flow of containers
off the boat, but great effort by many engineers and scientists has minimized the pinch on
container flow such that commerce moves relatively unconstrained. The system is far
from perfect and often the method applied to relieve a potential bottleneck is to simply
not scan every container [Koch, 2004]. Some containers are labeled as higher risk and
interrogated while many pass through unchecked. False alarms also cause some
procedural disruption for a small percentage of containers scanned. Despite some
drawbacks, the port-based approach has been well implemented and given the
improvement over previous ineffective methods, should be considered a successful first
step towards prevention of containerized nuclear terror.
2.1 Port-Based Systems
2.1.1 Passive Detectors
There are many ways to apply the port-based approach including both passive detectors,
which scan for the normal radiation signal from fissile material, and active systems,
which beam neutrons or photons towards the cargo causing a unique return signal from
subsequent fission events. Most systems have focused on the placement of detector arrays
in a wall, mounted on or near the docks. Some of the ground-mounted arrays are situated
such that semi-trucks or trains pass through detector portals along their normal routes.
Almost all of these systems require the vehicle to stop for a few minutes so that a
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statistically significant number of counts can be collected. The type and geometry of
detectors varies depending on the manufacturer and determines the time needed to scan
each container. An example of a port-based scanner is shown in Figure 2-1 [Kok, 2004].
Figure 2-1: Port-based scanners for semi-trucks
Other port-based approaches propose mounting an array of detectors at some place in the
unloading process. For instance, it has been suggested that mounting detectors on large
quay cranes would give enough time for confident detection (see Figure 2-2). Also, the
gantry assemblies that drop the containers onto the truck or train could house a series of
detectors and have been considered as possible mounting locations [Kok, 2004].
Additionally, a cadre of hand held detectors has been distributed to customs personnel for
mobile monitoring. These detectors are by necessity small and often require a few
minutes of count time to distinguish the radiation from natural background. Some
personnel carry dosimeters with them at all times so that an increase in radiation dose
will signal an alarm condition [Hasson, 2005].
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Figure 2-2: Detectors mounted on quay cranes
Still more creative approaches have been proposed, but not yet implemented. For
example, researchers at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) have designed
a cell phone based system that would hide a small detector inside a series of cell phones.
Each phone would then act as a node for an entire detection network. LLNL has also
proposed (and built to prototype) a buoy based detection system that would theoretically
detect radiation from a ship passing by [Wampler, 2004]. It has also been suggested that a
large array of detectors could be deployed on barrier islands or peninsulas surrounding
some ports or on bridges such as the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco or the
Sunshine Skyway Bridge over Tampa Bay. It is not clear how these systems intend to
receive enough counts from passing containerships at such long distances and short
proximity times.
Mobile detectors mounted on vehicles are also currently being considered. LLNL has
built a prototype radiation detector mounted in the back of a moving truck for finding
fissile material in buildings and other places, but it could theoretically be used to search
containers at port [Ziock, 2004]. Similarly, small coast guard boats outfitted with
radiation detectors could drive by the hull of each incoming containership or other vessel.
It has also been proposed that a helicopter, carrying a large array of detectors on its
underside, could fly across the bow of each ship and hover for a few minutes.
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2.1.2 Active Detectors
Active interrogation methods are receiving much more attention than passive systems for
port-based applications because of their superior ability to distinguish threatening signals
from benign background. Focused beams of photons and neutrons intended to excite the
fissile material offer unique signals by returning either high-energy (>3000 keV) de-
excitation gammas or high neutron fluxes. The use of an active system on a containership
is not practical because the two-week long dose that crew members would receive rises
above unacceptable levels. Still, a survey of current approaches to fissile material
detection would not be complete without a brief mention of active systems.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has devoted considerable resources to
developing an active approach using neutrons. The idea is to focus enough neutrons
towards the concealed fissile material to cause a significant number of fissions. High-
energy gammas emitted from the fission process and from fission fragment decays
provide a unique signature of fissile material. It turns out that firing a stream of neutrons
at cargo will only return significant numbers of greater than 3,000 keV gammas if the
cargo contains fissile material [Slaughter, 2003].
One other developing technology that has been proposed as a possible way to detect
fissile material is by active interrogation using high-energy photons [Bertozzi, 2003].
This approach would take advantage of photo-excitation of the fissile nuclei through
nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF). For the safety reasons already identified above,
the approach is not useful aboard containerships. The dose given to the crew would likely
be far above acceptable limits and it would be both illegal and unacceptable to the
international shipping community for the crew to absorb doses out of the normal range.
Nevertheless. NRF could be used at port to scan suspect cargo given that a proper amount
of shielding is present. An important application of these active interrogation
technologies may be of use as another layer of the overall defense.
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2.1.3 Irrational Port-Based Assumptions
The port-based approach has a fatal flaw, which if exploited, could expose a hole in the
entire nuclear defense of the United States. Before a nuclear device is in range of the
systems described above, the weapon could be remotely detonated. The minute that the
containership enters a bay, inlet or other docking area, it could be remotely activated or
set off by suicide bombers stowed in the container such that it would destroy surrounding
urban areas and infrastructure.
While not explicitly stated or considered, the fundamental assumption of the port-based
approach is that the weapon will not be remotely detonated or equipped with
countermeasures such as booby-traps. It is already implicitly assumed that a terrorist
group has the ability to procure or manufacture a complex nuclear device. Therefore, it is
illogical to assume that the group will be unable to accomplish simple engineering feats
such as remote detonation and countermeasures. As seen in the recent Madrid train
bombings, a cell phone is sufficient for an initial firing signal [CBS/AP, 2004].
Furthermore, it can be argued that the terrorist might also booby-trap the weapon such
that any opening of the container or other inspection would detonate the device. It might
even be the case that the terrorist arranges his own embedded radiation detector such that
the high fluxes from an active probe would set off the firing sequence.
It can be argued that the terrorist would smuggle the fissile material into the country in
small pieces for later assembly. From the nefarious view of the terrorist group, it would
seem to diminish the potential for success if the weapon were assembled in the country,
where it would be subject to the watchful eye of various government entities and other
policing agencies. Furthermore, many attractive target cities are by the ocean and have
dense urban areas near major seaports so adding the extra step of in-country assembly
would only increase the chances of being caught - there appears to be no motivation to
attack an interior city like St. Louis or Denver, when larger and more economically
important cities such as New York are accessible with less risk. From the terrorist's
perspective, it is irrational to risk detection at port when one could simply detonate before
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even reaching current U.S. homeland defenses, especially if already within range to
inflict damage on an American city.
Given the assumption of rational enemy, there seems little reason to expect the nuclear
device will ever reach port-based detectors. The current maritime security utilizing only a
port-based approach is therefore not offering an optimal last line of defense. Moreover, it
is not offering the terrorists any deterrent from the containership method of attack.
Rather, they will likely detonate the weapon at some optimal point while the
containership is taxiing towards the port. It is under these pretexts that a new approach is
not only required, but also essential for national security.
2.2 Smart Containers
The only other approach currently suggested that attempts to make detection aboard the
ship might seem, at first, to be very similar to the containerized detector system but the
utility of the "smart container" is extremely limited. The smart container approach, which
has been proposed by Klann and McGregor at Argonne National Laboratory, consists of
tiny wafers of solid-state neutron detectors inserted inside every imported container
[ANL, 2003]. These small, thin wafers are attached or are in some way connected to the
electronic seals soon to be prominent on all incoming containers. The would-be location
of the detector is shown in Figure 2-3 [Kok, 2004].
There are several differences with this sort of approach, all of which point to the
advantages of the containerized detector described in this thesis. Perhaps an obvious
difference is that the small wafers are shipped alongside cargo while the approach
described here entails detectors shipped in empty, dedicated containers (see section 3.1.3
for more detail). Smart containers are therefore not a clandestine approach, which leads
to severe security problems. Most importantly, a terrorist group would, upon obtaining
their container, simply remove, disable or otherwise deceive the detection unit [Koch,
2004]. While each smart container will be part of a network and an alarm signaled when
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Figure 2-3: Smart detector location
one has been disabled, it is safe to assert that, considering the nearly 11 million
containers, the number of broken smart container detectors at any given time will be too
high to account for every disturbance without disrupting commerce. The tampering
would likely go unnoticed.
Furthermore, the small, thin detectors offer such a low solid angle (even relative to a
weapon concealed in its smart container) and not enough thickness to slow down
neutrons, that the detector will likely not resolve a confident signal. Also, the cost of
fabricating 11 million detection units, even if made cheaply for around $1000, would
balloon to 11 billion without including significant operation and maintenance costs. And,
the implementation of the smart containers would be useless until they were attached to
all 11 million containers because it only takes one container to smuggle a weapon.
Finally, an ultimately overwhelming disadvantage of smart containers is that they are set
up to only look for neutrons. The neutron signal from uranium is almost non-existent and
smart containers are therefore limited to detecting plutonium (see section 5.3). It is not
practical to also include large gamma detectors with enough efficiency in 11 million
containers. Less significantly, the smart detector approach would be unlikely to detect
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dirty bomb material because most radioisotopes emit gamma radiation and not neutrons.
Clearly, the limitations of the smart containers preclude any realistic chance of their
practical implementation.
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Chapter 3: Ship-Based System Description
The basic concept of the ship-based system is to hide detectors in empty standard 40-foot
shipping containers and send them back and forth across the ocean alongside normal
cargo. Upon positive detection, an alarm condition is transmitted to the United States and
an interception of the containership occurs while still at sea. This novel approach
employs the inherent advantages of standoff, sensitivity and stealth to more effectively
achieve its objective of detecting a concealed nuclear weapon before it can be detonated.
The most important advantage, standoff, offers the benefit of detection at sea before the
weapon is in range of a U.S. city and while an effective response is still possible.
The ship-based system is essentially a detector in a box. Containerized arrays of cesium
iodide (CsI) gamma detectors and boron tri-fluoride (BF3) neutron detectors are linked to
small data processing and transmitting devices. Continuous data is transmitted to a
central U.S. location for collection, assessment, and possible dissemination to responders
in the event of threat identification. If a positive detection is made, data transmission,
processing and reporting should take on the order of minutes and will allow for the
formulation of an appropriate preventative response.
The system is capable of detecting both weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Using
the 232U impurity daughter nuclide, 208TI, which emits an energetic 2615 keV gamma, in
combination with the 238U daughter 23 4 mPa 1001 keV gamma, the system will detect
uranium. For plutonium, the system will detect mostly neutrons from spontaneous fission,
but will also be equipped for identifying high-energy gammas (>3000 keV) from fission
products and secondary radiation via (n, y) reactions in the surrounding cargo. While
signal attenuation in dense material is high, long count times from voyages (often on the
order of two weeks) and random pathways of air allow the transmission of even weak
radiation signals through several cargo containers.
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Each containerized gamma detector is held in a three-dimensional spectroscopic imaging
array to maximize surface area and with corresponding coded apertures to reduce
background. A three-dimensional gamma imaging system has previously been applied to
high-resolution nuclear medicine and to passive imaging of radioactive sources at
distances of 100 meters [Chen, 1989]. The method is both scalable in size and predictable
in performance and is substantially more sensitive than conventional techniques. Using
an iterative reconstruction approach, a single detector can obtain three-dimensional
information without motion. The detectors are placed in such an array so that the system
can distinguish between a distributed natural background and a concentrated point source.
The use of a coded-aperture will reduce background, minimize false positives and
improve detectability.
Each detector array is hidden by itself in an empty 40 foot, dedicated container. The non-
descript nature of the containerized ship-based detection systems allows these units to
operate covertly. The stealth of the containerized units will discourage attempts by
adversaries to tamper with the system. Furthermore, the knowledge that a system is
operational combines with the inability of the enemy to locate the detectors to achieve a
degree of deterrence by denial.
One further benefit of the ship-based system is that it consists of commercial off the shelf
(COTS) technology. No major technological advancements are required to reduce the
system to practice. Components are made of commercially available gamma and neutron
detectors; electronics developed for similar purposes; a small computer for data
acquisition and processing; and transmission devices that have been available for
decades. Effectively, the new approach entails only a rearrangement of available
technology in a new way to address a burgeoning threat.
3.1 Advantages over Current Technology
As compared to currently envisioned and deployed technology-categorized port-based
systems-the ship-based approach boasts the advantages of standoff, sensitivity and
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stealth. Standoff allows for detection at sea, before the weapon ever becomes a threat to a
IJ.S. city. The ship-based system attains enormous gains in sensitivity due to both the
long count times during a two-week oceanic voyage and the nearly million-fold reduction
of natural background signal interference while at sea. Stealth is achieved by shipping
each detection unit inside a standard, non-descript container such that the adversary is not
aware of its exact location, thereby offering the advantage of covert deployment and self-
defense. The unique advantages of the ship-based system over current technology are
outlined in this section.
3.1.1 Standoff
Operating under the assumption that a terrorist group or rogue nation can either
weaponize fissile material or procure a functional nuclear weapon and reverse engineer
any inherent safety features, it is unreasonable to assume that they would not be able
achieve remote detonation capability. Terrorists have already demonstrated such a
capability, albeit on a smaller scale, in the pre-election Madrid train bombings [CBS/AP,
2004]. It is therefore likely that the terrorist, not taking a chance on detection at port, will
opt to remotely detonate the weapon while taxiing through urban areas and before port-
based detectors have a chance to operate. Furthermore, a terrorist group might send a
contingent of suicide bombers along with the weapon in hope of ensuring its delivery. Put
simply, once the weapon is in range of urban areas or other targets, the game is already
over. It is therefore necessary to make a positive detection away from U.S. shores, while
an effective response is still possible.
In order to further illustrate the inherent and crucial difference between a port-based
detection regime and a ship-based detection regime, the concept of perimeter defense is
employed. Depending on the yield of the smuggled nuclear device, a perimeter can be
defined such that detonation outside its boundaries would not produce any damage to a
U.S. city. The idea is, of course, that the perimeter must be defended. Placing detectors
far within the perimeter (e.g. port-based scanners) still allows the possibility of
catastrophic damage because the weapon could be brought just inside the perimeter and
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detonated without ever reaching port-based detectors. The city is left defenseless. With a
ship-based detector network, the weapon would never be allowed inside the perimeter
and the threat is therefore mitigated.
Another perhaps more instructive way to view the perimeter defense concept is through
the eyes of the terrorist. Given remote detonation capability, when assessing a target city
outfitted with port-based detectors, the terrorist sees no defense against perimeter breach.
Under the current port-based detector regime, the enemy is confident in success and is
therefore undeterred. When evaluating targets, a delivery method that offers no chance
for perimeter breach, such as one defended by the ship-based network of detectors, is
clearly not attractive and the adversary will likely move on to the next target. A ship-
based network of detectors covering all American cities likely removes the U.S.
homeland from the target list.
A visualization of perimeter breach is perhaps useful through example. Figure 3-1 depicts
the most common routes containerships take into the Port of New York/Port of New
Jersey, shown in blue [CPIP, 2003].
Figure 3-1: Containership taxiing passageways at Port of New York/New Jersey
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Containerships without detectors aboard can easily breach the perimeter as densely
populated centers such as Brooklyn, Lower Manhattan, Staten Island, Newark and Jersey
City are all in range of a potential nuclear blast. A rational adversary would not take the
chance of detection at port when the target is already in range and would detonate while
taxiing along the blue paths shown Figure 3-1. The advantage in standoff of a ship-based
system should be crystal clear at this point.
3.1.2 Sensitivity
One further improvement that the ship-based approach has over existing technology is its
sensitivity. Background from natural radioactive sources, such as thorium, can interfere
with the signal from the weapon. On land, the concentration of thorium is significant
enough that a noticeable background is seen; but due to the extremely low concentrations
of thorium in the ocean, background contributions from natural sources are virtually non-
existent [Ivanovich, 1982]. Background characterization is a major part of this thesis and
much more detail is given in Chapter 5. Lower background radiation from the
environment increases sensitivity because the signal can more easily be distinguished.
Thus, at sea, detection confidence is increased and the number of false positives is
decreased.
More importantly from a sensitivity perspective, Broderick has found that the average
voyage time for a U.S. bound containerships is around two weeks [Broderick, 2004]. A
long voyage time affords the ship-based detection system on the order of two weeks to
make a measurement instead of the approximately two minutes that common port-based
solutions allow. Given a longer time for measurement, a resolvable signal can be seen
through much more cargo. The extra time more than offsets the potential proximity to the
weapon of port-based scanners (this will be clear once results of the simulations are
presented in Chapter 7).
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3.1.3 Stealth
Each detector unit and all data processing and transmission equipment will be placed in a
non-descript container so that the adversary will not know the location of the detectors.
There are several advantages to this necessary part of the detector network; the most
important of which is a degree of both indirect and direct self-defense. Because the
enemy will not know the location of the detectors, he will have no way of opening the
container and tampering with the system. It is not difficult to imagine an indirect
tampering scenario where a well-financed terrorist organization would manipulate a
foreign port's human infrastructure such that detection units could be disabled either by
tampering or by purposely dropping the container. Even worse, the crane operator could
be paid to place the weapon on the ship in a location far away from detectors. This would
be especially easy to accomplish if a crane operator were also paid to place all
containerized detectors on one end of the ship and place the weapon at the other end. As
long as no one knows which containers hold detector systems, the terrorist will have no
chance to manipulate port workers.
A second advantage of covert operation is an increase in deterrence by denial because the
adversary does not know which ships are covered with detector units. A terrorist will
most likely look for the easiest mode of attack and if one avenue appears blocked, he will
look for other options. Again assuming the viewpoint of the adversary, considering the
resources likely tied up in the procurement of a nuclear weapon, it does not make sense to
risk a mode of attack where the chances of success are diminished because of a deployed
network of ship-based detectors. At this point it is useful to reiterate earlier statements
about the problem the ship-based system solves. The ship-based solution seeks to solve
the containerized nuclear terrorism problem, not the entire nuclear terrorism problem.
A third advantage of operating covertly is an inherent self-defense against direct
tampering. Following traditional military strategy, if the adversary has no knowledge of a
unit's location, he has no way to attack it. Similarly, if the terrorist has no knowledge of
the containerized detector's location on the ship (or in the loading area) then there is little
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hope of disabling it. Even though the containerized units will not be physically defended,
covert operation ensures a high level of confidence that they will not be disabled;
however, as a countermeasure just in case their location is discovered, the container
might also be secured with an alarm system that will signal a central U.S. location that
the container has been opened. This alarm condition might also be initiated if the unit
suddenly stops sending data.
3.2 Physical Description
Already conceptually outlined, some more detail on the physical components of the
system is provided in this section. For reference and to aid in visualization of component
arrangement, a data flow chart is provided in Figure 3-2.
40 foot container
Figure 3-2: Containerized unit component diagram
3.2.1 Commercial Off-the-Shelf Technology
As currently envisioned, a ship-based detection unit consists completely of commercial-
off-the-shelf technology (COTS). A reliance on COTS affords the advantage of rapid
development and implementation. Because there is no requirement for development of
new technology, it is likely that a prototype ship-based detection unit could be engineered
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and fabricated on the order of months. Furthermore, all elements of the containerized
detectors have been in extensive use in the past and are therefore robust. Some detail of
each component is given below.
3.2.2 Gamma Detectors
The currently envisioned type of gamma detector is a cesium iodide crystal activated with
thallium. CsI is preferred not only because of its relatively high efficiency, but most
importantly, its resistance to thermal and mechanical shock [Knoll(l), 2000]. Relatively
high cost is the downside to CsI, which is more expensive than commonly used sodium
iodide. These cost/benefit analyses are beyond the scope of this thesis, but should be
carried out by the ultimate vendor per government budgetary constraints. It is important
to delineate the reason for an initial preference of CsI crystals, especially over the much
more common and cheaper sodium iodide crystals.
Sodium iodide is the standard crystal for gamma detection where cooling is not possible,
but NaI is not the most attractive option because of its susceptibility to both mechanical
and thermal shock [Knoll(l), 2000]. It is common knowledge that while loading a ship,
crane operators tend to drop containers from time to time. The mechanical shock of such
an event could cause the NaI crystal to crack. Additionally, the possibility of large
temperature swings might cause some degree of thermal shock. NaI manufacturers
indicate that a common crystal will not withstand a change of more than 15 degrees
Fahrenheit per hour [Bicron, 1992]. As an illustration to provide intuition of common
temperature swings, a survey of hourly temperature data in the United States shows that
temperature gradients of this magnitude actually occur around 2.5 times per year [NWS,
2003].
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Table 3-1: Hourly temperature change example
Station Call Year Change >1OF Change >15F
IND 1996 7 0
EYE 1996 7 3
IND 1997 6 0
EYE 1997 10 2
IND 1998 12 4
EYE 1998 14 6
Average 9.33 2.5
The above data is not meant to be conclusive, but rather suggestive. It shows that
temperature changes of 15 degrees per hour are at least possible. As part of the
cost/benefit analysis, the government might elect to insulate the cheaper sodium iodide
detectors with a material of low density such as Styrofoam. Additionally, placing the
crystal array on springs might alleviate some degree of mechanical shock.
It should be noted that due to the high cost of CsI detectors, it is possible that the final
product will consist of some other crystal, liquid or plastic scintillator. Given the large
volume of a standard 40-ft. container, there is plenty of room for large tanks of liquid
scintillator or large enough blocks of plastic scintillator to ensure a high efficiency of
2615 keV gamma capture. Gas filled detectors, such as high-pressure xenon tanks, are not
considered because of degraded energy resolution due to acoustic effects and because of
their extremely high cost [Lasche].
It is also fairly straightforward to eliminate germanium from consideration. Despite a
large increase in energy resolution over CsI, the detector requires cooling, which is not
feasible in the remote containerized setting. There are also several scintillators that can be
eliminated because of high cost and low availability. Lutetium orthosilicate (LSO) and
yttrium aluminum phosphate (YAP) fall into the high cost/low availability category,
while also having lower resolution than NaI [Knoll(1), 1997]. Finally, if cadmium
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Hourly Temperature Change for stations in
Indiana for 1996-1998
zirconium telluride (CZT) could be engineered to eliminate high energy peak "tailing",
the semiconductor may prove an interesting option that should be considered in the
cost/benefit analysis, but the extremely low availability of the material with large enough
surface area will likely prove prohibitive.
3.2.3 Neutron Detectors
As with gamma detector selection, the choice of neutron detector will depend on a
cost/benefit analysis carried out at the engineering and commercialization stage. The
recommended choice of neutron detector is either a standard 3He or BF3 tube
commercially available through many vendors. 3He would be chosen because of its high
detection efficiency [Knoll(2), 2000], however, the rare gas is more expensive; whereas
BF3 might be chosen as a slight downgrade in efficiency but at a much cheaper price. A
3He detector at 4 atm with a diameter of 2.5 cm has a thermal neutron detection
efficiency of around 79%, while a BF3 detector with around twice the diameter at just
under half the pressure has an efficiency of 46% [Crane]. It is not necessary to choose a
neutron detector with an attached moderator because neutrons will be well thermalized by
the time they traverse the weapon (especially the high-explosives) and intermittent cargo.
The low energy neutron spectrum reaching the detector also eliminates the possibility of
using proton recoil detectors, which are more suitable for a high energy spectrum
[Knoll(2) 2000]. The commonly stated disadvantage of 3He neutron detectors is their
poor energy resolution and subsequent inability to produce a spectrum. For this
application, there is no need to obtain a neutron spectrum for energy discrimination so the
disadvantage does not present a problem.
Stand-alone plastic and liquid scintillators are not considered for neutron detection
because of their general efficiency bias towards high-energy neutrons. However, the
possibility of using plastic scintillators as substitutions for CsI in an array to detect both
neutrons and gammas has not been overlooked. Pulse-shaping techniques developed in
the last decade have increased the possibility of employing this type of dual-use detector;
however, plastic scintillators are still less efficient for thermal neutrons than 3He tubes
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and it is not necessary to image neutrons. Furthermore, the increased gamma background
in a plastic scintillator from neutron interactions would decrease detection confidence in
the 2615 keV gamma signal. It has therefore been determined that a separation of neutron
and gamma detectors is advantageous.
3.2.4 Array Configuration
The array of scintillator crystals should maximize surface area in all three dimensions. It
is not sufficient to build the common planar imaging scanners seen at ports or border
crossings. The weapon could be in any direction relative to the detector and a planar array
only "looks" in one dimension efficiently. Three arrangements of detectors are given in
this section, but the ultimate configuration will again depend on the cost/benefit analysis
made by the government and vendor. The first, and perhaps most efficient configuration
would be a sphere of outward pointing detectors. However, another constraint is the
desirability of a coded aperture mask, which has been developed only for flat surface
reconstruction and it is not clear that the same technology would be applicable to a
spherical surface. In the interest of maintaining a complete system of COTS components,
the spherical arrangement is not given further consideration. Another possible
arrangement is to configure the detectors in a cube, with a coded-aperture in front of each
face. While probably the most practical, the cube of detectors might not prove to be the
most efficient design. A more efficient design might be to arrange the detectors in a half-
pyramid such as seen in the sculpture at the National Mall in Washington D.C., shown in
Figure 3-3.
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Figure 3-3: Example of a half-pyramid array configuration (photo taken July, 2004
at the National Mall, Washington D.C.)
The staggered nature of the pyramid would provide a maximum exposure of detector
surface area, thus minimizing the number of detectors needed for the entire three-
dimensional array. Only two of a typical pyramid's four triangular faces would be
necessary as radiation could enter from the backside of each detector essentially
unimpeded. The drawback of the half-pyramid is that some images would be triangular,
but this will not affect detection confidence. Coded apertures would still surround the
pyramid, but fewer detectors would be required. The distance between the flat face of the
aperture and indented portions of the half-pyramid should not adversely affect the
reconstruction process; however, a more detailed analysis of this effect will be necessary
if the half-pyramid is chosen.
3.2.5 Coded-Aperture
Each face of the 3-D detector array will be outfitted with a coded aperture. The use of
these coded apertures significantly reduces background through an image reconstruction
process. On a basic level, the coded-aperture is essentially a partially opened mask that
allows some photons through, while blocking others. The pattern of photons that are
allowed to pass can be used through detailed reconstruction algorithms to reduce
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background, thus enhancing point-like or relatively point-like images. Coded-aperture
technology has been available for years and has been successfully applied to a wide
variety of applications including medical imaging; but most importantly it has been
applied specifically to searches for fissile material [Ziock, 2004].
More detail on the advantage of the coded aperture is necessary, but the value of imaging
to reduce background is not completely appreciated until a background is fully
characterized in Chapter 5. To better illustrate the coded-aperture process, a concept
diagram has been reproduced in Figure 3-3 below from other work at MIT [Accorsi,
2001].
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Figure 3-4: Coded aperture schematic diagram
Essentially, the source projects only one shadow on the detector array, while the
distributed background projects many shadows on the array. The reconstruction process
takes into account different projections and significantly reduces background, leaving
mostly the source in the image. In this way, background from the ocean, ship and cargo
can be reduced to increase confidence in detectability and limit false positives.
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3.2.6 Electronics and Data Processing
Electronics for similar applications have been developed and are readily available [Ziock,
2004]. Problems with signal processing from multiple detectors are not underestimated,
but have been solved in the past for imagers intended to search for fissile material. One
problem that can be particularly difficult when dealing with a large array of many
detectors is spectral and electronic drift. For this reason, periodically, the detector units
will require some maintenance and calibration, which can be performed upon each arrival
in the United States (see section 8.3 for more on deployment). It is not clear how often
this maintenance will occur without having shipped these detectors across the ocean
several times.
The computational power necessary for data processing in a ship-based system is not
prohibitive. Each containerized unit will likely need less processing power than a normal
personal computer. The computer will essentially take data from a multi-channel analyzer
and process the information. Data processing will include not only normal background
reduction algorithms, but also reconstruction of the coded aperture image. It will be
directly linked to the transmission device.
3.2.7 Transmitter
A transmitter will be included with each detector unit to send data back to a centralized
U.S. location for analysis and possible dissemination to responders. Transmission could
occur through direct broadcast to the United States or more likely would arrive via
satellite link. One option identified that would minimize the number of signals bounced
off satellites is to design containerized detectors with the ability talk to each other and
have at least one master unit on each ship that would broadcast the signal to the satellite.
This would, however, complicate the deployment of the system because the master units
would have to be distinguished and assurance made that each ship has at least one master
unit. A master unit would also introduce a single-point failure mode that could severely
weaken the entire system and is therefore not recommended.
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Secure and clandestine transmission of data is desired so as not to give away the
detector's location. The study of these techniques is outside the scope of this work, but
will have to be implemented by knowledgeable officials. It suffices to state that this type
of technology has been around for decades and should not be difficult to use for this
application.
Concern has been raised that the containership's external communication systems would
interfere with the electronics of the detector array. However, radiation detection
measurements made by Kernan for this explicit purpose aboard the USNS Regulus with
the radar and other communications systems in operation indicated no interference
[Kernan, 2003].
3.2.8 Power
Power requirements for each detector unit will not be challenging. It has been estimated
that the total power required for the detectors and electronics is on the order of 100-200
Watts. Data processing should not significantly exceed the power requirement for the
electronics. There exists a great degree of variance in power requirements necessary for
signal transmission depending on the type of transmitter employed. There are several
options for power generation but the preferred method would be to use fuel cells, which
are commercially available and relatively inexpensive. Fuel cells offer advantages over
conventional generators in that they are exhaust free and relatively quiet. A containerized
unit operating with a mechanical generator would emit exhaust that could be detected by
the adversary. Similarly, the noise associated with conventional generators would signal
the location of detector units.
3.2.9 Dissemination and Response
The final component of the ship-based network is the human element, which concerns
procedure if an alarm condition is signaled. Little attention has been given to this portion
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of the system because it has been deemed too early to delineate procedures for responders
and it is not within the scope of this thesis to analyze response scenarios. The likely
course of action in case of a positive detection would be to blockade the suspected ship
and board for further inspection. One important point to note is that once the data has
been processed and sent to a central location, some contingent of permanent staff should
be on hand to make rational decisions about positive detections and make appropriate
recommendations about the nature of the threat. For instance, if close enough to a
detector, the image may show, geometrically, whether there is an assembled weapon or a
fissile material smuggling attempt. Also, spectral analysis could show if the signal
received indicates a large activity of some material for a dirty bomb. Some human
element should be involved in the decision making process once the image has been
received so that a more effective response can be implemented.
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Chapter 4: Unique Radiation Signatures from Fissile Material
Nature has shaped nuclear structure such that its most powerful and destructive isotopes
are not easy to detect. Finding fissile material is a difficult task not only because most
gamma radiation from weapon materials is emitted at low energies and is therefore easily
shielded and but also because neutron emission from highly fissile isotopes, 235U and
239pu, is almost non-existent. Nature's apparent opaqueness is not without weakness;
ironically, it is the methodology necessary to create materials of mass destruction that
introduces a detectable signature. The enrichment process preferentially increases the
concentration of the impurity 232U in reprocessed weapons grade uranium and the
creation of plutonium in a reactor produces significant quantities of 24 0Pu, both of which
are not found in nature, but are highly detectable.
The measured radiation signature of a nuclear weapon greatly depends on its design and
the quality of material used. A gun-type weapon is in a fundamentally different geometry
than an implosion-type weapon and will have different self-shielding signal attenuation
[Fetter(1) 1992]. Also, depending on the size and specific design, self-shielding due to
the tamper and high explosives may vary. The scope of this work has been strictly
constrained firom suggesting any detail of design geometry; however, some weapon
model had to be adopted to ensure the accuracy of radiation transport simulations. More
germane to this work is the type and quality of the fissile material used in the weapon and
the radiation produced. Primary radiation and secondary interactions with both the
material surrounding the fissile isotopes and the cargo are also considered in detail.
Before proceeding with spectroscopic analysis, it is important to outline the setting for
self-attenuation by defining the weapon geometry.
4.1 Weapon Geometry Model
It is not the intention of this work to research possible configurations of fissile material
and the constituent parts of a nuclear weapon. However, it is necessary to find a balance
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between detail and reality when assuming a model. Early nuclear weapon designs have
been declassified by the U.S. government and are easily obtained with a brief literature
search [DOE, 2001]. These declassified designs will serve as an upper-bound constraint
to the level of detail assumed in this study. As such, the weapon model adopted for the
analysis of radiation signatures and as input for computer simulations is exactly the same
as assumed by Fetter, et al. in "Detection of Nuclear Weapons", a pioneering work in this
field [Fetter(1), 1992]. A diagram of Fetter's model, which is intentionally described here
to exact specifications to minimize ambiguity, is deliberately copied into the simulation
without modification and shown in Figure 4-1. The model might prove to have some
degree of accuracy as it might also be asserted, though in no way assumed, that a terrorist
weapon might follow open literature design to an extent.
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Figure 4-1: Weapon Model
4.2 Fissile Material Model
The exact amount of fissile material necessary to ensure a run-away chain reaction before
subcritical separation is not openly accessible and depends in detail on the design of the
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high explosives and tamper as well as the yield desired. In keeping with the Fetter model
described above, the amounts of uranium and plutonium assumed for the analysis and
simulation are shown in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1: Weapon geometry and materials used in simulation
12 kg Uranium Model 4 k Plutonium Model
Density Density
Material Radius (cm) (gm/cm 3 ) Mass (kg) Material Radius (cm) (gm/cm 3) Mass (kg)
Air 5.75 0.001 0.0 Air 5.75 0.001 0.0
Uranium 7 19.05 12.2 Plutonium 6.27 16.9 4.0
Aluminum 7.1 2.7 0.2 Aluminum 6.37 2.7 0.1
Beryllium 9 1.848 2.9 Beryllium 9 1.848 3.6
Depleted uranium 12 19.05 79.7 Depleted uranium 12 19.05 79.7
High explosives 22 1.9 71.0 High explosives 22 1.9 71.0
Aluminum 23 2.7 17.2 Aluminum 23 2.7 17.2
50 kg Uranium Model 12 kg Plutonium Model
Density Density
Material Radius (cm) (gm/cm3) Mass kg) Material Radius (cm) (gm/cm 3) Mass (kg)
Air 5.75 0.001 0.0 Air 5.75 0.001 0.0
Uranium 9.34 19.05 49.8 Plutonium 7.11 16.9 12.0
Aluminum 9.44 2.7 0.3 Aluminum 7.21 2.7 0.2
Beryllium 11.44 1.848 5.1 Beryllium 9 1.848 2.7
Depleted uranium 14.44 19.05 120.8 Depleted uranium 12 19.05 79.7
High explosives 24.44 1.9 92.2 High explosives 22 1.9 71.0
Aluminum 25.44 2.7 21.1 Aluminum 23 2.7 17.2
The isotopic composition of the fissile material is shown in Table 4-2. Depleted uranium
is assumed to originate from enrichment tails, but to have no concentration of 232U since
there is no guarantee that a uranium tamper will be used. All other materials are modeled
consistent with their natural isotopic concentrations.
Table 4-2: Isotopic composition of fissile material
Isotopic Composition of Fissile Material
Uranium Isotope Weight Percent
235U 90.5
238u 8.5
2 3 4 U 1.0
. ___ _ __ 232u 1 00 ppt
Plutonium Isotope Weight Percent
239Pu 93.5
240pu 6.0
241 PU 0.4
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4.3 Detecting Uranium
4.3.1 Gamma Detection
One of the key variables that will ultimately describe the range at which a positive
detection can be made is the isotopic composition of uranium in the weapon. It is
generally accepted that weapons grade uranium (WgU) consists of 90% 235 U, just under
10% 238U, and around 1% 234U [Fetter(l), 1992]. There is no way to accurately predict
the enrichment of uranium that a terrorist might use so a chart of enrichment vs. critical
mass is provided in Figure 4-2 for reference, but it should be recognized that this curve is
somewhat of an upper bound for the amount of material needed as implosion will
increase the uranium density and decrease the critical mass [Bunn, 2004].
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Figure 4-2: Critical mass of uranium versus enrichment of 235U
It is not the enrichment of 235 U that provides the most important radiation for detection.
Rather, it is the impurity 232U-on the order of hundreds of parts per trillion in WgU-
that provides the most active and energetic decay chain. Therefore, the concentration of
232U is actually more important than the mass of uranium from an activity standpoint.
However, WgU mass will prove important from a self-shielding perspective.
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232 U decays through a long series of isotopes to 208T1, which emits a 2615 keV gamma.
This high-energy gamma is extremely penetrating and can be detected through several
containers of cargo. It is because of the energy and relative high intensity of this 208T
gamma that the thrust of the analysis going forward will focus on the concentration of
232U. Experimental results indicate that the 232U line is seen in spectral measurements of
assembled warheads. In 1990, Fetter, et al. were allowed to make measurements of Soviet
Cruise Missiles and found a high activity of 2 32U [Fetter(2) 1990]. It remains to quantify
the expected concentration of 232U, but first a survey of other possible gamma signatures
is provided.
4.2.2 Weapons Grade Uranium Spectrum
To provide more detail of the expected radiation signature, a measured high-resolution
spectrum of 2.2 kg of WgU with 100 ppt 232U is shown in Figure 4-3, from Gosnell at
LLNL [Gosnell(l1), 2000; Gosnell(2), 2000]. The 2615 keV line from 232U is evident and
is clearly the most attractive signature due to its high-energy and intensity. Other
energetic gammas are also visible, including several 212 Bi lines between 1500 and 2000
keV, all of which will transport significantly through several containers of cargo, but are
still not as intense at the 208Ti line. Gamma intensities of each isotope in the 232U decay
chain are provided in Appendix D. While many identifiable gammas exist in the
spectrum, the tendency to concentrate only on the 208Tl line should not be curbed; it is
difficult to imagine creating a more identifiable spectrum from a long-distance
measurement standpoint.
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Figure 4-3: Highly enriched uranium spectrum
Away from the 232U decay chain, the most interesting line comes from the 1001 keV
gamma from the daughter product 234mPa. Highly penetrating and a significant indicator
of 2 38 U, close attention to this gamma is necessary because there is no guarantee that 232 U
will be present (see section 4.3.5). Finally a brief look at the gamma spectrum of 235U
shows that there is nothing of high enough energy to garner interest and a more detailed
study supports this conclusion.
4.3.3 232U Concentration in Weapons Grade Uranium
Clearly, the concentration of 232U in fissile material is of great importance to the overall
result of this study. 232U does not occur in nature and is created only during irradiation in
a reactor. Most of the 232U concentration in WgU will have come from the enrichment of
reprocessed uranium and will have been created through the following reactions
[Perrung, 1998]:
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(1) 3 704 Mv >231 Th rs> >231 Pa r) >232 Pa 232 
704 Mv 25.5h 3 4
(2 234 U >230 Th (n) >23 231 Pa (ny) >232 Pa >232 U(2) 3 46ki, > U > U 2Pa
(3) 235 U (n7y) > 236 U (ny) > 237 U f- > 237 Np n >
236m N! 4 >236 - 232
"P22.5h > Pa 2 9 > U
(4) 2 3 8 U (n,2') >237 U 6, >237 Np (2,) >236m Np A >236 PU >232 U6.d22.--'hP 2 .9 U
The United States used reprocessed uranium in its gaseous diffusion program in the
1960s and therefore much of U.S. oralloy is contaminated with 232U [Gosnell(2), 2000;
Rhodes, 1986]. While there is no evidence to substantiate the claim, it might be suggested
that other countries would have undertaken similar methods to enrich their own fissile
material. This might be especially true considering the economic advantage in separative
work units (SWU) of using reprocessed uranium as opposed to natural uranium. It is
important to stress that 232U will not be present in significant quantities, if at all, for
fissile material enriched from natural uranium feed (see section 4.3.5).
One final comment that deserves attention is the fact that a simple isotopic measurement
of spent fuel is not a good approximation for the concentration of 232 U in weapons
material. The enrichment process, almost by definition, takes advantage of the mass
difference between 235U and 23gU. The same physical process that allows for streams of
lighter 235U to be enriched relative to 238U should also preferentially enrich 232U relative
to 235U (and 238U). The exact enrichment calculation is, of course, beyond the scope of
this thesis. Instead, a 232U concentration distribution for US oralloy is shown in Figure 4-
4 [Gosnell(1), 2000].
49
25
20
015
Ce-
.10O
Q.
E
() 5
A
Min. = 20
Max. = 17,900
Mean = 645
Median = 240
Mode = 110
, 11,l 1, II II I I IsI I El I ,,,I,,,, §-
0 1000 2000 3000
Oy ppt U-232
Figure 4-4: 232 U parts per trillion in U.S. oralloy
The fissile material model chosen for this study consisted of a baseline concentration of
100 parts per trillion 232U. As can be seen from the above chart, this is a rather
conservative estimate, at least for U.S. WgU. Simulation results presented in Chapter 7
will therefore be quoted at 100 parts per trillion; but can be scaled to good approximation
if a non-linear term is included to account for self-attenuation.
4.3.4 Neutrons from Uranium
Neutron signatures from uranium are of little use. The spontaneous fission half-life of
235U is 1.8 x 10 s years, or 1.2 x 10-26 per second, which is less than one neutron per
second for the given model. The spontaneous fission half-life of 238U is 1.01 x 1016 years,
or 2.17 x 10 -24 per second, which produces only a few neutrons per second. Also,
accounting for (a ,n) reactions in the material does not significantly increase the total
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number of neutrons emitted from WgU [Fetter(1) 1992]. It is safe to assume, even given
the long count times at sea, that passive detection of WgU with neutrons is not effective.
4.3.5 Virgin Uranium
One concern commonly expressed in the weapons detection field is that virgin uranium
would be used as feed to enrich fissile material for use in the nuclear device. The problem
is that 232U does not occur in nature and if natural uranium were used as feed material for
enrichment, there would be no 232U present in the weapon. For all conceivable scenarios,
it is safe to assume that 232U is only present in uranium that has been irradiated in a
reactor. The question as to what type of uranium would be used as feed material is left
open but it can at least be stated that there are significant gains in efficiency by using
previously enriched uranium, such as that from a reactor, for the feed material.
Furthermore, despite a likely superior budget, the United States clearly used reprocessed
uranium as feed material for its enrichment process as evidenced by Figure 4-4. Perhaps
more importantly, at least some Russian weapons material was enriched using
reprocessed uranium. Measurements made by Fetter of a Soviet warhead, shown in
Figure 4-5, reveal a large peak at 2615 keV and indicate the presence of 232U in Russian
assembled weapons [Fetter(l), 1990; Belyaev, 1990]. Given the poor security of fissile
material in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, there is at least a chance that uranium
obtained by a terrorist group would have the 2 32 U impurity.
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4.4 Detecting Plutonium
4.4.1 Neutron Detection
Converse to the method of looking for uranium, the gamma radiation signature of
plutonium is not strong. Plutonium does not, by itself or any of its daughters, give off any
high-energy, high intensity gammas. The 239Pu chain is almost exactly that of 235U, which
as seen above, is not of use. Of note, however, is the 24Am daughter of 241pu, which
emits a 662 keV gamma with relatively high intensity. This line will be indistinguishable
from the 137C line possibly found in benign medical isotopes within normal cargo so that
by itself, the 662 keV line is not enough to assume a positive detection of weapons grade
plutonium (WgPu).
Fortunately, plutonium can be detected by directly looking for neutrons or by inferring
their presence from unique secondary reactions. Neutron interactions including radiative
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capture and inelastic scatter will produce high-energy gammas that can be detected
IMorgado, 2003]. There are virtually no sources of neutrons in common cargo and the
background is therefore expected to be fairly constant and uniform. A very brief
description (constrained not to include neutron interaction physics, which is easily found
elsewhere [Lamnarsh, 1966]) of neutron origins and subsequent interactions is given in the
sections below.
4.4.1 Neutron Sources
WgPu is most likely to be detected using neutrons. The signal from spontaneous fission
neutrons in WgPu is orders of magnitude stronger than that of uranium. The strength of
the signal is highly dependent on the amount of 238Pu and 24 0Pu in the fissile material.
The spontaneous fission half-life of 2 3 8 Pu is 5.0 x 1010 years and of 2 4 0 Pu is 1.2 x 10
years, giving 4.39 x 10-19 and 1.83 x 10-19 per second per atom, respectively. 239Pu
spontaneous fission neutron intensity is of the same order as 23 8U and therefore
insignificant. When combined in the assumed weight percentages for the weapon model
and accounting for (a, n) reactions, 56,000 neutrons per kilogram per second are
produced [Fetter(l), 1992]. As will be discussed in section 7.7.4.3.2, significant
multiplication, where spontaneous fission and (a ,n) neutrons cause normal fission, can
occur for larger quantities of plutonium. For 4 kilograms, the number of neutrons leaving
the core surface per kilogram per second turns out to be around 110,000, which offers a
huge advantage over the natural background.
4.4.2 Neutron Interactions within the Weapon
Direct measurement of neutrons is not the only way to detect the presence of plutonium.
Secondary (n, y) interactions with materials surrounding the weapon such as the tamper
and explosive lenses as well as interactions with alloy stabilizing elements in the core
cause a small, but high-energy flux of gammas [Morgado, 2003; Luke]. Moreover, a
large percentage of the neutrons that do escape the weapon assembly will eventually
interact with surrounding cargo.
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An initial flux of around 110,000 neutrons per kilogram of WgPu per second can be
expected from spontaneous fission and (a, n) reactions as well as multiplication within
the weapon [Fetter(1) 1992]. These neutrons can interact with other materials both
surrounding and inside the core causing radiative capture. Materials within the heavy
metal tamper such as depleted uranium or tungsten do not give off high energy gammas;
however, capture in hydrogen and nitrogen in the high explosive lenses will produce
highly penetrating gammas. Alloyed materials, such as gallium, which were used to
improve the properties of plutonium at Los Alamos in the 1940's, also offer high energy
capture gammas [Hammel, 1998]. Gallium can be present on the order of 3% of the total
core mass and "'Ga emits a 2201 keV gamma when it captures a neutron [Hammel,
1998].
It is also possible to detect the presence of plutonium by looking for high-energy gammas
emitted from spontaneous fission fragment decay. Slaughter, et al. at LLNL have
performed a comprehensive study of this effect in terms of an active interrogation and
have found that a significant number of gammas greater than 3 MeV are emitted from
these fission fragments [Slaughter, 2003].
Neutrons may also undergo inelastic (n, n' y) collisions while still slowing down in the
weapon (and possibly in the cargo), which can produce high-energy gammas. While a
considerably lower flux is expected without active interrogation, the number of gammas
greater than 3 MeV from fission fragment decay will not be negligible, especially when
contrasted with the essentially zero background at these energies.
4.4.3 Neutron Interactions within the Cargo
Neutrons that escape the weapon will interact with the surrounding cargo. Cargo could
have almost any isotopic composition, but much of it is organic. This will allow for
further interaction with hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen, producing more high-energy
gammas. If the weapon happens to be situated in the center of the containership, the
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cargo will likely capture a significant portion of the neutron flux. Even if situated near the
edge, high percentages of the total neutron flux will be captured before leaving the ship.
The neutron flux will be well thermalized by the time it leaves the weapon, but there still
exists the possibility of (n, n' y) interactions in the cargo. A flux of gammas from 2-11
MeV significantly higher than background, would signal the presence of a large neutron
flux and therefore fissile material.
Thus, it is important to quantify the flux of high-energy gammas from plutonium in a
natural setting. Fortunately, this work has been carried out within the specific context of
fissile material detection. Morgado, et al. made measurements with a 4.5 kg Pu "BRP
ball" surrounded by 2 inches of moderator/absorber [Morgado, 2003]. The results of their
measurement showed the existence of high-energy gammas from secondary neutron
reactions with count rates at meter of 100 per second from 1-2 MeV, 50 per second
between 2-3 MeV, 30 per second from 3-6 MeV and 10 per second at 6+ MeV. Any
measurement significantly above the background of gammas greater than 3 MeV would
be cause for alarm.
Some mention of the possibility of trace amounts of 232U in plutonium is necessary.
Small amounts of 23 6 Pu, which decays with a 2.9-year half-life to 232U, could be present
in plutonium [Gosnell(2), 2000]. Also, the possibility exists that some small fraction of
23 2U from spent fuel could still end up in WgPu after reprocessing. This possibility is
identified only for completeness and will not be considered in any subsequent analysis.
It is also possible that a large flux of neutrons from a cosmic event such as a solar flare
would cause a benign increase in high-energy gammas, but this would be an impulse
event and could easily be distinguished from the constant flux of high energy gammas
from spontaneous fission neutron capture. Moreover, a solar event would be
simultaneously detected by other deployed units and various scientific endeavors
throughout the world.
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4.5 Detecting Fissile Material
In summary, the detection of fissile material depends on high-energy gammas and
neutrons. 232U impurities in reprocessed uranium provide an intense source of radiation
that could indicate the presence of reprocessed WgU and the 1001 keV line from 238U
could indicate the presence of virgin WgU. Any significant neutron flux above
background is cause for alarm and could indicate that plutonium is on board. High-energy
gammas, greater than 3 MeV, also indicate the presence of plutonium. The next important
step is to quantify the expected high-energy gamma and neutron background aboard a
containership at sea.
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Chapter 5: Background Radiation
The expected background radiation in a detector's field of view is one of the major
constraints governing confident detection of any radioactive material. Given the nature of
a potential interdiction of a containership at sea, extremely high confidence in positive
detection is required. That is, a minimization of false positives is crucial to the practical
operation of the ship-based network of detectors. It is not within the scope of this thesis
to suggest possible interdiction methodologies; however, it can be assumed that if a
positive detection were made, the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard would immediately stop the
containership at sea and board for further inspection. False alarms causing significant
disruption of commerce due to such interdictions are not acceptable; therefore, a
minimization of false positives is necessary. It follows that a strong effort should be made
to characterize the expected background radiation from the natural environment, from the
containership and from the cargo.
The following sections will discuss a first attempt at the characterization of neutron and
gamma backgrounds expected on a containership at sea. As yet, there appear to be no
measurements of background radiation aboard a fully loaded containership; therefore the
following assessment is constrained to theoretical calculation, in which inferences about
likely background are made from known isotope activities in similar circumstances.
Without actual measurement, the efficacy of the background estimate depends squarely
on the transferability of radiation patterns in materials of known loading frequencies and
measurements made on other ships. The limitations of theoretical background
assessments should be specifically noted and the material presented here should therefore
be taken only as an estimate. For this reason, reliance on measurement, where available
and applicable, has been preferred over calculation.
It is worth noting that once the ship-based system is deployed, a database of typical
backgrounds aboard containerships will be built by default [Lanza, 2005]. Most
measurements will be benign, thereby at minimum producing a good characterization of
57
the background. These background spectra could be fed back into a central database for
constant cross-reference and used in background subtraction algorithms. The longer the
system is deployed, the more valuable the database will become.
5.1 General Background
Natural background from both cosmic and terrestrial sources is well documented and
thoroughly measured. This thesis will not discuss the details of natural background unless
directly applicable to detection aboard a containership; however, some mention of what
the entire background spectrum might look like aboard a containership is made. To be
clear, the only background of interest is what interferes with fissile material
measurement. Gamma background lines of concern are only those around important
energies such as 2615 keV and 1001 keV. Conversely, due to their continuous energy
spectrum, neutrons of all energies will have to be considered.
2 3 2U does not occur in nature and therefore poses no threat of interference; however, the
natural decay chain of thorium poses a problem because its daughter products match
those in a weapon as shown in Table 5-1. While natural uranium is responsible for the
1001 keV line and occurs in both the environment and weapon, its intensity is so low that
the line is not usually seen in terrestrial measurements. Natural thorium emits a 2615 keV
gamma, which interferes with weapon gammas from 232U. While 232U and 232Th have
different parent nuclides, their daughters past 228Th are identical as seen in Table 5-1. The
difference at the top of these two decay chains will prove useful and is explained in detail
below in section 5.3.4.2 and Appendix A. After an extensive search, including hundreds
of possible medical and industrial isotopes, it is safe to conclude that no other naturally
occurring isotopes or expected cargo materials, beyond thorium and uranium, directly
interfere with the 2615 keV and 1001 keV lines.
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Table 5-1: Decay series comparison
Thorium Series 236Pu/232U Seriesh-232 (a)
Ra-228 ( ) Pu-236 (a )
Ac-228 (/ ) U-232 (a)
Th-228 (/3 ) Th-228 (- )
Ra-224 ( a) Ra-224 (a )
Rn-220 ( ) Rn-220 (a)
Po-216 (a) Po-216 (a)
Pb-212 (/3) Pb-212 (/3)
Bi-212 (i 0.6496) Bi-212 ( 0.6496)
(a 0.3504) (a 0.3504)
Po-212 () Po-212 ()
TJ-208 ( ) Tl-208 ( - )
Pb-208 (stable) Pb-208 (stable)
Some mention of the types of radioactive materials potentially in cargo is necessary.
While not the focus of the ship-based system, the system will likely detect dirty bomb
materials and some of the radioactive cargo might interfere with that signal. It is also
necessary to look at these medical and industrial isotopes as a check to be sure that no
other interfering gammas are present. As a reference for customs personnel, the IAEA
provides the list in Table 5-2 of radioactive isotopes commonly shipped for medical and
industrial purposes [IAEA, 2002].
The gamma energies of these isotopes show no interference and are given for reference in
Appendix B. While spontaneous fission yields of 238Pu and 252Cf could potentially
interfere with measurement, they are rarely transported via containership and in most
circumstances do not occur in large quantities. Moreover any shipment of these neutron-
producing isotopes would be on the shipping manifesto. Other common background
isotopes that might have been included by the IAEA report are 40K (1460 keV), which is
common in concrete, fruits and kitty litter, 87Rb (no gammas) and 134Cs (604 keV). None
of the isotopes in Table 5-2 interfere with important gammas from the weapon.
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Table 5-2: Common medical and industrial radionuclides
Most Common Medical and Industrial Radionuclides
Sodium-22 Yttrium-90 Barium-133
Phosphorus-32 Technetium-99 Cesium- 137
Calcium-47 Technetium-99m Promethium- 147
Cobalt-58 Ruthenium- 106 Iridium- 192
Cobalt-60 Palladium- 103 Mercury- 197
Gallium-67 Indium- 111 Thallium-201
Selenium-75 Iodine- 123 Radon-222
Krypton-81 m Iodine- 125 Radium-226
Yttrium-88 Iodine- 129 Plutonium-238
Strontium-89 Iodine- 131 Californium-252
Strontium-90 Xenon- 133
There are many possibilities requiring attention when characterizing the expected
background, especially considering the wide range of potential cargo materials. Having
briefly mentioned benign background, a thorough discussion of potentially interfering
background follows, which will lead to a quantification of expected neutron and gamma
background rates.
5.2 Neutron Background
Fortunately, the neutron background on sea-going vessels has been measured by several
groups and is already well characterized. There are limitations to this data, as they apply
to containerships full of cargo; however, the limitations will be minimal due to the
extreme rarity of naturally occurring neutron sources in cargo. For this initial assessment
of neutron fluxes, published measurements will be taken as a very good approximation.
5.2.1 Neutron Sources
Neutrons from terrestrial sources are almost non-existent. The vast majority of neutron
background comes from cosmic events in the atmosphere. Cosmic ray muon interactions
in the upper atmosphere cause a cascade of particles, a percentage of which are neutrons
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[Kudryavstev, 1999]. Cosmic neutrons can be detected directly or can interact with other
nuclei in spallation events. Due to spallation, an increase in the neutron population near
dense, high atomic number objects is commonly seen and several groups have measured
this phenomenon.
The background neutron flux from natural sources will increase at the detector due to the
"ship-effect". The effect was studied and described in detail by O'Brien, et al. who report
up to twelve times the natural flux due to spallation from cosmic neutrons interacting
with the heavy metals composing the hull of the ship [O'Brien, 1978]. Due to interest in
the increased flux around high atomic number materials, the ship-effect has been studied
extensively. A detailed survey of ship-effect literature has produced a fairly
comprehensive measurement of neutron populations on sea-going vessels. Most of these
measurements were made on U.S. Navy ships and can be considered good
approximations as to what might be seen on a containership. The extrapolation of an
increased flux due to the addition of spallation events with iron, steel and aluminum in
the cargo is not significant since the vast majority of cargo materials do not have a high
enough mass number to allow more than a negligible addition of events; however, to stay
conservative, some accounting for spallation in the cargo is assumed.
The complete and detailed study of neutron fluxes near various interfaces, carried out by
O'Brien, et al., has been summarized in Table 5-3 [O'Brien, 1978].
Table 5-3: Expected neutron background
Interface Neutrons/(cm 2*sec) Neutrons/(m 2*2 weeks) Weighting factor
Air/Ground 0.0064 77,414,400 0.00
Air/Seawater 0.0031 37,497,600 0.10
Air/Iron 0.0770 931,392,000 0.25
_ Air/Aluminum 0.0210 254,016,000 0.15
Air/Air 0.0052 62,899,200 0.50
Weighted Average 0.0127 153,634,804
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Neutron Background including Ship Effect
_
Taking the interface numbers a step further to estimate the effect of the steel cargo
containers and an overestimation of aluminum in cargo (to err on the conservative side),
weighting factors were postulated to calculate a weighted average. The weighting factors
were rather arbitrarily assigned and are only intended to be rough estimates of the neutron
population throughout the complicated geometry and composition of the ship and cargo.
The postulated range is between 10 million and 1 billion neutrons incident on the detector
due to natural background over a two-week voyage.
Another comprehensive study aboard the USNS Regulus characterizes the ship effect
[Kernan, 2003]. A key bit of information, not addressed elsewhere is the vertical
variation of neutron flux within the ship. Neutrons will be quickly moderated in the
seawater, lowering them below spallation energy thresholds, such that the flux of
neutrons below sea level will be lowered. Because of the complex nature of ocean wave
patterns and container depths on the ship, the analysis of vertical variation of neutron
background within the containership is not discussed here. Rather, it is merely stated that
backgrounds will follow the general trend of decreasing flux with height. For detection
limit analysis, the higher top deck numbers will be assumed in the interest of
conservatism. The lower background fluxes below sea level are mentioned only for
completeness.
5.2.2 Neutron Background Quantification
Data from the Regulus agrees within statistical and reasonable measurement error with
that of O'Brien quoted above. Other sources corroborate the O'Brien numbers as well,
for instance, similar results were obtained by Sheu, et al. in their study of neutron fluxes
near interfaces [Sheu, 2002]. And from an integration of MCNP modeled spectra
produced by Frank, et al., a total flux of just below 10-3 neutrons cm-2 sec- was calculated
[Frank, 2001].
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Since there are virtually no neutron sources in common cargo, the quantification of
neutron background will rely on the data reproduced from O'Brien above, which is
heavily corroborated. The measured fluxes form a much better estimate than calculation
and a reliance on experiment produces the weighted average flux from Table 5-3,
1.54 x 108 neutrons per square meter per two weeks. This number will be adopted as the
benchmark for neutron detectability calculations
5.3 Gamma Background
The characterization of gamma background is straightforward when considering
contributions from the ocean and ship, but an assessment of the gamma background from
cargo depends largely on the assumed constituents. A description of backgrounds due to
the ship and ocean as well as a description of potential backgrounds from cargo follows.
As discussed above, natural thorium and uranium, 232Th and 238U, contribute the only
significant gamma energies that could interfere with measurement. It follows, then, that
the number of 2615 keV and 1001 keV counts seen in the background will be directly
proportional to the concentration of thorium and uranium in the ocean, ship and cargo.
An effective way to deal with variations of thorium and uranium laden cargo must be
postulated. For the remainder of this thesis, a concept termed "potential background" will
be used. This term refers to the prospective background in the cargo due to products with
high thorium and uranium concentrations. The concept is necessary because of the high
variability of such a limited set of thorium and uranium rich items. More directly, the
statistical approach of finding an average concentration of thorium on a containership
would be ineffective since the standard deviation would be much larger than the mean.
Furthermore, finding the average would likely be a time prohibitive endeavor, requiring
careful documentation of millions of cargo materials and their respective thorium and
uranium concentrations. Therefore the potential background concept is employed and
introduced as what could potentially be in the cargo that would cause an increase in
gamma background.
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5.3.1 Gammas from the Ocean
One constant contributor to the gamma background is that of thorium and uranium in the
ocean. Thorium entering the ocean is preferentially attached to sinking particulates,
which causes extremely low concentrations near the surface [Ivanovich, 1982]. Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory estimates concentrations of thorium in seawater are on the
order of 10-7 milligrams per liter (4 x 10-3 Bq m-3). As compared to the expected
concentration of thorium on the earth's surface of 11,000 Bq m-3, more than a million-
fold reduction in background from thorium is achieved at sea [LBL, 2005].
More quantitatively, measurements have been made of thorium concentrations in several
relevant parts of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans are reproduced in Table 5-4. The total
number of 2615 keV gammas is also calculated for a vast volume of ocean surrounding
the containership. As seen in the fourth column of Table 5-4, a calculation of total
thorium grams in a "relevant volume" of water surrounding the ship is used to
characterize the total 2615 keV flux. The relevant volume is taken to be a square mile of
ocean surface area projected 10 meters deep into the water, which is likely an
overestimation of source boundaries for gammas. Taking into account the surface area of
the relevant volume, 5.24 x 106 m2, the flux/m 2 is also tabulated.
Table 5-4: Thorium concentrations in the ocean
Clearly, there is no significant contribution of 2615 keV background from the ocean
water, even with a large volume taken into consideration. The 2615 keV gamma is
basically non-existent. A similar calculation can be made of the background contribution
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Thorium Concentrations in the Ocean
Concentration Concentration Total grams in 2615 keV 2615 keV Flux/m 2
Location (gm/liter) (gm/m 3) relevant volume gammas/sec aboard ship
North Atlantic 6.40E-10 6.40E-07 16.58 9 1.65E-06
Caribbean 6.40E-10 6.40E-07 16.58 9 1.65E-06
North Pacific 3.30E-10 3.30E-07 8.55 4 8.50E-07
Pacific 1.60E-09 1.60E-06 41.44 22 4.12E-06
of the 1001 keV line from uranium in the ocean water. It would be redundant to
reproduce the calculation here, but since every part of the thorium calculation is linear
with concentration, a simple scaling can be applied. Uranium is present in the ocean in
concentrations approximately four orders of magnitude higher than thorium (it does not
attach to sinking particulates as well) [Ivanovich, 1982; LBL, 2005]. Not even accounting
for the low relative intensity of 1001 keV gammas per 238U decay, a four order division
of column six of Table 5-4 shows that the 1001 keV background contribution from the
ocean is still negligible. The above calculation illustrates the huge advantage for
detection of weapons concealed on cargo ships coming at sea as opposed to land based
detection such as at ports or at border crossings.
5.3.2 Gammas from the Ship
The possibility exists that thorium and uranium might be found in various material
constituents of the ship. Some construction materials and heavy metals will have small
concentrations of thorium and uranium and the number of background gammas from the
ship must be considered. While characterizing the neutron ship effect aboard the Regulus,
gamma measurements were made with high-purity germanium detectors. The ship was
parked at dock so that some 2615 keV flux is expected from the docked side of the
Regulus. Hour long measurements netted 3 and 13 counts of the 2615 keV gamma (no
distinguishable 1001 keV peaks were present). This translates into the fluxes shown in
Table 5-5.
Table 5-5: 2615 keV gamma background from the ship
2615 keV Gamma Background from Ships
Measured 2615 keV
Counts/hour 2615 keV Flux (m'2*s' 1)
3 0.001
13 0.004
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Making the conservative assumption that none of these gammas originated from the land
or dock, the above fluxes are low and likely negligible for all practical purposes.
Some concern has been raised in various settings about the radioactivity of the
containership's engine fuel. The thought is that excess uranium might be present in the
large volume of engine fuel and would therefore increase the background of 1001 keV
lines. Measurements made aboard the Regulus were specifically designed to address this
concern. The activity of 26Ra, a 238U daughter, was measured and the results indicated no
increased flux near the engine fuel [Kernan, 2003].
5.3.3 Gammas from the Cargo
It has been quite easy to characterize the contribution of gamma background from the
ship and ocean, but contributions from the cargo are not so straightforward. As such, a
considerable amount of work has been devoted to potential ways to quantify natural
background in the cargo.
The most concentrated source of thorium and uranium in cargo exists in objects made of
rock and in particular, granite and marble. Almost all forms of commercial granite and
marble have some concentration of thorium and uranium. A few relatively rare types of
granite and marble have high concentrations of thorium, especially those originating from
Brazil and India, where huge deposits exist; however, most granites and marbles contain
very little thorium and uranium [Tzortzis, 2003]. Other relatively rare, but non-negligible
sources of thorium in cargo include ceramic tiles and kitty litter. Sources of thorium that
will be considered negligible (due to both the rarity of the item and low activity) are
lantern mantles, camera lenses and welding rods [Smith]. There is also little concern for
other sources of uranium that have much lower activities than granite and marble such as
ceramic glazes (fiesta ware), dental ceramics and polishing powders, especially
considering the low emission rate of the 1001 keV gamma [IAEA, 2002].
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A first step towards characterizing the potential background is to calculate thorium
concentrations in various granites and marbles. Concentrations of thorium in marble and
granite are approximately equal, so to minimize redundancy the calculation will be
constrained to granite [Tzortzis, 2003]. This might also be considered a time prohibitive
task; but fortunately, the work has already been carried out for other purposes. Tzortzis,
et al. completed two studies on the specific activities of many different type of granite
and their results are shown in Table 5-6 at the end of this section. Also shown is the
number of interfering 2615 keV gammas per second per kilogram for each type of
granite.
The average density of granite is 2.7 gm/cm3 and the average concentration of thorium in
granite is 15 parts per million [Sachs, 2003; Tzortzis, 2003]. Using these numbers, 9.0 x
1020 thorium atoms per kilogram of granite are expected, which correspond to around 14
Bq/kg. Assumrning secular equilibrium and taking into consideration the number of 2615
keV gammas per decay of 232Th, this concentration equates to a specific activity of
around one 2615 keV gamma per kilogram per second of granite on average. One
interfering gamma for each kilogram of granite is not a significant problem considering
that the specific activity of 2615 keV gammas from the weapon at 100 parts per trillion
232 -1 -1232U is 54,783 kg- l sec-
An imaging system measures specific activity, not just activity, and it is clear why this
capability is necessary. Consider that a large slab of average granite (say, for a large
commercial countertop) is on board with dimensions of 5 meters x 2 meters x 10
centimeters, which weighs on the order of 2700 kilograms and would have around 2700
2615 keV gammas. The entire slab of granite would show up on the image as a
distributed background of 2700 gammas per full solid angle, spread over an imaged2~~~~~surface area of 10 m2 , while the weapon would show up as an imaged point source
(effective surface area of 1/100 m2) with 54,783 gammas per full solid angle. Not
accounting for self-shielding of the slabs, it would take twenty 2700 kg countertops of
granite stacked one behind the other just to equal the number of counts from the weapon,
but the specific activity would still pale in comparison, hence the value of imaging.
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To quantify the effect and advantage of imaging as well as justify the low false alarm rate
from granite in the cargo, an intensity factor, RspeciicActivir v , is employed. The intensity
factor is a simple ratio of specific activities.
RSpecificActivity
(A/m)weapon 
_
(A / m) granite
where A is the activity, m the mass, and SA the specific activity. The intensity factor is
also shown i Table 5-6.
Table 5-6: Intensity factor for granite
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SAweapon
SAgranite
(5-1)
Specific Activity in Granite Intensity Factor
Commerical Name Specific Activity (B kg-) 2615 gammas kg'1 sec1 SA(Weapon)SA(Granite)
Bianco Pera 37 2.6 20728.7
Santa Cecilia _85 6.1 9023.1
Blue Paradise 92 8336.5
Blue Pearl 77 5.5 9960.5
Verte Brazil 121 8.6 6338.5
Upatuba 21 1.5 36522.0
Verte Eukaliptos 26 1.9 29498.5
Red Africa 113 8.1 6787.3
Tropical Japorana 17 1.2 45115.4
Astudo _32 2.3 23967.6
Baltic Brown 136 9.7 5639.4
Rosso Balmoral 490 35.0 1565.2
Rosso Porino 172 12.3 44591
Giallo Penere 82 5.9 9353.2
Nero Afica 0 0.0 N/A
Rosa Beta 69 4.9 11115.4
White Arabesco 146 10.4 5253.2
Saint Tropez 40 2.9 19174.1
Kinawa 101 7.2 7593.7
Multi-Colour 82 5.9 9353.2
Capao Bonito 190 13.6 4036.6
New Imperial 273 19.5 2809.4
Juparana - 265 18.9 2894.2
Prand Paradisso 51 3.6 15038.5
Cafe Brown 906 64.7 846.5
Rosa Ghiandone 89 6.4 8617.6
Jacaranda 147 10.5 52174Colib ri _155 11.14
Even for the worst case scenario, a slab of Caf6 Brown (product of Brazil) with a specific
activity of 906 Bq kg- , the number of counts per unit area from a weapon is still 846
times higher than that of the granite.
5.3.4 Reducing False Alarms
While unlikely given the analysis above, an alarm condition from granite or marble is
conceivable and some course of action should be in place as a safety net. There are
several ways of further distinguishing the difference between granite and a weapon.
These include both cross-references with shipping manifestos and with other isotopic
measurements.
5.3.4.1 Shipping Manifesto Cross-Reference
Per implementation of U.S. Customs Office policy, all shippers are required to report the
contents of their sealed containers at least 24 hours prior to loading at the foreign port.
This information could be used as a way to pre-empt false alarms by simply cross-
referencing the containership's manifesto. Any major shipments of granite, while still
unlikely to cause a false alarm, would be known in advance and would therefore be used
to adjust expected backgrounds.
5.3.4.2 Spectroscopic Source Identification
5.3.4.2.1 The Use of 238U Gammas
Another way to reduce the possibility of a false alarm condition is to reference
measurements of the 1001 keV gamma from 238U with the 2615 keV gamma from 232Th.
Uranium is commonly present in granite with a ratio of about 1:3 (U:Th), but the ratio of
238U to 32U is vastly higher in the weapon. In practice, it is very difficult to find a 1001
keV peak when taking environmental measurements and granite spectra produced by
Tzortzis fail to distinguish the peak after lengthy measurement [Tzortzis, 2003]. The
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reason for this difficulty is that the relative intensity of the 1001 keV gamma is low and
accounts for just over half of a percent of total gammas from 238U. Conversely, a look at
the WgU spectrum shown in Figure 4-3, where 238U makes up nearly 7 atom percent and
2 3 2 U is only 00 ppt, gives a rough ratio of 1001 keV to 2615 keV gammas at about 1:1.
Clearly, the combination of a nearly 1:1 1001 keV to 2615 keV ratio would indicate a
weapon and a spectrum showing only (or mostly) the 2615 keV peak would indicate only
a benign slab of granite.
5.3.4.2.2 The Use of 228Ac Gammas
The concept of using other gammas to confirm source origin can be extended and further
strengthened by looking for the 911 keV peak from 228Ac. A brief glance at the decay
chain of both the 23 2 Th from natural sources and the 232U from the weapon reveals some
distinguishing thorium daughters (see Table 5-1).
Note that the spectra of daughters below 228Th will match exactly, but there remains an
important distinction between the two decay chains. The five radionuclides atop the chain
offer a way to distinguish between the origins of the 2STl gammas. 232Th, 228Ra, 236Pu
and 232U are not exceptionally active and emit mostly low energy gammas; however, the
contribution of 228Ac is significant. 228Ac emits penetrating gammas with energies at 911
keV, 969 keV, 965 keV, 795 keV, and less intense but more energetic, 1631 keV and
1459 keV. These 228Ac lines, especially 911 keV, are readily visible on a spectrum of
granite and account for 41.2% of the activity of the entire thorium series. A more detailed
quantification of the actinium procedure and suggested background reduction techniques
are provided in Appendix A.
In much the same way as the 1001 keV line can be used to confirm the presence of fissile
material relative to benign granite, the presence of a 911 keV line can be used to confirm
benign quantities of granite relative to fissile material. Simply put, a measurement of
2615 keV gammas accompanied by 1001 keV gammas indicates the presence of fissile
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material, while a measurement of 2615 keV gammas accompanied by 911 keV gammas
indicates the presence of natural thorium in granites and marbles.
5.3.5 Gamma Background Quantification
After consideration of gamma contributions from the sea, ship and cargo, a quantification
of potential background can now be approximated based on reasonable and conservative
assumptions. The quantification of background from the sea and ship is straightforward
and explicitly stated in Tables 5-4 and 5-5, but a potential background from cargo is not
so easy to determine. Further complicating quantification is the above demonstrated
background reduction due to imaging and source distinguishing algorithms from 1001
keV and 911 keV lines. As such, four potential backgrounds will be stated: one worst-
case scenario, where no imaging capability is assumed and Caf6 Brown granite in large
quantity is aboard; two average scenarios, where an average amount of granite in the field
of view is assumed both with and without imaging; and one best-case scenario, where
imaging is assumed and no granite or marble is present. To stay conservative, the
inclusion of spectroscopic source identification is not assumed in any scenario.
The best and worst case scenarios are unlikely, but serve to bracket background potential.
The worst-case scenario assumes 1000 tons of Caf6 Brown granite in the detector's field
of view and the two average scenarios assume 5 tons of average activity granite. The
average, no imaging estimate represents the expected background if just a large detector
is placed in the container. The average, with imaging scenario represents a best estimate
of the most likely gamma background seen by the ship-based system without any credit
for source distinction algorithms using uranium and actinium lines. With imaging
capabilities, the background directly in front or behind the weapon's effective surface
area is considered. That is, only the projection of granite cast through the surface area of
the weapon is taken into account. This entails simply dividing the average, no imaging
cargo flux by the average intensity factor (11,637) from Table 5-6 above. Quantification
proceeds through Table 5-7 by simple addition of contribution.
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Table 5-7: Expected 2615 keV gamma background
Expected 2615 keV Gamma Background
(all units in gammas m -2 S-1)
Case From the Sea From the Ship From the Cargo Total
1000 tons of Cafe Brown 2.07E-06 2.22E-03 6.47E+07 6.47E+07
Average, no imaging 2.07E-06 2.22E-03 5.1 OE+04 5.1 OE+04
Average, with imaging 2.07E-06 2.22E-03 4.38E+00 4.38E+00
No granite aboard 2.07E-06 2.22E-03 0.OOE+00 2.22E-03
Because imaging capabilities are expected to easily distinguish between the distributed
granite and concentrated point source, the expected background will fall much closer to
the average, with imaging scenario than to the average, no imaging scenario. Allowing no
credit for spectroscopy and accounting for background for the portion of the image
directly behind the weapon a conservative estimate of 2615 keV gamma background flux
is around 4.38 2615 keV gammas per square meter per second. It must be restated that
this number is only an estimate, but is as conservative and accurate as possible given the
entirety of the above discussion. For the detectability calculations to follow, the number
of 2615 keV gammas over the 2 week voyage is 5.3 x 106 per square meter.
5.4 Detectability
The motivation for the above discussion of background is to quantify detectability.
Accurate characterization of background is a necessary ingredient in statistical analysis
for stating positive detection confidence intervals. False positives are not only costly
because they would disrupt commerce, but also because they would tend to devalue the
perceived effectiveness of the ship-based approach. It is common practice in the isotope
identification industry to quote a 95% confidence limit before claiming detection, but
much more stringent standards are necessary for this application. An at sea interdiction of
a containership resulting in a false positive is unacceptable and it is therefore necessary to
absolutely minimize the number of false positives due to background interference. This
minimization cannot result in 100% confidence because of inherent statistical constraints;
however, the false positive rate can be pushed so far as to remain practically negligible.
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A good benchmark for negligible false positive detections should be set at less than 1%.
The IAEA makes similar recommendations for guards at border crossings [IAEA, 2002].
The target number adopted for this thesis will take an even more conservative approach
and demand that the false positive rate not exceed 0.3% (this target corresponds to a 3a
detection, which will be explained below). The detectability limit is set such that if 1,000
nuclear devices were concealed in containerships, the system would produce only 3 false
interdictions., a negligible disruption of commerce. Similarly, the system will detect all
but three of 1,000 concealed weapons and the chances of finding one weapon are 99.7%.
In order to achieve the target minimization of false positives, statistical analysis has been
carried out with the intent of quoting a minimum number of counts over background.
This is done in the following manner. A Gaussian distribution of counts is assumed as
-x2/ 2e
G(x) = (5-2)
The 0.3% confidence level occurs at x = +3 so that a 3 standard deviation corresponds
to the required number of counts above background.
Defining the variables P as the peak counts, B as the background counts, wp as the region
of interest width around the peak and wb as a region of interest width in the background,
the standard deviation of the peak with background contribution can be simplified to
up P + W B (5-3)
One major radiation detection equipment manufacturer [Gedcke, 2004] derives an
expression for the detection limit, PDL, and concludes that
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PDL =(2)(3ap) = 6 1+'PB(54
The ratio - is a function of the background reduction software, but a normal estimate is
//b
to set 1/ = , so that the term in parenthesis becomes 2 [Gedcke, 2004]. Using the
backgrounds derived for neutrons in section 5.2.2 and gammas in section 5.3.5, the 3,
or 99.7% confidence, detection limit can be calculated. The results are shown in Table
5-8.
Table 5-8: Three-sigma detectability limits
Detectability
99.7% Confidence
2615 keV Gammas/(m 2*sec) 2615 keV Gammas/(m2*2 weeks) Detection Threshold
Gammas 4.38 5.30E+06 19,531
NeutronsI(m2*sec) Neutrons/(m2*2 weeks)
Neutrons 0.083 1.54E+08 105,300
The detection threshold represents the minimum number of counts needed to claim a
positive detection. As presented in Table 5-8, the threshold is conservative in its
assumptions in that a high-A cargo for increased spallation events in the cargo was
assumed and an absolutely no credit was given for spectroscopic source identification and
reduction. In the presentation of simulation results (Chapter 7), these numbers will be
constantly referenced and are a key component to the analysis of system capabilities.
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Chapter 6: Cargo Characterization
Characterization of common cargo on the containership is one of the key components
requiring detailed attention during the modeling process. It is necessary to properly and
accurately describe the cargo that lies between the weapon and the containerized
detection units because the attenuation and path of the radiation directly depends on the
intervening material properties. More directly, the elemental composition and bulk
density of various cargo will affect the gamma signal and the isotopic composition and
bulk density will affect the neutron signal. It is therefore vital to the accuracy of the
simulation, and indeed the results presented in this thesis, that the cargo is appropriately
and accurately characterized.
The model described here was created as input for simulation with MCNP (Monte Carlo
N-Particle Transport Code). In the academic community, the code is considered the gold
standard of radiation transport and the Monte Carlo method of simulation is well
established. Developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory for other applications, the
code has evolved through several iterations, constantly improving its accuracy.
Specifically, the version used in this simulation was MCNP5 and was run directly on
personal computers, not on parallel processors.
6.1 Importance of Cargo Constituents and Density
Any simulation of radiation transport that does not accurately model the intervening
material is essentially useless. A thorough literature search and discussion with various
field experts does not yield a detailed an accurate model. All attempts encountered have
adopted a single density, single material, homogenized representation of cargo. This
single material model has severe drawbacks that depart greatly from reality as will be
described below.
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The isotopic composition of the materials between the weapon and the detectors attenuate
the radiation signal exponentially. For photon transport, the exponent not only depends
on the thickness of material, but also depends on both the density, p, and atomic
number, Z; and for neutron transport, the exponent depends on both p and mass number,
A. For photons, the fraction of measured to source intensity at a given thickness, x, of a
material is
=e -,ul(6-1)
O
where u is the mass attenuation coefficient, defined in many ways, but depending on
cross sections for Compton scattering, Rayleigh scattering, pair production and photo-
electric effect [Turner, 1995]. The dependence on the number of electrons, Z, in these
cross sections is firmly established. For neutrons, there is negligible interaction with
electrons, thus the attenuation dependence on mass number A, not Z. Signal reduction is
not as well defined for neutrons because of multiple scattering events and due to
inaccuracies in calculation, neutron transport is generally simulated on a computer. The
dependence of mass number on neutron slowing down and the vast variation in capture
cross section with isotope is also well known.
Due to the non-linear nature of signal attenuation and wide variation in densities of
common materials, the characterization of intervening cargo is the most important facet
of the entire MCNP model; therefore, a significant portion of the time allotted for this
thesis was spent characterizing and modeling common cargo.
To date, it appears that the vast majority of attempts to characterize cargo have made the
approximation of condensing the entire set of possible materials into one container. This
has been done either by physically placing a single material inside a container for
subsequent measurement or by making some sort of average density approximation in a
computer model. Most attempts have been made with the goal of describing a "typical"
container with the constituents often chosen to demonstrate the particular strengths of one
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method (i.e. low Z for gammas and high A for neutrons). A typical container is not
sufficient for this application; rather, the model requires a statistical distribution of cargo
in many containers.
One of the underlying contentions of this thesis is that these models are wholly
unreasonable and vastly inaccurate due to the existence of randomly oriented pathways of
air [Wagner, 2004].2 That is, in reality, cargo is not evenly distributed and much of the
volume between the weapon and detector is air, effectively creating random pathways for
eased radiation transport. In an average density approximation, these pathways of air do
not exist and aggregate transport will be significantly lower. This is why, for example,
shielding is designed with an average density, often a solid block of material, not a block
with drilled holes. Many of these pathways exist throughout each container; some will
occur because of packing inefficiencies and some will occur because of the physical
geometry of the cargo.
It is the relative nature of exponential attenuation in common material and essentially
1/r2 solid angle intensity loss in air that provides the difference in radiation transport of a
uniform and lumped density model. Presented below is a new approach to the
characterization of a large number of possible materials, which is more accurate than a
simple average density approximation.
6.2 Modeling of Cargo for MCNP
Almost any industrial product or good that can fit into a container could potentially find
its way between the weapon and detector. Most common applications of radiation
transport have only a few possible materials to model; even human dose calculations are
often limited to a few major constituents of tissue. A completely accurate model of cargo
requires literally millions of material compositions and densities. It is both time
prohibitive and likely impossible to perfectly characterize and model every type of
2Rich Wagner, of Los Alamos National Laboratory, first suggested this idea, termed the "pinhole effect",
through personal correspondence in 2004.
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shipped good. Moreover, the computing power needed for simulations including millions
of materials likely comprising billions of surfaces and cells is not at present available.
Therefore, an optimization of practicality and accuracy was made.
The first, and most obvious, approximation limited the number of cargo types considered.
Lumping together materials with common attributes, such as beverages or woods,
immediately reduced the number of materials needed in the model. For instance, soft
drinks, juices, wines, and drinking water have similar compositions and densities, so all
were combined into one "beverages" material. Likewise, all woods were taken to have
the same elemental composition and were combined into one material. Taking the woods
a step further, however, wood density varies greatly from balsa to oak, so an average
density was calculated for the model. Unfortunately, this average density approach within
some materials tends down the path just argued against; however, the discrepancy in
attenuation between similar materials such as various woods is not nearly as great as the
discrepancy between, say, metal and air. Where applicable, similar lumping of materials
occurred.
A second approximation was a geometric condensing of the materials. It is both
computationally impractical and time prohibitive to model the geometry of even lumped
materials. For example, all the various types of furniture could be exceedingly difficult to
model. Further, MCNP runtime is proportional to the number of surfaces defined and
detailed modeling of things like furniture, let alone farm machinery, is not practical.
Each material composition was carefully researched. Isotopic concentrations were
generally limited to abundances greater than a tenth of a percent, but a few impurities of
lower concentration were added to ensure realistic simulation.
6.2.1 Redistribution of Density
Instead of modeling detailed geometry, the materials were lumped into cubes with their
densities kept constant. The cube approximation requires both explanation and
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justification. Simply put, the approximation removes any air from the volume that the
cargo displaces and redistributes the air in the volume surrounding the material.
Continuing with the furniture example, the volume that a single-piece wooden chair takes
up in each container does not have an even density distribution. Rather, there is a certain
percentage of the volume that is just air with a density of around 0.001 gm/cm3 and a
certain percentage of the volume that is wood with a density of, say, 0.55 gm/cm 3. The
cube approximation simply accounts for only the wood, so that a cube of 0.55 gm/cm3
wood is made with a reduced volume (still constant density) and the remainder of the
volume is left for air. This, of course, changes the volume that the chair would take up in
reality. To account for the extra volume, air surrounds the cube of wood. In a sense, all
that has happened is a redistribution of density. Figure 6-1 illustrates the concept.
a 0.001
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Figure 6-1: Cargo Density Redistribution
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Each material was approximated in the same way. In this manner, every material was
essentially made into a cube of constant density corresponding to the material surrounded
by a volume of air.
The question of how much volume to choose for the wood and how much to choose for
the air immediately follows. Fortunately, most seaports publish the imported tonnage of
various cargo and commodities, which, when combined with known shipping volumes
(generally quoted in twenty foot equivalent units, TEU), respective densities and
firequencies, can be used to calculate the volume of each material.
6.2.2 Cargo Materials
As might be expected, the type and volume of materials imported varies by point of
origin. It is therefore necessary to reference not just one shipment, but rather to reference
at least a year of shipments to a major port so that individual fluctuations of materials are
minimized. As such, the Port of New York/New Jersey was chosen because of its large
number of port calls and because it receives shipments from all over the world. Cargo
tonnage data categorized by material and imported by the Port of New York/New Jersey
in 2002 is provided in Appendix G [Harlingen, 2002].
After lumping the material types, Table 6-1 shows the 33 materials selected for the
MCNP model.
Table 6-1: Material for MCNP model
80
Material Tonnage
Crude Fertilizers/Minerals 7,441,496
Organic Chemicals 3,231,415
Beverages 2,721,911
Vehicles 2,139,004
Machinery 1,377,754
Paper & Books 1,373,404
Vegetables 1,358,524
Plastics 1,350,073
Furniture 1,236,492
Iron/Steel 1,196,708
Fruits 1,061,098
Stone 1,024,583
Iron/Steel Bulk 898,939
Ceramics 875,203
Animal/Vegetable Fats/Oils 867,002
Apparel 772,932
Cocoa 723,678
Wood 720,008
Coffee 681,737
Electric Machinery 585,960
Inorganic Chemicals 569,990
Edible Preparations 529,901
Sugars 498,905
Toys 476,707
Glass 457,304
Cereals 451,862
Rubber 444,504
Fish/Meat 366,262
Dairy 348,738
Copper 309,682
Aluminum 199,502
Cereals 167,071
Others 3,202,039
Total 39,660,388
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For reasons outlined above, a large portion of work was allotted such that a careful
description of the density and elemental composition of each material was obtained.
When lumped (as in the beverage example), a tonnage-weighted average of densities and
compositions was calculated. Needing to set a tonnage cut-off at some point, the "others"
entry above is the sum of all other materials imported with a weight less than the 150,000
tons annually. A composition and density approximation was employed for this
miscellaneous material that consisted of an average over the above materials. As
expected this miscellaneous material was mostly organic, with a small percentage of iron
and aluminunm.
6.2.3 Air Percent by Volume
The combination of tonnage and density is still not enough to completely model the
cargo, because it would only be a guess as to what percentage of air is in each type of
container. For example, "toys" might have a large portion of air (picture a plastic doll
house), while fertilizer will have very little air. Also, the arrangement of packaging could
increase or decrease the amount of air remaining. For instance, "fruit" might be packed in
a simple cubic or a body cubic centered fashion. Moreover, the packaging of boxes inside
the cargo container varies depending on the space available. See below for examples of
various recommended packaging arrangements in 40-foot containers [TIS, 2005].
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Figure 6-2: Container Packing Examples
It is clear that any guess at air volume percentage would not be consistent. Fortunately,
there is a way to constrain the problem that provides an answer without any assumptions.
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The average density of cargo shipped into the United States is available with a quick
calculation by using the total weight of cargo shipped into the U.S. ports and the total
number of TEU [Palmer, 2003]. The density calculation is shown in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2: Average density of cargo
3
The average density, Pavg container = 0.1923gm / cm3 , can now be used to derive the
relative volume of air. The procedure will be to find an average material density,
Pavgmaterial, specifically not including the contribution of air. Once calculated, the
material density will be constrained by the average density, Pavg container' specifically
including the air, to set an equation that will give the volume of air per unit volume of
material. The entire calculation is provided for each material in Table 6-3 at the end of
this section.
Not yet including the contribution of air, the remaining 33 material masses, mi , were
assigned volumetric probabilities, P(V ), by dividing through by the respective material
densities, pi,
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Average Density Calculation
TEU Origin Tonnes/TEU Density Density
Trade Origin Tonnes/TEU Imported weighting weighted gm/TEU weighted(yr 4) factor ~~~~~~~~~~ gm/cm 3
_________ _ (yr_ .) factor contribution gmcm contribution
Africa 10.95 70000 0.0072 0.0789 10950000 0.2861 0.0021
Far East 6.04 4734000 0.4873 2.9432 6040000 0.1578 0.0769
Latin America 9.22 1299000 0.1337 1.2328 9220000 0.2409 0.0322
Mediterranian 9.21 706000 0.0727 0.6693 9210000 0.2407 0.0175
Middle East 8.5 31000 0.0032 0.0271 8500000 0.2221 0.0007
North America 9.77 23000 0.0024 0.0231 9770000 0.2553 0.0006
North Europe 8.73 1406000 0.1447 1.2634 8730000 0.2281 0.0330
Oceania 12.84 117000 0.0120 0.1546 12840000 0.3355 0.0040
South East Asia 7.06 1329000 0.1368 0.9658 7060000 0.1845 0.0252
Totals/Averages 82.32 9715000 7.3584 _ 0.1923
Weighted Average 7.3584
Tonnes/TEU
Weighted Average 0.1923
(gm/cm3) 01
Vi =- (6-2)
Pi
such that the probability of finding material i in an average containership volume is
mi
p(V) 33Pi (6-3)
Z 
i=1 
The next step involves a calculation of average material density, specifically not
including the air. To calculate the average density of just the cargo materials, each
volume in equation 6-3 must be weighted by its density so that a probability of finding
density p (pi) can be found.
P(Pi ) = p(V )Pi (6-4)
The sum of these p (pi) then gives the average density of just the cargo materials, not
including the air
33
Pavg - material I P ( pi ) (6-5)
i=1
As can be seen in Table 6-3, the average density of just the cargo materials, Pvg ._...eril. is
3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.7931 gm/cm 3. Once an average density of the 33 materials is known, the above
referenced average cargo density, Pavg - container' of 0.1923 gm/cm 3 can be used as a
constraint to give the relative volume of air required per unit volume of material. With
Pair - 0.001 gdcm 3 and using a unit volume of material, a simple algebraic expression
can be set up as
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PairVair + Pavg material 1
V.i +IVair+1
and inserting the numbers for clarity
0.OIV. +0.7932
a ir -- =0.1923
Vair +
where the left and right hand sides are both the average densities in a unit volume. The
different representation on the left hand side is simply a breakdown of density weighting
by volume. Solving for the volume of the air needed,
(6-8)VFir = 3.1611
The volume fraction of air can now be stated as
air= 0.7596
Vair 1
where the in the denominator represents the volume of a unit cell of material. So that
75.96 percent of the volume in an average cargo container is air. It is crucial to the
believability of this percentage to point out that the calculation been constrained only by
the known numbers, Pavg-container Pavg-mnaterial, and the reported tonnages and import
volumes.
The more than three quarters fraction might be surprising at first, but when visualizing
things like solid wooden chairs or plastic doll houses, the percentage is not so startling.
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- Pfavg _ container (6-6)
(6-7)
(6-9)
For example, an examination of the chair in Figure 6-1 clearly reveals that a large
percentage of the volume needed for the chair in a container is air. By inspection of
Figure 6-1, it appears that the volume percent of wood is significantly less than 1/4.
Perhaps further examples are necessary because it is non-intuitive to accept that 3/4 of the
volume is air. For instance, consider that a box of Christmas ornaments, commonly
shipped from Southeast Asia, has very little material per unit volume. It might be
instructive to picture what a box of Christmas ornaments might look like if completely
flattened by a truck. Only a small volume of flat material would be left and the rest of the
original volume would be air. Similarly, a trash compactor typically condenses large
volumes of garbage into small cubes for disposal by simply removing all the air (which is
a rather good analogy to the cube approximation outlined above). It is essential to the
simulation results presented in Chapter 7 that the 3/4 air volume is accepted and it might
be important to reiterate that the percentage is extracted purely from known shipping
data; there are no assumptions in the calculation.
With the air comprising 76 percent, the rest of the materials make up the final 24 percent.
Combining the air percentage with the known probabilities of cargo an absolute list of
volumetric probabilities with corresponding densities was created for simulation and is
shown in the last column in Table 6-3.
6.3 Pixel Approach
Given the above assigned probabilities, it remains to model the cargo. This was done by
setting up an array of cargo "pixels" between the weapon and detector. Each pixel had
easily variable dimensions in the model, but for the simulation results presented in this
thesis, pixels were 1.0 meters x 1.0 meters x 1.5 meters. The longer pixel dimension
extends along a line between the detector and weapon (see Figure 6-3).
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Table 6-3: Material volume probability calculation
Figure 6-3: Pixel array example, top-down view (left) and side view (right)
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Density Volume Absolute
Material Mass (MT) (gm/cm 3) (cm3) p(Volume) p(Density) Probability
Equation Reference known known (6-2) (6-3) (6-4)
Fertilizers 7,441,496 1.29 5,768,602 0.1154 0.1488 0.0277
Organic Chemicals 3,231,415 0.984 3,283,958 0.0657 0.0646 0.0158
Beverages 2,721,911 1.01 2,694,961 0.0539 0.0544 0.0130
Vehicles 2,139,004 7.3 293,014 0.0059 0.0428 0.0014
Machinery 1,377,754 7.8 176,635 0.0035 0.0276 0.0008
Vegetables 1,358,524 0.4 3,396,310 0.0679 0.0272 0.0163
Plastics 1,350,073 0.927 1,456,389 0.0291 0.0270 0.0070
Furniture 1,236,492 0.55 2,248,167 0.0450 0.0247 0.0108
Paper & Books 1,373,404 1.201 1,143,550 0.0229 0.0275 0.0055
Iron/Steel 1,196,708 7.8 153,424 0.0031 0.0239 0.0007
Fruits & Vegetables 1,061,098 0.641 1,655,379 0.0331 0.0212 0.0080
Stone 1,024,583 1.65 620,959 0.0124 0.0205 0.0030
Iron/Steel Bulk 898,939 2.5 359,576 0.0072 0.0180 0.0017
Ceramic 875,203 2.4 364,668 0.0073 0.0175 0.0018
AnimalNegetable Fats/Oils 867,002 0.952 910,716 0.0182 0.0173 0.0044
Apparel 772,932 1.314 588,228 0.0118 0.0155 0.0028
Cocoa 723,678 0.593 1,220,368 0.0244 0.0145 0.0059
Wood 720,008 0.55 1,309,105 0.0262 0.0144 0.0063
Coffee 681,737 0.432 1,578,095 0.0316 0.0136 0.0076
Electric Machinery 585,960 7.8 75,123 0.0015 0.0117 0.0004
Inorganic Chemicals 569,990 2.5 227,996 0.0046 0.0114 0.0011
Edible Preparations 529,901 1.4 378,501 0.0076 0.0106 0.0018
Sugars 498,905 0.721 691,963 0.0138 0.0100 0.0033
Toys __ 476,707 0.9247 515,526 0.0103 0.0095 0.0025
Glass 457,304 1.55 295,035 0.0059 0.0091 0.0014
Cereals 451,862 0.79 571,977 0.0114 0.0090 0.0027
Rubber 444,504 1.522 292,053 0.0058 0.0089 0.0014
Fish 366,262 1.04 352,175 0.0070 0.0073 0.0017
Dairy 348,738 1.025 340,232 0.0068 0.0070 0.0016
Copper 309,682 8.93 34,679 0.0007 0.0062 0.0002
Aluminum 199,502 2.7 73,890 0.0015 0.0040 0.0004
Cereals 167,071 0.6 278,452 0.0056 0.0033 0.0013
Others 3,202,039 0.1923 16,651,269 0.3330 0.0640 0.0800
Total 39,660,388 50,000,976 0.7932
Air 0.7597
Equation Reference (6-5) (6-9)
There are a total of 700 pixels in the 3-dimensional array, 10 across the long side of the
weapon container, 5 vertically stacked and 14 deep. Varying shades represent different
materials. The weapon can be seen as a small circle inside its container on the top-down
view.
A theoretical detector was set in each pixel to measure the flux of neutrons and photons at
different distances. Each detector is essentially a ghost, not filled with any material so
that a detector in one pixel would not affect results in an adjacent detector. In this way,
literally hundreds of measurements could be made with one simulation. Note that, in
practice, only one detector would be available, but there is no way of knowing, a priori,
which direction the weapon will be located relative to the detector. In a sense, the
problem has been turned around so that there is one weapon location and many detector
locations. Of course, it is the distance between the weapon and detector that matters and
the use of several detectors is only a time minimizing convenience that produces, in one
simulation, an entire 3-dimensional map of the flux throughout the whole volume.
Using the probabilities in Table 6-3, each pixel was assigned a material. The pixels were
filled with a material by generating a random number and matching it with corresponding
probabilities. The process of generating the distribution of materials was carried out in
Microsoft Excel. Using the random number function, 700 random numbers between 0
and 1 were generated and referenced to the probability of each material appearing. A
series of nested IF/THEN test functions were used to assign materials.3 A typical array of
materials is shown in Figure 6-4. The materials, along with corresponding densities, were
then transferred directly to the cell definition cards in the MCNP input deck.
3 As the adept Excel user will note, the maximum number of nested IF/THEN functions is seven, but there
are 33 materials. To circumvent this problem, random numbers not yet assigned a material were reprinted
to a different worksheet and a new test was run. This included five iterations before all materials were
accounted for.
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T'Fable 6-4. Example of a random array of materials, side view (see Figure 6-3, right).
Iron/SteelPlastics Air Air Miscellaneous Beverages ron/Steel Miscellaneous Beverages Air Air MiscellaneousBulk
Coffee Air Air Air Edible Air Fertilizers Air Air Air AirPreparations
Plastics Air Air Vegetable Air Iron/Steel Vegetable Coffee Air Furniture Air
Fruits &Air Vegetable Air Furniture Fruits Air Air Vehicles Air Air Air
Vegetables
Vegetable Vegetable Air Miscellaneous Vegetable Plastics Air Air Air Air Air
Fats/Oils Fats/Oils Fats/Oils
6.4 Discussion of the Pixel Approach
The pixel approach is an approximation. As such, it has deficiencies; however, the pixel
approach is a much better model of actual cargo than the commonly used average density
approach. One way to quantify the improvement is through the concept of resolution as it
applies to lumped density. Defining resolution, R, as
R = Pixels (6-10)
Container
The resolution of the average density approach is 1, while the resolution of the pixel
approach proposed here is 102. There are 102 pixels composing each container. A two
order of magnitude improvement in resolution (and an invaluable increase in accuracy) is
gained by using this method. An optimization between computer runtime and number of
pixels was made and ultimately limited the resolution. An improved resolution would
provide even more accurate results, however, the major advantage of the pixel approach
is already attained with any resolution above 1 due to the lumping of densities and
inclusion of air.
Another approximation made by the pixel approach is the loss of detailed geometry.
Remembering that space is linear (in non-relativistic terms), there is no difference in
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number of counts between a geometry where an attenuating medium is near the source or
near the detector for an unscattered particle. Figure 6-4 illustrates the two cases.
Source
O
Material
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Detector Source
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MaterialI Detector
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Figure 6-4: Linearity of space
The model's divergence from reality appears when scattering is considered. If part of the
geometry actually extends closer to the source than the pixel approximation assumes,
there is a chance of lost counts due to low-angle scattering events. An illustration of this
concept is provided below in Figures 6-5 and 6-6.
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Figure 6-5: Extra low angle scattering events into the detector
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Figure 6-6: Loss of low angle scattering events due to pixelized geometry
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Similarly, moving the material closer to the detector will lose some events otherwise
counted.
Because of the large energies (2615 keV) and the forward biased (non-isotropic) nature
of scattering cross sections involved in the process, only low angle scatter will contribute
significantly to the number of counts. This contribution will be maximized for materials
with densities concentrated in the center of each container as their geometry provides the
largest range of low scattering angles still able to reach the detector.
The geometric effects on the pixel approximation are discussed only for completeness. In
fact, the divergence of model and reality is minimal and likely negligible. This can be
easily shown by studying change in energy seen in low angle Compton scattering and
comparing it to the energy resolution of the detector. The change in energy due to
Compton scattering is
E-E EE2 (1 cos¢0) (6-11)
mr:
where E is the incident energy, Eo is the outgoing energy, and the angle of scatter. As
¢ exceeds a few degrees, given the geometry of the pixel array, the change in energy is
larger than the resolution of the detector. The counts would fall into the Compton
continuum on the measured spectrum. Thus, a negligible number of counts are lost due to
the geometry effect from the pixelized approach. Moreover, counts lost due to the pixel
geometry effect might be regained if the modeled pixel happens to fall in the center of a
container that in reality has cargo stacked at its edges. The bottom line is that there are
competing negligible gains and losses depending on the difference between the model
and reality and as resolution increases, these divergences disappear.
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6.5 Cargo Model Summary
The most important part of any radiation transport model is the accurate characterization
of intervening materials that attenuate the signal. Because signal attenuation in air
depends essentially on only solid angle and attenuation in matter depends on much higher
exponents, a significant gain in radiation transport is likely with a lumped density model.
Pixelizing the cargo allows for quantification of air volumes, calculated from known
shipping tonnages and material densities. The inclusion of air redistributes the modeled
cargo into lumped densities, which are more representative of real cargo. The new pixel
approach in combination with probabilistic density distribution improves the accuracy of
existing models.
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Chapter 7: Results and Discussion
This chapter presents the results of MCNP simulations, which directly characterize the
capabilities of the ship-based approach. To increase confidence in the results and quantify
the effects of varying parameters, 38 different simulations were made based on the three
pixel arrays. The simulation and subsequent data processing of all 38 input files was time
intensive and despite the advantage of running more cases, a cut-off had to be set. Three
different arrays were run as controls while variable parameters changed. Variables
include fissile material, fissile mass, gamma energy and shielding. Also, average cargo
density runs were made for each of the above variables as a comparison to other current
projects adopting this model. Clearly, there is an incentive to continue the simulation for
more than three different random arrays where more reasonable best and worst case
scenarios might be statistically established. Only two arrays were in the original set of
input decks, but third array was chosen for its concentration of dense materials in one
location. The intent was to demonstrate the limitations of the system in the rare case that
several containers worth of dense material are concentrated in one part of the ship. The
results of all 38 simulations are presented in this chapter in graphical form.
7.1 Control and Variable Description
To set the stage for presentation of results, it is important to delineate the different input
decks with the intent of describing postulated radiation source and shielding scenarios. In
previous sections (4.1 and 6.2), the detailed model of the weapon and cargo was
described for a standard case. It remains to outline the motivation for changing the
radiation source variables.
There is no way of knowing, a priori, what type of weapon might be smuggled in a
containership, especially given the nature of the enemy and the consequences of being
caught with a stolen nuclear weapon. It is therefore crucial to plan for and be able to
detect all possible scenarios. While it is safe to assume that WgU or WgPu will be in the
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weapon, it is not at all clear how much will be there. The control model given by Fetter,
et al., assumes a uranium content of 12.2 kg or a plutonium content of 4 kg. A study of
weapon design is far out of the scope of this thesis, but one obvious thought is that a
terrorist group might not be as efficient as a state and would therefore require more fissile
material. Not at all suggesting any design considerations and to study the effect of an
increased fissile mass, some simulations were run with 50 kg of WgU and others with 12
kg of WgPu. This was done with the intent that a thorough review would be made by
qualified individuals and the MCNP model could then be rescaled such that different
amounts of fissile material would be present. It is important to stress that no calculations
or other considerations were made and the 50 kg and 12 kg numbers were quite
arbitrarily chosen. Only a rescaling of dimensions occurred to account for the extra
material. All other thicknesses were kept constant. Some perhaps surprising results exist
when comparing fissile mass variations.
Another parameter varied was shielding. There are literally thousands of possible ways
that the terrorist might package the weapon. To conceal the device, it is assumed that
some normal packaging or cargo will also be present in the container; however, this still
allows ample room for a multitude of shielding options. Simple radiation protection
principles apply and the group would likely choose to use the most effective shielding
possible to minimize their chances of being caught. As such, an optimal shielding, within
reason, has been assumed for both photons and neutrons. In models with WgU, the
shielding assumed is an encompassing sphere of lead 2 centimeters thick. For neutrons,
two shields were considered, one 5-centimeter sphere of water equivalent and one 20-
centimeter sphere of polyethylene. Also, as side interest and not at all practical, in one
simulation the entire container was filled with Portland concrete to see what effect it had
on long-term neutron transport.
A quick comment concerning the limitation of 2 centimeters of lead as an optimal
configuration for the terrorist group is necessary. Clearly, one would achieve an optimal
shielding by filling the entire container with lead or some other high-Z material, but this
is not practical. The extra weight of adding large amounts of lead, even on the order of a
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few centimeters, might cause an alarm condition at the port of origin due to the increase
in expected weight and balancing offset during loading. Additionally, it is likely that in
the near future, some cargo will be x-rayed at the port of origin. A large amount of lead
would signal an alarm, especially when the shipping manifesto would indicate less dense
material. Even if only a small number of containers were x-rayed at the port of origin the
thought is that due to the risk of failure, there would be enough of a deterrent against the
use of exorbitant amounts of lead.
Finally, the gamma energy for uranium models was switched between 2615 keV and
1001 keV. Of course, this was done to measure the distance of confident 232U detection
relative to confident 238U detection. Also, the entire spectrum of 232U and daughters was
input to better understand the transport of all gammas (see Appendix D for energies and
intensities). To save on computational time and improve the statistical reliability of the
results, all simulations other than the spectral ones were run with monochromatic sources.
That is, some runs were made with only 2615 keV and some with only 1001 keV
gammas at later rescaled for branching and intensity.
7.2 Number of particles
The sheer number of decay gammas per second makes the simulation of two weeks worth
of radiation computationally prohibitive. Rather, only several minutes of radiation can be
simulated without exceeding the MCNP stride. Stride refers to the ability to generate
truly random numbers and once it has been exceeded, the sequence begins to repeat and
no real useful information is gained. Statistically, the stride is the limiting upside for the
number of particles. Two source strengths were considered for these simulations. The
number of 232U decay gammas over a two minute period for the assumed model is 1.1228
x 109 for 12 kg of uranium and the number of spontaneous fission neutrons is over a 30
second period is 1.320 x 107 for the 4 kg case. A scaling of branching ratios and absolute
intensities was made during data processing. Most importantly, the time was scaled up
for a two-week voyage. The logic that time is, of course, linear and once statistically
significant, it is not physically problematic to scale time from two minutes to two weeks.
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7.3 Model Dimensions
Some dimensions for the MCNP model have been outlined in Chapters 4 and 6, but for
completeness the rest are given here. The weapon sits in a regular 40-foot container. The
dimensions of the container are 6.058 meters long, 2.438 meters wide and 2.591 meters
high. Container walls are normally corrugated, but the model here is flat and assumed
0.27 centimeters thick. The weapon is situated in the center of its container and the
distance from the center of the weapon to the end of the pixel array is 22.28 meters.
7.4 Additional MCNP Modeling Comments
This brief section is included with the intent of describing miscellaneous parts of the
MCNP model for the purpose of completeness. Anywhere that open spaces exist in the
model (for instance in the center of the weapon), an air fill was used. The radiation source
in the fissile material was given a power law distribution, which allows for an accurate
representation of average 232U concentration in a hollowed sphere. Also, MCNP's built-in
function for the spontaneous fission neutron spectrum in 240pu was utilized for plutonium
problems. While the tamper consisted of depleted uranium, no additional 1001 keV
gamma source was included in the simulation because there is no guarantee that a
terrorist would utilize a depleted uranium tamper instead of tungsten or another dense
material. The gamma simulations made measurements using discrete energy bins, each
10 keV wide, ranging from 0 to 3000 keV. It is probably not necessary to state, but the
entire spectrum of neutrons was tallied in one energy bin.
7.5 Distance to Threshold
One of the most important numbers presented in this section is the distance to threshold.
The definition of "distance to threshold" is the distance from the weapon's core at which
the flux falls below the three-sigma detectability limits calculated in section 5.4.
Likewise, the average distance to threshold is an average distance over all measured
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fluxes in a particular case that fall below the three-sigma detectability limit. A tabulated
summary of all distance to threshold cases is shown in Table 7-1 at the end of this
chapter.
7.6 Energy resolution
Because simulations do not consider actual counts by a detector, there is no statistical or
electronic peak broadening. The peaks produced by MCNP are therefore broadened only
by bremsstrahlung and parts of the Compton continuum. There are some advantages and
disadvantages to this representation. As in any model, it is impossible to precisely
reproduce the physical world. In this case, the departure from the real world comes in the
form of double and single escape peaks, electrical noise, pulse shaping and general
engineering irregularities. The model is not without advantage as it gives an absolute
number of gammas that will cross the detector's surface area at a certain energy and
discounts real world inconsistencies for the purpose of physics quantification. The
engineering aspects such as inefficiencies can be addressed at a later time.
Typically, the way that data processors account for peak broadening is to define an
energy range in their multi-channel analyzer. Any gamma falling within that energy
range is then counted and a continuous spectrum is formed by approximation and
extrapolation. The total number of counts attributed to a peak is then calculated by
discrete summation over a specified full-width half-max (FWHM) which corresponds, in
part, to the detector's energy resolution. Fortunately, the discretization of energies is
exactly what MCNP does when it creates energy "bins". If a gamma falls into a user-
specified energy range, it is counted and in this way MCNP models an MCA very well.
There are two opposing forces at play: one physical process (electrical noise, pulse
shaping, etc.) that tends to broaden discrete gamma energies thus making them
continuous and one analytical process (MCA) that discretizes the continuum. MCNP does
not account for the physical broadening but does discretize the energies. Therefore, all
results presented below have a defined energy range encompassing a tall, thin peak and
with a very fine energy resolution. Unlike a real world detector, the model allows for a
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narrow energy range to be defined and all the expected contributions from that discrete
gamma energy will be counted. For example, in many of the results quoted below, a
small energy range of 20 keV (two 10 keV bins) was defined around the 2615 keV peak
and all gammas were counted. In the real world, a range of perhaps 100 keV or more
would be necessary to account for all the gammas. Either way, both the MCNP model
binning and the real world MCA binning theoretically count the same gammas; the real
world simply has a wider range to count.
7.7 Simulation Results
The following section presents some of the most important conclusions of this thesis and
serves to quantify the capabilities of the ship-based system. The graphs presented here
consist of flux estimates based on surface tallies in MCNP. It is important to note that
these numbers are fluxes, not counts. Some degree of detection efficiency and dead-time
losses will have to be taken into account. Efficiency losses should account for no more
than a factor of 4-6 reduction. Detectability limits are also quoted from section 5.4 in
terms of flux so that a direct comparison can be made without taking into consideration
any efficiency losses. The flux across all weapon-facing surfaces was measured using the
MCNP tally surface-segmenting feature.
7.7.1 Spectral Simulation
It makes sense to begin the presentation of simulation results by looking at the spectral
attenuation of the signal as it propagates through both the weapon and cargo. To
accomplish this, the intensities of the entire litany of 232U decay gammas (see Appendix
D) were input and measured at various interfaces. To quantify the effects of self-
shielding, measurements were made within the weapon at surfaces directly outside the
core, reflector, tamper and high explosives. Surface measurements were also made at
several pixel interfaces to show why, even through air, low energy gammas offer little to
no value for detection of fissile material from any practical distance. The following charts
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represent the entire series of spectral flux measurements and it is important to keep in
mind that each peak will be broadened during detection due to counting statistics and
interactions within the crystal. The first plot presented, Figure 7-1, is the spectrum of
radiation comning out of the weapon core.
232 U Spectrum Through Core WgU for Two-week Voyage,
12 kg of 30-Year Old U, 100 ppt 232U
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Figure 7-1: 232U spectrum through core
The key interest is to search for peaks with high energy, which will have better transport
and lower background. Several major peaks have been identified, but the large difference
in counts and background of the 2615 keV peak is obvious and clearly the most attractive
for detecting uranium. The 212Bi peaks are of interest because of their high energy and
low background; however, they are all orders of magnitude less intense than the 2615
keV peak.
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Moving outward through the weapon, 
Figure 7-2 shows the spectrum 
through the
reflector.
232U Spectrum Through Reflector 
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Figure 7-2: 232U spectrum through 
reflector
Not much difference is seen as the 
radiation travels through the relatively 
thin reflector,
but a slight attenuation is occurring 
at low energies. For the most part, 
photons leaving
the core also travel through the reflector. 
Figure 7-3 shows the spectrum through 
the
depleted uranium tamper. Recall 
that the depleted uranium was not 
considered another
source and no contribution to the 
spectrum was simulated for the 
tamper.
100
1.E+1L
1. E+1 z
1 .E+ 1
1 ,E+1C
0
C)
1 .E+(
1 I:4
E+ 2000
2500
A.
.
.
, I .
I Z Kg UI Jv- I %'-' - --- '
2 32U Spectrum Through Tamper for Two-week Voyage,
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Figure 7-3: 232U spectrum through tamper
A significant attenuation of low energy gammas occurred through the dense, high-Z
tamper. The higher energy bismuth and thallium gammas still transport well, although
more than an order of magnitude drop in each peak occurred. The next measurement was
made at the edge of the high explosives, which essentially gives the spectrum of gammas
from 232U leaving the weapon and is shown in Figure 7-4.
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2 3 2 U Spectrum Through High Explosives for Two-week
Voyage, 12 kg of 30-Year Old U, 100 ppt 232U
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Figure 7-4: 232U spectrum through high explosives
More attenuation occurred through the thick high explosives as several peaks have begun
to vanish. The bremsstrahlung continuum can now be plainly seen superimposed over the
Compton continuum in the low energy regime. Only four major peaks of interest still
exist-three bismuth and one thallium-once the radiation has left the weapon and self-
shielding has occurred. The next series of charts tracks the attenuation of radiation after it
has left the weapon and once it is traveling through the cargo. No pixilated cargo is
present; instead, a uniform density has been used so that the attenuation of lower energy
gammas can be plainly seen.
102
.. v ....
Figures 7-5 through 7-8 show the evolution of the spectrum as it travels through the
uniform density cargo. Uniform density was chosen for the spectral simulation to
eliminate ambiguity as is meant only to show relative attenuation, not represent real
cargo. Distances measured at the surface of each pixel are given in the chart title (the
uneven distances are due to the width of the cargo container).
2 3 2 U Spectrum at 1.28 Meters for Two-week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year-
old U, 100 ppt 2 32 U, Average Cargo Density @ 0.1923 gm/cm 3
500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Energy (keV)
Figure 7-5: 232U spectrum at 1.28 meters
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Figure 7-6: 232U spectrum at 2.78 meters
232U Spectrum at 4.28 Meters for Two-week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-Year
Old U, 100 ppt 2 32U, Average Cargo Density @ 0.1923 gm/cm 3
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Figure 7-7: 32U spectrum at 4.28 meters
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After around four meters of uniform density cargo, all except the 2615 keV peak have
fallen into the background. The 208TI signal still remains on the order of 1,000 particles
above the background continuum.
7.7.2 Signal Attenuation in Air
In this section, simulation results are presented that measure the amount of attenuation in
air. The inclusion of these elementary results might at first seem superfluous, but the
intent is to build a visual contrast between the model of radiation transport in air, the
model of radiation transport in a uniform density (presented in 7.7.3) and the model of
radiation transport in the pixel model which will fall between air and uniform density. As
will be a common theme throughout this chapter, there are four cases presented here, one
with 12.2 kg of WgU, one with 50 kg of WgU, one with 4 kg of WgPu and 12 kg of
WgPu.
The 3-dimensional surface plot will be used to present many of the subsequent results.
Each point is defined by the flux measured on the weapon-facing side of each pixel.
Three dimensions are required to present two-dimensional variations, so that presenting
the flux over the three-dimensional MCNP model would demand an inaccessible fourth
dimension. To circumvent this problem, the vertical direction has been suppressed by
averaging fluxes from all five pixels stacked on top of each other into one flux. The
following surface plots then represent both the east-west and north-south directional
variations but an average over all the up-down variations. This manner of presentation
actually improves the accuracy of the results because it takes into account all five up-
down pixels in one plot, thereby reducing the variance. In a simpler way, it may be useful
to just think of an array of pixels in just the east-west and north-south directions and what
is plotted in Figure 7-8 is the variation of flux through a 2-dimensional pixel array.
The variation of gamma signal in air as it propagates through the pixel array is plotted in
the following figures and represents the best-case scenario for radiation transport. Figures
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7-8 through 7-1 can be thought of as a ceiling for the maximum fluxes possible after
self-shielding by the weapon, but with no cargo present.
2615 keV Flux per m2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, in Air
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Figure 7-8: 2615 keV flux 12 kilograms of uranium in air
As expected, the essentially /r 2 attenuation of signal due to solid angle is seen and very
little, if any, attenuation occurs due to Compton scattering or pair production. Figure 7-9
shows the case with 50 kg of uranium.
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2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 50 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, in Air
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Figure 7-9: 2615 keV flux 50 kg U in air
The same linear drop is seen with 50 kg of uranium as expected. One important and
unexpected phenomenon can be seen here. As a result of the thicker core, the effects of
the weapon self-shielding have caused enough attenuation to bring flux levels below the
12 kg model. The distribution of source particles throughout the core has been held
constant, but a significant portion of inward lying particles do not make it out. More
quantitatively, the distribution of source particles falls off as 1/r2 with distance, while r is
in the exponent of signal attenuation. For the 50 kg case, a back-of-the-envelope
approximation shows the expected effect that the signal should be reduced by roughly
1/3, which was measured (see Appendix E for the calculation).
Figures 7-10 and 7-11 I show the 4 kg and 12 kg of plutonium models in air. The linear
behavior on the log plot shows the expected decay of neutron signal. Also of note is the
extremely flat plane, which indicates that uniform scattering has occurred.
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Neutron Flux per m2 for 2 Week voyage, 4 kg Pu,
in Air
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Figure 7-10: Neutron flux 4 kg of Pu in air
Neutron Flux per m2 for 2 Week voyage, 12 kg Pu,
in Air
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Figure 7-11: Neutron flux 12 kg of Pu in air
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7.7.3 Signal Attenuation in a Uniform Density Model
Using the uniform density model commonly adopted in current practice, five more
simulations were carried out. Four of the five cases correspond to the air models run
above and an additional case is run for the 1001 keV gamma. The uniform density model
assumes the 0.1923 gm/cm 3 calculated in section 6.2.3 across the entire array of pixels.
Additionally, a common composition was chosen to represent an average cargo. Isotopic
composition for the uniform density material was based on a weighted average of other
cargo materials. As expected, this consisted mostly of organics with some iron and
aluminum. The intent of this section is to give a worst-case scenario where no free air
pathways are allowed. It is also meant to match simulations run elsewhere with a uniform
density model. One of the basic themes of this thesis lies in the comparison of results
from this section and subsequent sections, which present a more accurate pixilated cargo
model.
Each surface plot lower range has been truncated at 10,000 counts because anything
below this level falls well into the noise and is below detectability limits. There exists a
potentially erroneous inference that a flux of 10,000 particles at is seen at this level due to
the flat floor of the graph; but that is not the case, in fact the surface plot falls well below
the defined floor. Figure 7-12 shows the flux plot for the 12 kilogram uranium weapon in
the uniform density model.
The lower-bound case of Figure 7-12 shows a significantly steeper gradient than the air
models. In this case, the flux drops below the detectability threshold of -20,000 at
around 10 meters, which corresponds to about four total containers (three with cargo, one
corresponding to the weapon/detector) worth of linear coverage. The 50 kg model
follows in Figure 7-13 for comparison.
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2615 keV Flux per m2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Uniform Density @ 0.1923 gm/cm 3
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Figure 7-12: 2615 keV flux 12 kg U, uniform density model
2615 keV Flux per m2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 50 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Uniform Density @ 0.1923 gm/cm 3
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Figure 7-13: 2615 keV flux 50 kg U, uniform density model
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Not much difference is seen between the 50 kg model and the 12 kg model, although the
lower flux out of the larger core is seen in this case as well. The signal drops below the
three-sigma limit at around 8.5 meters, an additional 1.5 meters less than the 12 kg
simulation.
To set a basis for estimation of the 1001 line, an exact replica of the 12 kg model
presented above was simulated except the gamma energy was changed. The results are
shown in Figure 7-14.
1001 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 2 3 2 U, Uniform Density @ 0.1923 gm/cm 3
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Figure 7-14: 1001 keV flux 12 kilograms uranium, uniform density model
There is clearly a significant difference between the 1001 keV transport and the 2615
keV transport The 1001 line will not be seen above detectability threshold past about 4.5
meters in the uniform density model.
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Neutron transport was also simulated using the uniform density model to establish a
lower bound for plutonium detection as well. Shown in Figure 7-15 is the 4 kg case.
Neutron Flux per m 2 for 2 Week voyage, 4 kg Pu,
Uniform Density @ 0.1923 gm/cm 3
Flux
4.54.5
Figure 7-15: Neutron flux 4 kg Pu, uniform density model
Neutron transport through uniform density is actually rather significant. Recall the
detectability threshold for neutrons was just over 100,000. This means that 4 kg of
plutonium can be seen through around 10 meters of material in the uniform density
approximation. Some additional counts and a jagged plane are seen below the
detectability limit, but can be attributed to statistical noise since scattering should still be
fairly uniform with a uniform material. The 12 kg version is presented in Figure 7-16.
Unlike the gamma situation for increased fissile material, three times as much plutonium
leads to a significant increase in distance of confident detection. The detectability
threshold is not reached until about 12 meters in this case. The difference in gamma and
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Neutron Flux per m 2 for 2 Week voyage, 12 kg Pu,
Uniform Density @ 0.1923 gm/cm 3
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Figure 7-16: Neutron flux 12 kg Pu, uniform density model
neutron transport with increasing fissile mass should be apparent. Additional self-
shielding severely affects the gamma signal because of its dense, high-Z material; while
the extra fissile material hardly serves to slow down neutrons. Also, as explained in more
detail in section 7.7.4.3.2, the extra neutron multiplication due to a large geometry (less
leakage) is evident.
7.7.4 Results with Pixelized Cargo
The pixelized model of cargo is a more accurate construct for radiation transport. The
relative merit of the approach was discussed in detail in section 6.4, but an adjustment of
perception can now be more concretely understood in the context of the air and uniform
density models presented above. The air model is an upper bound, while the uniform
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density model represents a lower bound and the pixel model, a mixture of air and cargo,
should fall somewhere in between.
Three different pixel arrays were chosen and each of the five cases was simulated to
better characterize the distance to threshold. The three arrays of materials, including 700
pixels each, are relegated to Appendix F for reference. Again, it is essential that the 3/4 air
by volume cargo model is based on known shipping quantities and no assumptions are
built into the volume calculation. The results quoted below are the very substance of the
entire thesis and everything discussed to this point has been both a preparation and
justification for these results, which are based on reasonable, but conservatively biased
assumptions.
7.7.4.1 2615 keV Transport
7.7.4.1.1 12 Kilograms of Uranium
2615 keV gamma radiation transport is shown in Figure 7-17 for the base case of 12
kilograms of uranium, implosion-based weapon with 100 parts per trillion 232U over a
two-week voyage.
Studying Figure 7-17, it should be clear that the more accurate model, allowing pathways
of air for partially unimpeded signal propagation, gives results of great significance. The
detectability limit of -20,000 particles is only breached in a couple of locations at
distances less than 22 meters. More importantly, an order of magnitude over the threshold
is seen in some places past 22 meters. The average distance to threshold can be
extrapolated out to around 25 meters. As shown by Broderick, the distance of 20 to 22
meters is important because large decreases in number of containerized detectors needed
to cover a ship at these ranges are seen (details will follow in Chapter 8) [Broderick,
2004]. The deployment of the ship-based approach is practical for a much lower distance
to threshold than 25 meters and the results suggested by the surface plot of Figure 7-17
are extremely encouraging.
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2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #1
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Figure 7-17: 2615 keV flux 12 kg U, pixel array #1
It may be important at this point to reproduce the above plot with a different scale. It is
quite non-intuitive that any radiation would make it through 22+ meters of material
because the tendency is to rely on the exponential signal decay equation. However, this
reliance should not mask the larger picture, which points precisely the advantage of
sensitivity with the ship-based approach. The fact that 2 weeks of count time is available
for measurement and that there are a large number of source particles produced during
that time should not be underestimated. To better illustrate this point and alleviate over-
reliance on intuition, Figure 7-17 is reproduced in Figure 7-18 which is scaled in terms of
flux per source particle.
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2615 keV Flux per Source Particle per m2, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #1
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Figure 7-18: 2615 keV flux per source particle, 12 kg U, pixel array #1
It is notable that on average only around 1 in 1012 particles are reaching the detector at
22+ meters; but this low transmission rate is well over detection limits during the two
week voyage. This should solidify the case that a reliance on radiation transport intuition
is not pertinent to the situation. It is unlikely that many experiments are carried out such
that only in 1012 particles are actually seen so that there is no basis for intuition in this
case. 4 The end result is that fluxes of 10,000-100,000 particles still reach detectors at 22+
meters due to the long count time for a 2-week voyage.
The above and following graphs are interesting from another perspective in that they are
not smooth. The bumpiness seen is due to the discontinuous nature of the pixelized cargo
and it is clear that some pixels significantly attenuate the signal and some pathways of air
4 An acknowledgement of the scientists looking for neutrinos is necessary here since they are dealing with a
much smaller number of detection events per particle.
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lend themselves to extremely good transport. It is an interesting exercise to match the
pixel materials to the gradients seen in these graphs. For instance, a look at the pixel
located 2 meters off center and around 13 meters deep in Figure 7-17 appears to have
significantly affected the signal relative to surrounding pixels. After cross-referencing the
pixel array, it turns out that some steel and iron and fertilizer occurred in significant
quantities at this location. Pixel array #2 is presented in Figure 7-19 for the same weapon
model.
2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #2
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Figure 7-19: 2615 keV flux 12 kg U, pixel array #2
It appears that the random array output for pixel array #2 consists of slightly more
attenuating material deeper in the array. As compared to array #1, both fluxes drop below
one million around the 11-12 meter range, but array #2 drops rather quickly to below
100,000 particles by 16-17 meters. Even with the abrupt drop, the detectability threshold
is not breached before 20 meters and fluxes near 100,000 are still seen in the end in the
center. A good estimate of the average distance to threshold for pixel #2 is around 21
meters.
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It was the original intent of this work to run all cases for two different pixel models as a
first order check of accuracy. However, to worsen the uniform density approximation and
see what might prevent the system from detecting a weapon, the random pixel generator
was iterated extensively until a large grouping of dense materials ended up in one place.
Using density probabilities from Table 6-3, the probability of finding a material greater
than 1.0 gm/cm3 is 0.068 in a pixel. In this third pixel model, the probability of having
such an arrangement of dense materials (see Appendix F) is approximately I out of every
10,000 containerships (just over 1,000 containerships are in operation at any one time,
which translates into approximately 1.7 such arrangements each year for the entire fleet).
Clearly, the probability of having several adjacent and concentrated dense materials is
exceeding low. This might represent the nightmare case where several cargo constituents
like farm machinery and bulk copper are stacked between the detector and weapon in
concentrated locations. Somewhat surprisingly, the results shown in Figure 7-20 are not
so discouraging and if the detector happens not to be directly behind the dense
arrangement, then the signal will easily propagate through (as seen on the left side of
Figure 7-20).
2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage,
12 kg of 30-year old U, 100 ppt 2 32U, Pixel Array #3
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Figure 7-20: 2615 keV flux 12 kg U, pixel array #3
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The effect of the concentrated and repeated high-density pixels is obvious on the right
side of the graph. On the right side, the detectability threshold is breached at around 8
meters; and on the left side, it is not breached until after 20 meters. The results on the
right are not so disappointing and look much like the uniform density model ranges seen
above. Despite the concentrated dense materials, the same distance to threshold is
attained because there are still limited pathways of air in this region, allowing some free
transport. Even with the dense materials concentrated on the right side, the average
distance to threshold over the whole array is still 13 meters.
7.7.4.1.2 50 Kilograms of Uranium
As another variation of transport, the effect of changing the amount of uranium was
studied. The fissile mass of the weapon was changed to 50 kg and the same arrays used
above were simulated. The results of pixel array #1 are shown for the 50 kilogram case in
Figure 7-21. Some parts of the array allow for gamma transport above detectability
limits past 22 meters and the average distance to threshold is around 20.5 meters.
Consistent with the self-shielding discussed above, the fluxes are slightly lower for the 50
kilogram case.
The effect of increased uranium mass has been quantified in Figure 7-22 by calculating
the ratio of fluxes from the 50 kilogram model to those from the 12 kg model. The ratio is
constant at around 2.6 for most of the array, but diverges into a noisy region where some
areas drop below the detectability limit. Figure 7-22 agrees to good approximation with
the expected 3-fold increase in flux for the 12 kg model calculated in appendix E.
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2615 keV Flux per m2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 50 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #1
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Figure 7-21: 2615 keV flux 50 kg U, pixel array #1
Fissile Mass Comparison, 12 kg/50 kg Flux, Pixel Array #1
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Figure 7-22: Ratio of 50 kg/12 kg fluxes, pixel array #1
120
The results of pixel array #2 are shown in Figure 7-23.
2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 50 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #2
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Figure 7-23: 2615 keV flux 50 kg U, pixel array #2
A similar pattern emerges with this pixel array. As in the 12 kg model for pixel array #2,
gamma transport lowers the average distance to threshold, which in this case is around
19.5 meters. The ratio of 12 kg to 50 kg is extremely similar to Figure 7-22 above and is
not shown to eliminate redundancy.
Pixel array #3, with the concentration of dense materials, is shown in Figure 7-24. As
expected, the same effect as the 12 kg case is seen but with the detectability distances
lowered. The average distance to detectability for this case is 12 meters.
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2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 50 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #3
Flux
Me-
O' 2 - Meters
Figure 7-24: 2615 keV flux 12 kilograms uranium, pixel array #3
7.7.4.2 1001 keV Transport
To simulate the 1001 keV gamma from 238U, exactly the same pixel arrays and 12 kg
weapon model were input and only the source energy changed. The following three
simulations were run to quantify the flux of 1001 keV gammas through the pixelized
cargo. Figure 7-25 shows pixel array #1.
The results are not as encouraging as the 2615 keV transport, but that is to be expected
due to the much lower energy. Still, the detection threshold of -20,000 is not crossed
until 13-14 meters; and in the center, the flux stays above the limit until 17 meters. The
average distance to threshold for this case is 15.5 meters, which is still a quite practical
distance for detecting virgin uranium.
122
)o
1001 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #1
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Figure 7-25: 1001 keV flux 12 kg U, pixel array #1
The discrepancy in transport between the two energies is precisely why no detectability
t
credit was given for spectroscopic background reduction techniques (see section 5.3.4.2).
No credit was clearly an overstatement because through at least 13 meters, some source
verification using the 1001 keV line is not just possible, but practical. It should be noted
228that, while not explicitly simulated, the flux from the 911 keV gamma from 228Ac should
be only slightly less than the 1001 keV graphs.
It may also be useful to point out that while the natural uranium tamper was not
considered a source, the 1001 keV flux would be significantly increased if the terrorist
would be careless enough to use it. The -80 kg of extra 238U would produce a 1001 keV
source increase by a factor of at least 6.
Pixel array #2 for 1001 keV transport is shown in Figure 7-26.
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1001 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #2
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Figure 7-26: 1001 keV flux 12 kg U, pixel array #2
Different materials have different attenuation effects at different energies, which is why
pixel array #2 as compared to pixel array #1 was relatively more transparent for the 1001
keV gamma than it was for the 2615 keV gamma. The sharp drop off is still seen around
16-17 meters, but there is more signal allowance from about 10-15 meters. Pixel array #2
is a little more convex in the center than pixel array #1 relative to the 2615 keV results
because, at lower energies, Compton scattering is more prominent and pair production
cannot occur (because 001 keV < 2mec2). The threshold for detectability here is on
average around 13.5 meters.
The locally dense pixel array #3 is shown in Figure 7-27.
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1001 keV Flux per m2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #3
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Figure 7-27: 1001 keV flux 12 kg U, pixel array #3
As expected, the flux falls rapidly near the 8 meters seen for the same 2615 keV case
above. The average distance to threshold is around 9.5 meters.
7.7.4.3 Neutron Transport
All three pixel arrays were also subject to the built-in 24 0Pu spontaneous fission spectrum
for fissile masses of 4 kg and 12 kg. The transport of neutrons through cargo is expected
to be much different than photons with scattering events dominating such that the entire
spectrum of neutrons was measured instead of discrete energy bins. If a neutron crossed a
pixel's surface, it was counted regardless of energy. One other note on energy is that by
the time the neutrons reach into the cargo, they have been well-thermalized and there is
no need for a commonly used moderator surrounding the neutron detector, so no such
material was built in to the simulation.
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7.7.4.3.1 4 Kilograms of Plutonium
Figure 7-28 shows the expected flux throughout the pixelized cargo with a source of
56,000 spontaneous fission neutrons per kilogram per second for pixel array #1.
Neutron Flux per m2 for 2 Week voyage, 4 kg Pu,
Pixel Array #1
Flux
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Figure 7-28: Neutron flux 4 kg Pu, pixel array #1
The surface is still bumpy, but somewhat smoother than the gamma plots, especially
deeper into the cargo. The reason for this smoothing effect is of course that neutrons have
been scattering in every direction, causing lateral and even backward migration
throughout the cargo. The detectability threshold for three-sigma confidence is just over
100,000 and for pixel array #1, it is not breached on the corners until 20-22 meters. As
with the gamma plots, some paths allow for fluxes out of the pixel array at greater than
22 meters that are significantly higher than the threshold. An extrapolation with similar
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cargo might see the distance to threshold at somewhere around 25-26 meters for several
pixels and an average distance would occur at around 23.5 meters. Needless to say, these
results are extremely encouraging and will be cross referenced with thesis work from
Broderick to show how many neutron detectors are required to adequately cover each
type of containership (see Chapter 8).
The results of neutron transport simulation through pixel array #2 are shown in Figure
7-29.
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Figure 7-29: Neutron flux 4 kg Pu, pixel array #2
The flux pattern for pixel array #2 shows slightly poorer transport, especially in the
middle. A fairly uniform signal attenuation occurs throughout the array, but a noticeable
absorbing area is seen on the right from 8-1 1 meters. There are several materials in this
area with higher neutron capture cross-sections. The distance to threshold extends slightly
beyond the array except for the right side where threshold is met at around 21.5 meters.
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An average distance to threshold might be postulated slightly below pixel array #1 at
around 23-24 meters.
Pixel array #3 is shown in Figure 7-30.
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Figure 7-30: Neutron flux 4 kg Pu, pixel array #3
Recall that pixel array #3 was chosen with a high concentration of dense material on the
right side at around 8 meters. As expected, what is bad for photons is not so bad for
neutrons and the concentration of high-Z material has little effect, allowing neutrons to
travel through with less thermalization. In fact, it is hard to see any effect and pixel array
#3 shows a smooth surface. Similar to the other arrays, it is not until the 20-22 meter
range that detectability limits are breached. Again, in some cases an extrapolation of
distance to threshold is necessary to postulate an average, which will be taken as 23.5
meters.
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7.7.4.3.2 12 Kilograms of Plutonium
In this section, the 12 kg case is presented. Each pixel array was kept constant and the
only difference between the results presented in that last section is the fissile mass of
plutonium. Pixel array #1 is shown in Figure 7-31.
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Figure 7-31: Neutron flux 12 kg Pu, pixel array #1
The increased flux of neutrons from the three-fold increase in source strength is readily
seen above as compared to the Figure 7-28. Not a single point in the array falls below the
detectability threshold. With many measurements at the end of the array showing 2 order
of magnitude increase over the detectability limit, the extrapolated average distance to
threshold is 29 meters.
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A closer look at the data reveals an unexpected puzzle. Forming a ratio between the 4 kg
flux and the 12 kg flux produces the surface plot of Figure 7-32.
Flux Ratio from Change in Fissile Mass, Pixel array #1
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Figure 7-32: Ratio of 12 kg/4 kg Pu fluxes, pixel array #1
The ratio of fluxes stays nearly constant throughout 12 meters of the array, but then the
lower fluxes near the end of the graph give rise to a degree of noise. The puzzle is that the
ratio of fluxes exceeds the ratio of increased fissile mass, which should not be possible
since there are only three times as many source neutrons. In fact, the large increase in
flux from the extra fissile mass comes from increased internal neutron multiplication.
Spontaneous fission neutrons can cause additional fissions, which multiply by the
commonly known factor q, the number of neutrons per absorption. Additionally,
increased multiplication occurs due to less leakage in the larger hollow sphere. Other
reactions tend to multiply the number of neutrons including the (n, xn) process in the
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reflector. MCNP keeps track of the total multiplication and prints the number as output.
In the 4 kg case, the multiplication for all reactions was 1.608; while in the 12 kg case,
the total multiplication was 6.096. 5 The inclusion of increased photonuclear events and
(n, xn) reactions, especially in beryllium, along with the factor of four in multiplication
and the factor of three is fissile mass, makes clear the reason for the -30-fold increase in
flux seen in Figure 7-32.
Pixel array #2 for the 12 kilogram model is presented in Figure 7-33.
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Figure 7-33: Neutron flux 12 kg Pu, pixel array #2
The increased flux from a 12 kilogram weapon model is very apparent here. By 22
meters, the flux still has not fallen below one million per m2 . The extrapolated average
5 The multiplication here is not kff; rather it is the number of neutrons created per source neutron.
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distance to threshold is 26 meters and in the center nearly 27 meters. The 30-fold increase
in flux for the 12 kg case is seen in both pixel array #2 and #3, so the redundant charts
corresponding to Figure 7-32 will not be shown.
Pixel array #3 is shown in Figure 7-35.
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Figure 7-34: Neutron flux 12 kg Pu, pixel array #3
Again, the increased flux is easy to see. The extrapolated average distance to threshold is
around 24 meters for this case. A summary of all average distances to threshold will be
provided in the conclusion of this chapter, but there are several cases still to be
characterized.
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7. 7.4.4 Shielded Gamma Transport
To this point, it has been assumed that no shielding was put in place around the weapon.
The assumption may be unjustified because a terrorist group with the technical
competence to build or procure a nuclear weapon will certainly take as many precautions
as necessary to assure its delivery. It stands to reason that the group would attempt to
shield the weapon to minimize the radiation signal. The above results are still valuable
despite the likelihood of shielding. It is also quite possible that a terrorist group would
attempt to conceal the weapon in common packaging to make it appear as benign cargo.
For example, they might conceal the entire weapon, which less than a half-meter in
diameter, as well as firing or booby-trap mechanisms inside a big screen television or
common kitchen appliance such as a refrigerator or oven. While these items would be
slightly heavier than expected, the weight of the weapon with no shielding, -183 kg,
might not raise any significant alarm, especially if shipped alongside other heavy cargo.
If heavily shielded and still hidden inside a big screen television, the extra weight would
be more than noticeable. The unshielded simulations thus correspond to a terrorist
concealing a weapon alongside commonly shipped cargo, while the following shielded
simulations correspond to a terrorist with sole access to a container that will not also
include other cargo.
The way to shield gammas is through a dense, high-Z material, but by nature, these
materials are heavy and thus more noticeable. The inclusion of a sufficiently thick lead
shield surrounding the weapon would be easily distinguished due to its extra weight if the
device were concealed in a large appliance. An optimization of shielding thickness is not
carried out here due to the unknown variables of concealment and port/shipper scrutiny
of cargo weights. Instead, a lead thickness of 2 cm is chosen because it doubles the
weapon weight and may still be barely unnoticeable from simple weight aberration.
For neutrons, shielding is usually done with hydrogen rich substances such as water,
concrete, polyethylene or paraffin wax. There is no weight constraint to the shield size
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because all of these items would appear and weigh too much like typical cargo. As such,
the shielding scenarios for neutrons include much more material. Several scenarios were
considered for neutrons; the 4 kg case was shielded with 5 centimeters of a water-like
substance, the 12 kg case was shielded with 20 centimeters of polyethylene. One final
worst-case was considered where the entire container was backfilled with Portland
concrete.
7.7.4.4.1 12 Kilograms of Uranium, Shielded
The following results are from exact replicas of the cases shown in Figures 7-17, 7-19
and 7-20 except a 2-centimeter thick sphere of lead surrounds the weapon. Pixel array #1
is shown in Figure 7-35.
2615 keV Flux per m2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #1, Shielded with 2 cm of Lead
Flux
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Figure 7-35: 2615 keV flux 12 kg U, shielded with 2 cm of lead, pixel array #1
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The effect of lead shielding is surprisingly minimal, but not insignificant. There is still an
above threshold flux at 20+ meters and the average distance to threshold is about 19.5
meters. Even with a heavy, 2 cm thick sphere of lead surrounding the weapon, the ship-
based system can see through almost 20 meters of cargo on average. As compared to the
base case, unshielded pixel array #1 shows better transport, but not by orders of
magnitude. To quantify the effect of shielding, a simple ratio of the shielded case divided
by the unshielded case was calculated and plotted in Figure 7-36.
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Figure 7-36: Ratio of unshielded/shielded flux 12 kg U, pixel array #1
The interesting thing to note about Figure 7-36 is that, except for some noise after 15
meters, there is only around a factor of 3 difference in the two cases. Even in the noise,
there is no more than a factor of 5 reduction in flux. That is, a terrorist would have to be
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willing to risk detection by excess weight to gain only a factor of 3-5 reduction in flux. It
is not clear that the benefit of the lower flux is worth the extra risk for the terrorist, but
this is pure speculation. It is, however, quite clear that the system will still detect their
lead shielded weapon from around 20 meters with three sigma confidence.
The shielded version of pixel array #2 is shown in Figure 7-37.
2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
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Figure 7-37: 2615 keV flux 12 kg U, shielded with 2 cm of lead, pixel array #2
The shielding case in pixel array #2 is slightly more limiting than pixel array #1 with
distance to threshold over 22 meters only seen in the direct center, while an average
distance is closer to 19 meters. The unshielded/shielded ratio for pixel array #2 is shown
in Figure 7-38.
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Figure 7-38: Ratio of unshielded/shielded flux 12 kg U, pixel array #2
An extremely similar plot is seen in pixel array #2, reinforcing confidence in the results
presented for pixel array #1.
Continuing, pixel array #3 is shown in Figure 7-39. Just as in the normal case, the high-
density concentration of cargo on the right side has taken its toll on the flux. For the
shielded case, the detectability threshold is reached about a half-meter sooner, 7.5 meters,
on the right side of the plot. A decent transport through the left side allows the average
distance to threshold of the whole array to be around 10 meters. The shielded/unshielded
ratio is shown in Figure 7-40 for pixel array #3.
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2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 12 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #3, Shielded with 2 cm of Lead
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Figure 7-39: 2615 keV flux 12 kg U, shielded with 2 cm of lead, pixel array #3
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Figure 7-40: Ratio of unshielded/shielded flux 12 kg U, pixel array #3
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Again, a similar result is seen in this array. The drop to zero on the left side is prominent
because there is no flux to form the ratio in this location.
7.7.4.4.2 50 Kilograms of Uranium, Shielded
As in section 7.7.4.4.1, 2 centimeters of lead shielding was placed around the 50 kg
weapon model and measurements were made for all three arrays. The results are shown
in Figure 7-41 for pixel array #1.
2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 50 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel Array #1, Shielded with 2 cm of Lead
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Figure 7-41: 2615 keV flux 50 kg U, shielded with 2 cm of lead, pixel array #1
The same ratio consideration applies in the shielded case of 12 kg/50 kg flux as the
unshielded case. Fluxes are reduced to around a third of their 12 kg values. Still, a
significant flux of gammas can be seen towards the back of the array. The average
distance to threshold is around 18.5 meters in this case.
Shown in Figure 7-42 is the pixel array #2 case. The average distance to threshold for this
case is 17.5 meters. The shielding ratios are similar to Figure 7-40 and are not shown.
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2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 50 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel array #2, Shielded with 2 cm of Lead
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Figure 7-42: 2615 keV flux 50 kg U, shielded with 2 cm of lead, pixel array #2
2615 keV Flux per m 2 for a 2 Week Voyage, 50 kg of 30-year old U,
100 ppt 232U, Pixel array #3, Shielded with 2 cm of Lead
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Figure 7-43: 2615 keV flux 50 kg U, shielded with 2 cm of lead, pixel array #3
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Pixel array #3 is shown in Figure 7-43 for completeness. The additional attenuation
results of pixel array #3 are very similar to those shown in similar cases. The distance to
threshold is around 7.5 to 8 meters along the right side and the average distance for the
whole array is around 11 meters.
7.7.4.5 Shielded Neutron Transport
7.7.4.5.1 4 Kilograms of Plutonium, Shielded
In a very similar fashion to the shielded gamma simulations, neutrons shielded with 5
centimeters of water equivalent are presented in this section for each of the three arrays.
The shielded case for pixel array #1 is shown in Figure 7-44.
Neutron Flux per m2 for 2 Week voyage, 4 kg Pu,
Pixel Array #1, Shielded with 5 cm of Water
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Figure 7-44: Neutron flux 4 kg Pu, shielded with 5 cm of water, pixel array #1
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The above surface plot shows that the shielding has little effect on the neutron flux as
compared to the unshielded case. The detectability threshold is not breached except in the
corners and the extrapolated average distance to threshold is around 25 meters. There is
very little difference between this case and the unshielded case. The unshielded/shielded
ratio is plotted in Figure 7-45.
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Figure 7-45: Ratio of unshielded/shielded flux 4 kg Pu, shielded with 5 cm of water,
pixel array #1
The ratio is almost exactly one throughout most of the array. More noise is seen with
neutrons as the scattering process is random and more directional variation presumably
occurs near the end of the array where neutrons have undergone many, many scattering
events. An interesting thing to note in the Figure 7-45 is that there is little to no effect on
the flux at the front of the pixel array with the water-like shield in place as compared to
the unshielded model (Figure 7-28). A faster thermalization of neutrons due to the shield
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is occurring, but there is only a minimal amount of extra capture. Thermalized slightly
more, neutrons have a higher chance of removal, but the above chart suggests that this
effect is nearly negligible for the 5 centimeters of extra water-like material.
The graph in Figure 7-46 shows the results in pixel array #2.
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Figure 7-46: Neutron flux 4 kg Pu, shielded with 5 cm of water, pixel array #2
The shielded case did not significantly alter the neutron transport. The
unshielded/shielded ratio looks nearly identical to the one for pixel array #1 and the
average distance to threshold is taken to be 25 meters. For completeness, pixel array #3 is
shown in Figure 7-47.
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Figure 7-47: Neutron flux 4 kg Pu, shielded with 5 cm of water, pixel array #3
Again, little differs from the unshielded case. The distance to threshold is again beyond
the edge of the pixel array, but an extrapolation gives a distance of around 24 meters. The
unshielded/shielded ratio is also similar to array #1.
7.7.4.5.2 12 Kilograms of Plutonium, Shielded
In the same way that a 12 kilogram unshielded model was simulated in section 7.7.4.3.2,
a 12 kilogram model with shielding was simulated using the three pixel arrays. Because
the results of the unshielded, 12 kg/4 kg ratio was rather predictable and it would be
redundant to show the exact same increase in flux as above, another variable was
changed for the three subsequent plots. In this case, the shielding composition was
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changed to 20 centimeters of polyethylene. The results of the change are shown in Figure
7-48 for pixel array #1.
Neutron Flux per m 2 for 2 Week voyage, 12 kg Pu,
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Figure 7-48: Neutron flux 12 kg Pu, shielded with 20 cm of polyethylene,
pixel array #1
A noticeable, but by no means restrictive, difference can be seen when comparing this
surface plot to the 1l2 kilogram base case. The flux has dropped somewhat through the 20
centimeters of polyethylene, but still not one point on the chart is below detectability
threshold. The average distance to threshold is taken to be around 24.5 meters and
centerline fluxes might be above limits out to 26 meters. The ratio of the base case,
unshielded 12 kg flux to the 20 cm shielded flux is shown in Figure 7-49.
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Figure 7-49: Ratio of unshielded/shielded flux 12 kg Pu, shielded with 20 cm
polyethylene, pixel array #1
The drop off in flux for a 20-centimeter sphere of polyethylene is around a factor of five.
This is a significant improvement in shielding, but still not enough to appreciably affect
the distance to threshold.
The results of the shielded pixel array #2 case are shown in Figure 7-50. The effect of the
20-centimeter shield is seen above and has turned the flux at 21 meters almost uniformly
below one million particles. In this case, the average distance to threshold is 23.5 meters,
slightly lower than in pixel array #1. A plot very similar to Figure 7-49 is not shown.
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Neutron Flux per m 2 for 2 Week voyage, 12 kg Pu,
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Figure 7-50: Neutron flux 12 kg Pu, shielded with 20 cm of polyethylene,
pixel array #2
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Figure 7-51: Neutron flux 12 kg Pu, shielded with 20 cm of polyethylene,
pixel array #3
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Pixel array #3 is presented in Figure 7-51. Pixel array #3 resembles pixel array #2 in that
2the flux at greater than 21 meters consistently falls below one million particles per m2.
The same distance to threshold is found in this case and is taken as 23 meters.
7.7.4.5.3 Concrete Filled Container
In what was expected to be a worst-case shielding scenario, an attempt was made to
completely remove neutrons from the system before they ever reached the pixel array.
This was done by completely filling the space inside the container with Portland concrete
of density 2.3 gm/cm 3. The case is obviously impractical, but the results are interesting
enough that they warrant some attention and actually produce an important conclusion.
Pixel array #2 was chosen with 4 kilograms of plutonium for this case and the results are
shown in Figure 7-52.
The surprising results speak for themselves. Operating over a two-week period, the flux
of neutrons actually making it out of a concrete-filled container is significant. Out to a
distance of 10-11 meters, neutrons can be seen with a three-sigma confidence level. The
conclusion is., of course, that a terrorist will not be able to completely shield a 4-kilogram
plutonium-based weapon such that it cannot be seen through 10 meters of cargo. This is a
very significant statement.
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Neutron Flux per m 2 for 2 Week voyage, 4 kg Pu,
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Figure 7-52: Neutron flux 4 kg Pu, container backfilled with concrete,
pixel array #2
7.8 Summary of Results
Clearly, the physics behind the ship-based approach is favorable; radiation signal
attenuation is extremely high, often losing 10-12 orders of magnitude through 20 meters
of cargo, but it is still significant enough to identify a weapon. Nature has created nuclear
structure such that energetic gammas and neutrons from frequent nuclear decay provide a
signature that can identify an arrangement of fissile material in such a manner that the
threat can be mitigated. Simulations of shielded material measure a strong enough signal
that significantly more shielding might have been assumed.
It has been firmly established that the potential for detection on a containership is
attainable, but it remains to show that the ship-based approach is practical. From a
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physics standpoint, the most important numbers reported above are the fluxes; but from a
practical point of view, the most important results in the multitude of graphs and surface
plots shown above are the average distance to threshold numbers. Recall that distance to
threshold is the distance where the flux falls below the 3cy detectability limit. This
distance can be translated directly into the number of containerized detectors needed to
cover every container in each ship and then to cover all inbound containerships. To set
the stage for the translation and to summarize this chapter, the average distances to
threshold are organized in Table 7-1. The last column is a simple weighted average of the
three pixel arrays. It is weighted for photons such that the worst-case pixel #3 carries a
10% contribution, which is clearly an overstatement given the extremely low probability
(I in 10,000) of such an occurrence.
Table 7-1: Average distance to threshold
Summary of Avera e Distance to Threshold
Distance to Case Average
Threshold Distance to
Pixel Array Fissile Mass (kg) Energy (kev) Shielding (meters) Threshold
#1 12 2615 Self 25.0
#2 12 2615 Self 21.0
#3 12 2615 Self 13.0 22.0
#1 50 2615 Self 20.5
#2 50 2615 Self 19.0
#3 50 2615 Self 12.0 19.0
#1 12 1001 Self 15.5
#2 12 1001 Self 13.5
#3 12 1001 Self 9.5 14.0
#1 12 2615 2 cm Lead 19.5
#2 12 2615 2 cm Lead 19.0
#3 12 2615 2 cm Lead 10.5 18.4
#1 50 2615 2 cm Lead 18.5
#2 50 2615 2 cm Lead 17.5
#3 50 2615 2 cm Lead 11.0 17.3
#1 4 Full Spectrum Self 23.5
#2 4 Full Spectrum Self 23.5
#3 4 Full Spectrum Self 23.5 23.5
#1 12 Full Spectrum Self 29.0
#2 12 Full Spectrum Self 26.0
#3 12 Full Spectrum Self 24.0 26.3
#1 4 Full Spectrum 5 cm Water 25.0
#2 4 Full Spectrum 5 cm Water 25.0
#3 4 Full Spectrum 5 cm Water 24.0 24.7
#1 12 Full Spectrum 20 cm Polyethylene 24.5
#2 12 Full Spectrum 20 cm Polyethylene 23.5
#3 12 Full Spectrum 20 cm Polyethylene 23.0 23.7
#2 12 Full Spectrum Concrete 10.5 10.5
150
Chapter 8: Deployment of the Ship-Based Detector Network
Given the results presented in Chapter 7, the next step is to quantify the number of
containers needed on each ship with varying degrees of coverage. Due to previous thesis
work by Broderick, this task is a straightforward cross-reference [Broderick, 2004]. One
of the important outputs of Broderick's thesis was to set the framework for an easy
translation of distance to threshold into number of containerized detectors needed on each
ship. The details of his calculations and simulations are not summarized here, but are
instead taken as completely relevant since they were created in anticipation of the
numbers produced in this thesis.
Broderick's work delineates two fundamental types of container loading patterns. One
"centerline" pattern is considered where each containerized detector is placed in the
center of the ship for optimal coverage volume. The other is a random pattern where no
control is assumed over the placement of the containerized detectors [Broderick, 2004].
Another major conclusion of Broderick's thesis is that achieving coverage volumes of 80-
90 percent or more shows diminishing returns if done by adding additional containerized
detectors [Broderick, 2004]. It is not cost effective to achieve 100% coverage of a fully
loaded containership from a practical standpoint because the small benefit gained from
adding extra detectors is not worth the additional resources. Some degree of coverage
with respect to cost optimization is therefore necessary, but should be considered in
context of the diminishing increases in deterrence gained by adding additional containers.
It seems safe to assert that a terrorist is unlikely to adjust his level of deterrence if the
system is increased from 75% coverage to 85% coverage; significant gains in deterrence
by denial are likely achieved with much lower coverage percentages.
To help illustrate the concept of coverage volume, the following containership diagrams
have been adapted to show how distance to threshold affects the number of containers
covered [CPHIP, 2003].
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Figure 8-1: Coverage volumes in two-dimensions
The schematic is meant for illustrative purposes and does not match the exact dimensions
of a containership hull; however, it does represent precisely scaled dimensions of
containers and distances to threshold. The shaded containers represent detector units and
"R" defines the distance to threshold. A weapon within the sphere of containers
delineated by R will be detected with a three-sigma confidence level.
The two cases shown above represent the lowest average distance to threshold numbers
resulting from pixel arrays #1 and #2 (see Table 7-1). The left figure is a lead-shielded
50-kg uranium weapon and the right is a polyethylene-shielded 12-kg plutonium weapon.
Much larger circles could be drawn for other cases. For instance, the 29-meter average
distance to threshold for the bare 12-kg plutonium weapon would extend to easily
encompass the entire diagram.
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Of course, this diagram only shows two dimensions of the coverage volume and is
potentially misleading. The total number of containers within the coverage volume
cannot be calculated by cubing the number of containers along R. The container's 40-foot
dimension (perpendicular to the diagram) must be taken into account. Calculations made
by Broderick carefully include all dimensions of both the container and containership.
8.1 Detectors Needed on a Typical Containership
For deployment of the ship-based network of detectors, it is important to know how many
containerized units are required on each ship to give varying degrees of coverage. There
are over a thousand different containerships operating around the globe, but fortunately,
most can be categorized by TEU capacity. Because many containerships are
manufactured to the same specifications, they are easily categorized by capacity: 1440,
2496, 3600, 4800 and 6460 TEU. It is noteworthy that several large containerships with
capacities over 7,000 TEU are currently in shipyards or on order so that a new category
will have to be defined within the next decade [Sallas, 2002].
The number of containerized detectors needed to cover each type of containership is
listed in Table 8-1 for each weapon and shielding case. The average distance to threshold
numbers are taken from the last column in Table 7-1 and the remainder of the chart is
cross-referenced with work from Broderick. Detector coverage volumes are reported as a
percentage of the total volume of the ship. These percentages are, in essence, the amount
of coverage achieved for a fully loaded containership. Under each ship capacity column,
the "R" refers to a randomized placement of containerized detectors and the "C" refers to
the centerline placement of detectors. Some centerline scenarios are blocked out because
they are not physically possible. For instance, with a distance to threshold of only 14
meters, it is not geometrically possible to cover 95% of a 6460 TEU containership with a
centerline deployment.
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Table 8-1: Containerized detectors needed per containership
Containerized Detectors Needed per Containership
Distance to Ship Capacity (EU)
Threshold Percert 1440 2496 3600 4800 6460
Weapon Case (meters) Covered R C R C R C R C R C
2615 keV, 12 kgU 22.0 75 5 3 7 4 9 4 11 4 14 6
85 6 3 9 5 12 4 15 5 18 7
95 3 4 15 5 19 5 24 7 31 9
2615 keV, 50 kg U I 19.0 75 6 3 9 5 12 5 15 6 20 8
85 8 4 12 5 17 5 20 7 27 15
95 14 4 21 6 27 7 34 14 45
4 kgPu I 23.5 75 4 2 6 3 8 4 9 4 12 5
85 6 3 8 4 10 4 13 5 17 6
95 9 3 14 5 17 5 21 7 29 8
12kg Pu I 26.3 75 4 2 5 3 7 3 8 4 10 5
85 5 3 8 4 9 4 11 4 15 5
95 8 3 12 4 15 4 19 5 25 6
2615keV,12kgU, LeadShielding I 18.4 75 7 4 11 5 15 5 18 7 24 12
85 10 4 15 6 20 6 26 12 33 
95 15 5 25 7 34 9 43 -_ 55 
2615 keV, 50 kg U, Lead Shielding I 17.3 75 9 4 13 6 18 7 23 12 30 ..
85 12 5 19 6 25 8 31 41 
95 19 5 30 10 41 :53 70 ,,_
4 k Pu, Water Shielding 24.7 75 4 2 6 3 8 4 9 4 12 5
85 6 3 8 4 10 4 13 5 17 6
95 9 3 14 5 17 5 21 7 29 8
12 kg Pu, Polyethylene Shielding 23.7 75 4 2 6 3 8 4 9 4 12 5
85 6 3 8 4 10 4 13 5 17 6
95 9 3 14 5 17 5 21 7 29 8
1001 keV, 12kgU I 14.0 75 13 5 21 1 0 37 59
85 19 5 31 ; 40 - 52 - 68 __:-,
95 32 7 50 X 69 88 117
Some significant conclusions can be drawn from the above table. Most importantly, the
majority of ships can be covered enough to confidently find a weapon in almost any
configuration. Restrictive scenarios do occur; for example, it is probably not practical to
cover every 6460 TEU containership having a concealed virgin uranium weapon. Much
more discussion will follow on deployment scenarios (see section 8.3), but in response to
credible intelligence or substantiated threats, even 50-100 detectors is not out of the
question. Conversely, it is highly practical to cover just about any other scenario on the
above chart, many of which require less than 10 containerized units. Still, the above table
is conservative in that it does not take into consideration practical shipping constraints
such the inefficiencies of loading to full capacity.
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8.2 Load Factor Adjustment
Table 8-1 is extremely useful as a guide to the number of containerized detectors needed
to cover a filled containership, but is not entirely applicable to the real world. While fully
loaded voyages do occur, the likelihood of filling a containership to capacity is very low.
In fact, most containerships travel with a much lower capacity to both expedite commerce
and optimize fuel efficiency. The shipping industry defines "load factor" as the volume of
containers actually loaded divided by the volume at full capacity. Average load factors
tend to be in the 65% range [PIERS, 2001; San, 2004]. This fact alone vastly improves
the practical deployment of the ship-based system. It is also easy to see how the coverage
volume diagrams of Figure 8-1 would easily encompass all the cargo once nearly a third
of the containers are removed.
Depending on loading patterns, the 65% load factor is translatable into Table 8-1. A
containership loaded to 65% capacity should be almost fully covered with the 75%
numbers from Broderick. This increase of 10% is a conservative estimate, but is required
because the possibility of uneven loading patterns, which would reduce the coverage
volume of some containerized detectors, must be taken into account. For example,
Coverage A in Figure 8-2 is not as great as coverage B so some extra percent above
loading factor should be built in to the estimate.
Coeag\
Figure 8-2: Coverage volume inefficiencies due to loading factor
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Due to erratic container loading patterns, an estimate is made that 65% uneven loading
requires 75% uniform coverage. This estimate is conservative in that irregular loading
will only occur on top and containers throughout the rest of the vessel will be closely
packed. Accounting for the 65% average load factor, the 75% coverage numbers given by
Broderick translate into nearly 100% coverage of the ship. As such, Table 8-1 above can
be reduced to include just the 75% coverage lines as other rows would be superfluous,
corresponding to well over 100% coverage
Table 8-2: Containerized detectors needed per containership with 65% loading
factor
Containerized Detectors Needed per Containership, 65%/oLoading Factor
Distance to Ship Capacity
Threshold Percent 1440 2496 3600 4800 6460
Weapon Case (meters) Covered R C R C R C R C R C
2615 keV, 12kgU 22.0 -100 5 3 7 4 9 4 11 4 14 6
2615 keV, 50 kg U 19.0 -100 6 3 9 5 12 5 15 6 20 8
4 kg Pu 23.5 -100 4 2 6 3 8 4 9 4 12 5
12 kg Pu 26.3 -100 4 2 5 3 7 3 8 4 10 5
2615 keV, 12 kg U, Lead Shielding 18.4 -100 7 4 11 5 15 5 18 7 24 12
2615 keV, 50 kg U, Lead Shielding 17.3 -100 9 4 13 6 18 7 23 12 30 
4 kg Pu, Water Shielding 24.7 -100 4 2 6 3 8 4 9 4 12 5
12 kg Pu, Polyethylene Shielding 23.7 -100 4 2 6 3 8 4 9 4 12 5
1001 keV, 12kgU 14.0 -100 13 5 21 10 30 37 X 59 
The results tabulated above directly quantify the capabilities of the ship-based approach
in a practical, real-world environment. There are almost no impractical deployment
scenarios in the above table, and most scenarios require a rather low number of
containerized detectors. The deployment of a ship-based network of detectors is well
within reason and is perhaps surprisingly practical.
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8.3 Deployment Scenarios
While deployment of the ship-based detector network will ultimately fall under control of
the government, it is useful to suggest some deployment scenarios on the conceptual
level. A three-stage deployment will be outlined here with the realization that in practice
a much more detailed analysis is required. It is also likely that the broad view given here
(and to an extent, a detailed strategy) will not be static. Rather, the strategy will be
dictated by the world landscape at the time of deployment.
8.3.1 Containerized Units Required for Complete Coverage
Before beginning a discussion of particular deployment scenarios, it remains to quantify
the total number of containerized detector units that are required for complete coverage
of all incoming containerships. Again, Broderick performed much of the work in
anticipation of distance to threshold numbers from this thesis. It is a straightforward
cross-referencing task to produce Table 8-3. Broderick uses detailed analysis to calculate
the total number of detectors needed; for perspective, the number of TEU imported in
2002 was 12,916,00 with an average of 17 port calls per detector [Broderick, 2004].
Table 8-3: Containerized detectors needed for to cover all incoming containerships
Containerized Detectors Needed for Complete Coverage
Cargo Percent
Weapon Case Covered Random Centerline
2615 keV, 12 kg U -100 7,578 3,790
2615 keV, 50 kg U -100 9,861 4,607
4 kg Pu -100 6,406 3,106
12 kg Pu -100 5,706 2,890
2615 keV, 12 kg U, Lead Shielding -100 11,951 5,233
2615 keV, 50 kg U, Lead Shielding -100 14,705
4 kg Pu, Water Shielding -100 6,406 3,106
12 kg Pu, Polyethylene Shielding -100 6,406 3,106
1001 keV, 12 kg U -100 23,798 
157
The ability to cover all inbound containerships is well within reason. Most random
deployments can be covered by between 5,000 and 10,000 detectors with the lead
shielded scenarios requiring more. A Defense Science Board Report to the Department of
Defense provides a rough estimate of a suggested total deployment, defending against all
modes of attack at between 100,000 and 400,000 detectors [DSBTF, 2004]. Even 15,000
detectors are not at all impractical for the containership mode, consuming only a small
fraction of estimated needs. Thus, the results of the Table 8-3 are extremely encouraging.
Some optimization of random and centerline deployment is likely to occur. While it is
well within reason to deploy even 15,000 detector units, it might be desirable to limit the
number of random detectors and rely on centerline deployment for many scenarios. For
example, if the government decides to allow the adversary to know that all containerships
from the Middle East are covered, it might be reasonable to choose a large percentage of
centerline deployed detectors and leave only a few random detectors to maintain the
advantage of stealth. In other cases, it might be reasonable to deploy most of the detectors
clandestinely. Table 8-3 serves to bracket the two extremes and the final deployment will
require many checks and balances, necessitation much more detailed analysis.
8.3.2 Deployment Outline
A three-stage, tiered approach might offer the most practical and cost-effective
deployment of the entire ship-based network. The deployment of a fleet of containerized
detectors could begin on a small-scale with enough units located in "holding pens"
throughout high-risk locations of the world to adequately respond to credible intelligence
or substantiated threats. Containers would be simply shipped back and forth between the
U.S. and their holding pens. Each holding pen could also perform any maintenance,
calibration, or upgrades. A build-up of enough units to cover every inbound containership
could then occur over the course of a few years, with the first detectors likely deployed to
cover the Middle East, which accounts for only around a third of a percent of total
imports (see Table 6-2). A secondary deployment might broaden the scope of covered
inbound ships from ports in or around the Mediterranean and the Far East. Still more
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holding pens could be added in a secondary deployment as a continuous ramp of ship
coverage is initiated. In a final deployment, all incoming ships could be covered.
8.3.3 Initial Deployment
An initial deployment might consist of mostly containers in "holding pens". Holding pens
could initially house 10-20 detector units and could be established throughout the world
with a concentration in suspect regions. Containerized units would then be ready to
respond to emerging threats or be deployed to cover ships leaving ports of greatest
concern. Holding pens would be a necessary component of the initial deployment
because the units would need a point of origin, and upon return, a point of destination.
Once holding pens have been established, consistent routes could be defined such that
detectors are always on board any ship originating from the most threatening ports. As
part of the initial deployment, the entire Middle East could be covered with a minimal
number of detectors. It turns out that only around a third of a percent of containerized
cargo is imported from the Middle East (see Table 6-2); and given the low volume,
containerships leaving the region are likely to be of lower capacity, requiring even fewer
detectors. It would therefore be a minimal investment of resources to achieve complete
coverage of this entire volatile region.
Assuming around 100 detectors for various holding pens throughout the world, and
accounting for around 0.32% of the total detectors needed for the Middle East, Table 8-4
shows the number of units that would be required in the initial stage for each weapon
case. Most of the initial deployment comes from the 100 units in holding pens. Only on
the order of tens of containerized detectors are required to cover every port in the Middle
East.
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Table 8-4: Containerized detectors needed for an initial deployment
Cargo Percent
Weapon Case Covered Random Centerline
2615 keV, 12 kg U -100 124 112
2615 keV, 50 kg U -100 132 115
4 kg Pu -100 120 110
12 kg Pu -100 118 109
2615 keV, 12 kg U, Lead Shielding -100 138 117
2615 keV, 50 kg U, Lead Shielding -100 147 -
4 kg Pu, Water Shielding -100 120 110
12 kg Pu, Polyethylene Shielding -100 120 110
1001 keV, 12 kg U -100 176
A rapid and noticeable initial deployment is necessary to achieve deterrence by denial,
even if the entire layer of defense is not yet implemented. The deployment should occur
as soon as possible after a reduction to practice and subsequent demonstration of
capabilities. Such a step-deployment must be substantial enough so that it is noticeable to
the adversary. Once the terrorist is aware that ships are being covered, he will likely not
risk the loss of his weapon, even if the percentage of ships covered is low. This
discussion also brings to light the advantage of operating covertly. While the terrorist
knows that the containerized detectors are operating, he will not be aware of their exact
location. It is this element of stealth that affords the system the ability to cover only a
small percentage of ships in an initial deployment and still deter the enemy.
There are two deployment objectives that must be achieved so that a level of deterrence
by denial can be attained. First, the enemy must be aware that containerized detectors
exist and are operational; and second, the enemy must know that he cannot locate a
significant percentage of the detectors. Knowing and believing that containerized
detectors are operational achieves a level of deterrence by denial. An element of
ambiguity is essential to any deployment such that the enemy does not know where the
defenses lie [SBTF, 2004]. Given the desirability of covert deployment and necessity of
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Containerized Detectors Needed for Initial Deployment
(Middle East + 100 in Holding Pens)
visible deployment, some percentage of containerized detectors must operate covertly to
ensure the element of fear and some percentage must be visible to ensure the credibility
of the deterrent. Therefore, a combination of centerline and random deployments is
recommended to achieve both objectives.
8.3.3 Extended Deployment
An extended deployment would not be as step-like as the initial deployment. It could
consist of a slow ramp-up in coverage as budgetary freedom dictates. In the second stage,
many more ports of origin would be targeted according to their level of concern. A list of
sorts could be dynamically compiled, which would serve as a guideline for the ramp-up.
To quantify the secondary deployment, some other regions of concern might be included.
For this stage, coverage of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean and all of
Africa is attained with just under 22% of a full deployment. Simply multiplying through
Table 8-3, the following estimate for a secondary deployment is shown in Table 8-5 for
each weapon case.
Table 8-5: Containerized detectors needed for secondary deployment
Containerized Detectors Needed for Secondary Deployment
(Middle East, Southeast Asia, Mediterranian and Africa)
Cargo Percent
Weapon Case Covered Random Centerline
2615 keV, 12 kg U -100 1,766 933
2615 keV, 50 kg U -100 2,268 1,113
4 kg Pu -100 1,509 783
12 kg Pu -100 1,355 736
2615 keV, 12 kg U, Lead Shielding -100 2,728 1,251
2615 keV, 50 kg U, Lead Shielding -100 3,334
4 kg Pu, Water Shielding -100 1,509 783
12 kg Pu, Polyethylene Shielding -100 1,509 783
1001 keV, 12 kg U -100 5,333 -.
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To cover a major portion of the world, only between 1,000 and 2,000 units are required
for a completely random deployment. Less than 1,000 are needed for a most cases in a
centerline deployment. Again, an optimization between the centerline and random
deployment is necessary and the final number of units could fall anywhere between the
extremes.
8.3.4 Final Deployment
A final deployment would constitute coverage of every inbound containership and would
insert an extra layer of defense against containerized nuclear terror. It would entail nearly
100 percent coverage of all incoming containerized cargo at the three-sigma detection
level. For number of detectors needed in a full deployment see Table 8-3 at the beginning
of this chapter. While a full deployment would shield the United States from a
containerized nuclear event, it could be argued that complete coverage is not necessary.
For instance, it might be found too costly to cover all containerships from places such as
Oceania or the Caribbean. Some trade offs could be made as parts of the world are
deemed safe or of little threat. It is likely that these trade-offs would be dynamic, never
exposing the same ports to a complete lapse in coverage.
8.4 Cost
The cost analysis of the ship-based network of detectors is outside the scope of this thesis
because it will depend on many design trade-offs not yet analyzed. It is at least
appropriate to state that the system is not cost-prohibitive, especially given the relatively
low number of units required to ensure the national security of the United States should a
terrorist or rogue group intend containerized nuclear attack. One way to gauge the
relative value of the system to the government might be through analogy. The
government requested just over 9 billion dollars in 2004 on a national missile defense
(NMD) to shield the United States from nuclear missile attack [Isaacs, 2004]. Given the
findings of the Defense Science Board Task Force report for the Department of Defense,
which state that the threat of nuclear terrorism should be treated "as serious as that
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devoted missile defense" [DSBTF, 2004], it seems only rational that at least a small
fraction of the $9 billion requested for NMD should be apportioned for nuclear terrorism
defenses and at least a fraction of that spent on the system described in this thesis.
One other option might be to fund the system in part by charging a small "security fee" to
the shipping company. Using the 12,916,000 TEU imported in 2002, a $10 fee per TEU
would generate over $120 million per year for the ship-based system. A nuclear incident
involving containerships would likely cripple the shipping industry for an extended
period of time, thus providing motivation for shipping companies. Contrasted with the
vested interest that the shipping companies have in minimizing the threat of nuclear
terrorism, a small fee seems reasonable.
The instant that a terrorist places a functional nuclear weapon inside a container bound
for the United States, a nuclear attack has been committed. The slow transit time of a
containerized delivery as compared to a missile launch should not force a distinction
between the two modes of attack: both threaten American soil with nuclear force. The
question remains, by analogy, what would the United States be willing to pay to attach
detectors to every foreign nuclear missile so that an interception can be made while still
in transit? The ship-based network of detectors would not be so dissimilar for the
containerized mode of attack. The fundamental property that the system increases nuclear
deterrence and strengthens the U.S. nuclear defense posture for a relatively small cost all
but ensures the eventual deployment of the ship-based network of detectors.
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Chapter 9: Reassessment and Conclusion
9.1 Reassessment of Assumptions
The distance to threshold given by MCNP simulation and the number of containerized
detectors required for a practical deployment are so encouraging that a reassessment of
assumptions leading to these conclusions is necessary. It is useful to step back at this
point and recount what assumptions have been made to reach the point at which Tables
7-1 and 8-2 can be stated with confidence. In this thesis, the following have been
assumed, with corresponding justification immediately following:
Assumption:
Justification:
Assumption:
Justification:
Assumption:
Justification:
The threat of containerized nuclear terrorism is real.
The possibility that a terrorist has or at some point could have a
functional nuclear weapon is inherently assumed as part of the problem
and given the rhetoric and monetary investment of government officials,
there appears to be at least some concern that the threat is real.
A critical mass of weapons grade material is weaponized and concealed.
The critical mass used in simulations is given by Fetter and a functional
device must be assumed (as opposed to unassembled fissile material)
because there is no way of knowing, a priori, the adversary's
capabilities. The system will also detect unassembled fissile material.
There are at least 100 parts per trillion of 23 2U in WgU.
100 parts per trillion is on the lower end of Figure 4-4, representing U.S.
Oralloy. Measurements indicate that Russia also used reprocessed
uranium. Virgin uranium can still be detected from -15 meters.
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Assumption:
Justification:
Assumption:
Justification:
Assumption:
Justification:
Assumption:
Justification:
Weapons grade plutonium containing no more than 6% 240Pu, which
provides a large portion of the neutron signal.
Fetter provides this as a model for WgPu. Plutonium less than weapons
grade will have a stronger neutron signal and will be easier to detect.
A normal neutron background and practical gamma background is
present, not 1,000 tons of Caf6 Brown granite
There are virtually no neutron sources in cargo and the cosmic muon flux
is known. The chances of large amounts of rare types of granite all
located near the weapon are extremely low and shipping manifestos will
indicate their presence.
A non-restrictive and concealable amount of shielding is used.
For uranium, lead shielding could be thicker, but this might raise the
suspicions of foreign customs officials. Thicker shielding of lead will still
be detected, but with lower distance to threshold. Almost no amount of
neutron shielding will conceal plutonium over a two week voyage.
A lumped density cargo model with 3/4 air by volume.
The pixel approach is not an assumption, but rather an improved model.
The volume calculation is based only on known shipping data.
One major contention of this thesis is that above list of assumptions are reasonable and a
more detailed attempt to justify them has been made in Chapters 1-8. Based on the
accuracy of the assumptions, direct calculation and simulation has been performed which
shows that the ship-based approach is both practical and necessary.
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9.2 Conclusion
A new approach to the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material
aboard cargo containerships has been detailed. The novel approach removes constraints
of current port-based solutions by placing detectors outside the perimeter of a U.S. city.
Current defenses exist within the city's perimeter such that a terrorist could remotely
detonate the weapon while taxiing past urban areas, but the ship-based system does not
allow a concealed nuclear weapon to ever approach the U.S. homeland.
Simply a detector in a box, the system is essentially only a rearrangement of
commercially available technology, and will therefore require very little further research
and development. Going forward, the next task is to build a prototype and demonstrate
the accuracy of the results presented here. The intention of this thesis is both to provide a
thorough description of the concept and to indicate expected capabilities with accurate
simulation. The above analysis provides a framework by which the ship-based network of
detectors can be developed and deployed.
Chapters 2-5 describe the ship-based system, outline the advantages of standoff,
sensitivity and stealth over current technology, identify unique radiation signatures of
fissile material and characterize potential radiation background. Chapter 6 describes a
new, more accurate model of cargo-based only on known shipping data-that includes
random pathways of air allowing for improved radiation transport. The results of MCNP
simulations are presented in Chapter 7 with the intent of quantifying a distance to
threshold, which is found to be quite far. Simulations suggest that due to long count times
during a typical two week voyage, radiation transport is significant enough such that
containerized units will detect weapons grade uranium and plutonium with three-sigma
confidence from distances averaging greater than 22 meters. Given the distance to
threshold, the capabilities of the system are quantified in Chapter 8. The vast majority of
containerships require between 3 and 15 units deployed on each ship depending on its
capacity and degree of control over container placement. Given the low number of units
needed for each ship, deployment of a containerized detector network is practical. Even
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an initial limited deployment, not yet covering all inbound ships, at least increases the
level of deterrence by denial against containerized nuclear terror.
The ship-based system has been described in detail throughout this thesis. The new
approach accomplishes all of the objectives of port-based systems such as detection of
unassembled fissile material and dirty bombs, but it most importantly offers the ability to
detect an assembled nuclear device before the perimeter of a U.S. city is breached. Its
attributes and advantages over existing technology are clear, but the most important
characteristic of the system is its ability to achieve deterrence by denial. Current solutions
offer little deterrence because the rational terrorist will likely detonate the weapon before
it ever reaches port-based detectors. With the ship-based system aboard containerships,
the nuclear terrorist will not risk his one-time shot where he has a high likelihood of
failure. If in fact containerized nuclear terrorism looms on the horizon, the ship-based
system will most likely achieve its goal not by detection, but by deterrence.
As one final thought, consider that an irrational terrorist has concealed a shielded, 12-
kilogram, plutonium-based nuclear weapon onto a large 6460 TEU containership bound
for New York with the intent of detonation as the ship passes near Lower Manhattan.
Only 5 containerized detectors would be necessary to cover almost 100% of the ship with
a three-sigma confidence level and send an alarm condition so that the weapon never
approaches the U.S. homeland. There is no understating the importance of having
detectors aboard that ship.
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Appendix A: 2615 keV Gamma Origin Determination Procedure
In rare instances where imaging is not enough to resolve false alarms, such as granite
slabs in the very far field, it may be necessary to distinguish between gammas from the
granite and gammas from the weapon. If the intensity factor (see Table 5-6) is
substantially lowered due to large differences in granite and weapon locations, the
following procedure can be employed to distinguish benign cargo and fissile material.
The procedure takes advantage of the fact that actinium gamma lines will be present in
the spectrum of natural thorium but not in the spectrum of the weapon.
Referring to Table 5-1, the fact that there will be no actinium lines in the weapon can be
used to distinguish the thorium's 2615 keV contribution to the measurement from
weapon's contribution. Armed with knowledge of the nearly exact relative decay
intensities of 228Ac and 2 36Pu and 2 32 U daughter lines, the contribution of daughter
isotopes such as 208TI from the natural background can be essentially subtracted from the
total measurement. Once the background has been removed, a more accurate
representation of the weapon can be made and potential false alarms can be minimized.
Since the half lives of all daughters below 228Th in both decay chains are short relative to
the parent nuclides, secular equilibrium can be assumed to excellent approximation.
Secular equilibrium allows the formulation of nearly exact ratios of gamma intensities
between different daughters. For example, one of the most useful ratios is that of the 911
keV 228Ac gamma intensity to the 2615 keV 208TI gamma intensity. Defining q as the
ratio between the two energy line intensities, Iwpn for photons of weapon origin and
Ibgd for photons of background origin, the simple ratio can be constructed as
I7 = wIfln (A-i)
Ibgd
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Letting Ip be the 208T 2615 keV relative intensity of 0.1405 and Ibgd be the 22 8Ac
911 keV intensity of 0.1050, then takes a value of 1.3383.6 There will be 1.3383
counts at 2615 keV for every count at 911 keV. For convenience, the notation 7 =
<energy of weapon gamma, energy of background gamma> will be used with energies in
keV. The above example would then be <2615,911> = 1.3383. Some important values of
q are shown in Table A- 1.
Table A-1: Important values of 17, the weapon to background intensity ratio
Nuclide Ac-228
Energy (keV) 911.204 968.971 964.766 463.000 794.947 1630.627 1459.138
Pb-212 238.362 1.6391 2.6914 8.5490 9.9091 10.1395 27.2500 54.5000
Bi-212 727.330 0.2519 0.4136 1.3137 1.5227 1.5581 4.1875 8.3750
1621.500 0.0564 0.0926 0.2941 0.3409 0.3488 0.9375 1.8750
785.370 0.0414 0.0679 0.2157 0.2500 0.2558 0.6875 1.3750
1078.620 0.0203 0.0333 0.1059 0.1227 0.1256 0.3375 0.6750
T1-208 2614.533 1.3383 2.1975 6.9804 8.0909 8.2791 22.2500 44.5000
583.191 1.1429 1.8765 5.9608 6.9091 7.0698 19.0000 38.0000
861.564 0.1692 0.2778 0.8824 1.0227 1.0465 2.8125 5.6250
208T intensities have been adjusted for their 35.04% branching ratio for 22po from 212Bi.
Values of q as close to I as possible are statistically desirable. Resolution issues will
likely keep the detector from distinguishing the 228Ac 965 and 969 keV lines, so their
intensities will need to be combined and some statistical accuracy sacrificed. Not
considering intensity for the moment, the most probable candidates are <727,795> and
<862,795> because of their nearly to ratio and their proximity in energy, which
minimizes attenuation differences and energy variations in the detector. The most intense
6 See Appendix C for tabulated thorium series relative intensities and Appendix D for 232U series relative
intensities.
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gammas from thallium and actinium, <2615,911>, are extremely useful even though their
energies differ by 1704 keV. Also of interest may be <862,463> and <583,911 > for close
proximity scenarios. <1620,1630> could have been of great importance considering the
proximity in energy and of 0.9375, but the 1630 keV line from actinium will not
resolve itself from the1638 keV 234mPa line of the ambient 238U decay chain. Similarly,
the relatively intense 1245 keV line from actinium may not be of use because of a 1238
keV gamma from 214Bi of the 238U chain. The 1588 keV line from actinium will likely
prove to be useless because the interference of the double escape peak at 1592 keV from
the 2615 keV 208T gamma. The relatively intense 511 keV 20 8T gamma is of little use
since it coincides with the line from positron annihilation. The 212Pb, 239 keV peak may
be useful only because of its high relative intensity, but self-shielding severely attenuates
these gammas. The combination <2615,911> will have the most utility, but there are a
few others with some limited value.
Shielding Effects
For high energy and short distances, equation A-1 is a good approximation; however,
looking for lower energy gammas passing through dense material, the approximation
fails. Materials such as tungsten or natural uranium tampers and lead shielding
surrounding the fissile material will greatly attenuate the low energy gammas (see the
spectrum in Figure 7-4). For to remain accurate, this attenuation must be taken into
account. Complex and unknown weapon geometries and shielding configurations may
cause the results to become unreliable. However, if geometric approximations can be
made and weapon-self shielding scenarios assumed within a reasonable degree of error, a
valid can still be calculated. To account for attenuation, is modified from (A-1) to
m
wpnZIwon ex (A-2)77 -i
a n
vI eujxjbgd
J
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for m materials between the weapon and detector and n materials between the
background and detector. xi is the it h material thickness traversed by photons from the
weapon and xj is the jth material thickness traversed by natural background photons,
usually air; and
= - + y7 +hav )_(1-g) (A-3)hv hv hv (lg
where r, cr and K are the linear attenuation coefficients for the photoelectric effect,
Compton effect and pair production, respectively; T1g /hv is the average fraction of the
incident gamma energy converted into initial kinetic energy of Compton electrons and g
is the average fraction of initial kinetic energy lost to electrons emitted as bremsstrahlung
[Turner, 1995]. Background contributions can be simply subtracted from the total count
if detector efficiencies are not taken into account.
Detector Efficiency
In all crystal detectors, there is a reduction in counts due to intrinsic efficiency associated
with the scintillation material, photo-multiplier tube and electronic pulse discrimination.
This efficiency is dependant on the energy of the incident photon. Because of the energy
dependence, a further modification of 7a is needed. Adjusting (A-3) to account for the
scintillation material's absorption efficiency, 7 a is now redefined as
m
e(Evpl ) I wpneux( (A-4)
'a,e = n
£(Ebgd )Z Ibgde
J
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where (E) is the efficiency of the given type of detector crystal and photon energy E.
For the commonly used sodium iodide (NaI) detectors, the dependence of efficiency on
energy is shown in Figure A-I to provide a general trend [Knoll(l), 2000].
.@
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Gamma ray energy in MeV
Figure A-1: NaI Scintillator efficiency
Detector efficiencies with each CsI crystal should be thoroughly measured for energies
between 0 and 3 MeV before deployment for optimal results.
Total Counts from the Weapon
Without knowledge of background, the total contribution of counts from a weapon at a
specific energy can now be calculated. N is defined as the total number of counts at a
specific energy, F1wpn as the number of counts from the weapon and bgd as the number
of counts from the background, so that
172
N = rwpn + bgd
substituting (A-4) since F I,
N =rp n
F wpn
77a,e
and rearranging,
_ 
NF N
Il+-
T7a,e 
This expression gives the total counts from the weapon for different 'ae and N.
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(A-5)
(A-6)
(A-7)
Appendix B: Radioactive Cargo
Table B- is a list of potential radioactive materials in cargo. The list was complied by a
joint IAEA/Interpol/Europol/WSC project to familiarize guards at border crossings about
the types of materials they might encounter [AEA, 2002]. The most intense gamma
energies as well as spontaneous fission rates are included from other sources [Parrington,
1996].
Table B-i: Gamma energies from common background isotopes
Radiation from Common Medical and Industrial
Radionuclides
Gamma Energy (keV)
Isotope (Neutron yield per gm per sec)
Sodium-22 1274
Phosphorus-32 n/a
Calcium-47 1297
Cobalt-58 810
Cobalt-60 1332; 1173
Gallium-67 93; 300
Selenium-75 264; 136
Krypton-81 m 276
Yttrium-88 1836; 898
Strontium-89 909
Strontium-90 n/a
Yttrium-90 2186; 2319
Technetium-99 89
Technetium-99m 140
Ruthenium- 106 n/a
Palladium- 103 39; 357
Indium-111 245; 141
Iodine- 123 159
Iodine-125 35
Iodine- 129 39
Iodine- 131 364
Xenon- 133 80
Barium- 133 356; 81
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Cesium- 137 662
Promethium- 147 121
Iridium- 192 316; 468
Mercury- 197 134
Thallium-201 167; 135
Radon-222 5 10
Radium-226 186
Plutonium-238 43 (1,800)
Californium-252 43 (2,430)
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Appendix C: Thorium Series Relative Gamma Intensities
Table C-i: Thorium Series Relative Gamma Intensities [ENSDF, 2003]
Relative RelativeNuclideEnergy (keV)Relative Nuclide Energy (keV) RelativeNuclide Energy (keV) Intensity Intensity
Th-232 126 0.000170 Th-228 84.4 0.005133
59 0.000750 216 0.001027
132 0.000553
Ra-228 30.6 0.000032 166 0.000434
26.4 0.000006 206 0.000079
19.4 0.000055 74.4 0.000002
18.8 0.000829
16.2 0.002843 Ra-224 422 0.000011
15.5 0.000632 404 0.000008
13.5 0.006318 645 0.000021
12.8 0.001185 293 0.000024
6.7 0.000000 241 0.015795
6.3 0.000000
_____ _  Rn-220 550 0.000434
Ac-228 1631 0.006318
1502 0.001856 Po-216 805 0.000008
814 0.000028
672 0.000011 Pb-212 177 0.000201
42.5 0.000037 300 0.013031
1588 0.013031 415 0.000111
1459 0.003159 239 0.172164
1250 0.000253 115 0.002330
677 0.000253
666 0.000253 Bi-212 1079 0.002132
629 0.000182 1806 0.000434
623 0.000043 1074 0.000063
555 0.000186 1801 0.000000
523 0.000434 952 0.000711
492 0.000095 1679 0.000269
419 0.000083 893 0.001461
115 0.000039 1621 0.005923
1!345 0.000367 785 0.004344
__ _1135 0.000039 1513 0.001224
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Relative RelativeNuclide Energy (keV) Relative Nuclide Energy (keV) IntensityIntensity Intensity
562 0.003435 727 0.026456
509 0.001856 576 0.000003
440 0.000513 620 0.000014
378 0.000099 453 0.001422
Ac-228 __99.5 0.005133 Bi-212 493 0.000024
1374 0.000055 434 0.000055
1245 0.000387 288 0.001343
1103 0.000059 474 0.000197
463 0.017374 328 0.000553
452 0.000063
409 0.007503 Po-212 0 0.000000
341 0.001501
_ 264 0.000162 TI-208 1283 0.000075
1111 0.001224 1185 0.000024
840 0.003712 883 0.000043
772 0.005923 1161 0.000016
_ _ 649 0.000162 1744 0.000003
199 0.001303 588 0.000055
146 0.000632 821 0.000055
77.3 0.000103 705 0.000031
1154 0.000553 983 0.000288
1096 0.000513 650 0.000051
322 0.000908 928 0.000186
279 0.000790 1381 0.000010
185 0.000284 253 0.000987
174 0.000142 486 0.000071
1065 0.000553 763 0.002567
X _ -_ 795 0.016979 749 0.000059
-_ = 727 0.002527 211 0.000253
154 0.002922 722 0.000284
100 0.000379 233 0.000434
965 0.020138 511 0.031985
836 0.006713 1094 0.000553
969 0.063969 277 0.009082
911 0.105036 861 0.017769
782 0.001974 583 0.120041
338 0.044620 2615 0.140574
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~~~~~~~~~~~Relative Rltv
Nuclide Energy (keV) Intensity Nuclide Energy (keV) RelativeIntensity Intensity
_ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,
209 0.015400
328 0.011846
270 0.013426
129 0.009872
___ 57.8 0.001935 
178
Appendix D: 236 Pu/2 32U Relative Gamma Intensities
Table D-1: 2 3 6 PU and 232U Relative Gamma Intensities [ENSDF, 2003]
Relative RelativeNuclide Energy (keV) Intensity Nuclide Energy (keV) IntensityIntensity Intensity
Pu-236 48 0.833649 Th-228 206 0.010926
109 0.151573 74.4 0.000229
______ 165 0.008336 166 0.060095
515 0.002147 216 0.142044
563 0.001263 132 0.076485
___-__ 645 0.003031 84.4 0.710220
U-232 58 0.750261 Ra-224 241 0.995966
129 0.226730 293 0.001494
270 0.011856 645 0.001295
_ =__ 327 0.010622 422 0.000722
191 0.000117 404 0.000523
332 0.000185
338 0.000139 Rn-220 550 1.000000
209 0.000040
_~ ~ '773 0.000017 Po-216 805 1.000000
141 0.000012
478 0.000005 Pb-212 239 0.916563
503 0.000005 300 0.069373
547 0.000004 115 0.012403
817 0.000003 177 0.001072
831 0.000003 415 0.000589
Th-232 59 0.815451 Bi-212 727 0.519038
126 0.184549 1621 0.116203
785 0.085215
Ra-228 13 0.530938 39.9 0.085215
16 0.238922 1079 0.041833
12 0.099551 893 0.028663
18 0.069686 453 0.027889
15 0.053094 288 0.026339
19 0.004646 1513 0.024015
___ -_ .30 0.002655 952 0.013944
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Relative RelativeNuclide Energy (keV) Relative Nuclide Energy (keV) RelativeIntensity Intensity
Ra-228 26 0.000498 Bi-212 328 0.010846
6 0.000010 1806 0.008522
6 0.000000 1679 0.005268
474 0.003873
Ac-228 911 0.263019 1074 0.001239
969 0.160185 434 0.001085
338 0.111734 620 0.000279
965 0.050429 493 0.000473
463 0.043507 576 0.000061
795 0.042518
209 0.038563 Po-212 0 0.000000
270 0.033619
I1588 0.032630 TI-208 2614 0.431875
328 0.029664 583 0.368792
129 0.024720 511 0.098264
409 0.018787 861 0.054591
836 0.016810 277 0.027902
1631 0.015821 763 0.007885
____ -772 0.014832 253 0.003033
_ __ _ 99.5 0.012854 1094 0.001698
840 0.009295 233 0.001334
_ =_ 562 0.008603 983 0.000886
_ 1459 0.007910 722 0.000873
___ ~154 0.007317 211 0.000776
_ _~ 727 0.006328 928 0.000570
782 0.004944 486 0.000218
_ 57.8 0.004845 749 0.000182
____ ~1502 0.004647 821 0.000170
509 0.004647 588 0.000170
____ _41 0.003757 650 0.000158
199 0.003263 883 0.000133
_ = J 1111 0.003065 705 0.000096
322 0.002274 1185 0.000074
279 0.001978 1161 0.000049
146 0.001582 1381 0.000030
_- ~ 1154 0.001384 1744 0.000009
_ 1065 0.001384
1096 0.001285
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Relative RelativeNuclide Energy (keV) R te Nuclide Energy (keV) R te
_______ ~Intensity Intensity
Ac-228 440 0.001285
___-__ 523 0.001088
1245 0.000969
100 0.000949
1345 0.000920
185 0.000712
1250 0.000633
677 0.000633
666 0.000633
555 0.000465
629 0.000455
649 0.000405
264 0.000405
174 0.000356
77 0.000257
-- _ ___378 0.000247
492 0.000237
419 0.000208
452 0.000158
1103 0.000148
1374 0.000138
623 0.000109
- 1135 0.000099
115 0.000099
42.5 0.000092
814 0.000071
____ 672 0.000027
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Appendix E: Self-Shielding Effect in 50 Kilograms of Uranium
A rough estimate of the expected signal attenuation shows that 50 kilograms of uranium
is actually less detectable than 12 kg. In the MCNP model, the distribution of source
particles follows the r2 power law in both the 12 kg and 50 kg case so that particles are
evenly distributed along a radial line. A good approximation of the origin for an average
gamma decay is therefore the average radius of the uranium shell. For the 12 kg case, the
7cm - 5.75cm 9.34cm - 5.75cm
average is 2 6.373cm and for the 50 kg case, : 7.545cm.
2 2
Taking the difference of these numbers to quantify the average amount of extra material
the gammas will have to travel through
Ar=1.17 (E-1)
For signal intensity, I, the exponential signal attenuation due to the extra material is then
I c-pAr
- =e
(E-2)
()
Taking u = 4.878xl 0-2 cm2 / gm from the NIST online reference for uranium [NIST,
2005] and the input density of uranium at p = 19.05gm / cm 3 , a signal reduction of 0.337
is seen, which accounts almost exactly for the lower fluxes in Figure 7-21.
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Appendix F: Randomized Pixel Arrays of Materials
Table F-i: Pixel Array Arrangement
Pixel Array #1, Row 1
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Vehicles
Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Beverages Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Coffee Miscellaneous Air EdiblPreparations
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Miscellaneous Fertilizers Inorganic Cereals (rice) Air AirChemicals
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Cereals (wheat)
Pixel Array #1, Row 2
Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Fertilizers Air Miscellaneous Air Air
_ ~~~__
Air Air Air Air Furniture Air Air Air Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Paper & Books Air Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Air
Air Fruits Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air
Air Coffee Air Organic Air Air Fertilizers Air Air Machinery
Chemicals I I I
Pixel Array #1, Row 3
Rubber Air Air Air Air Air Fruits Air Air Air
Air Ceramic Air Air Air Air Air Organic Air Air
Chemicals
Air Air Wood Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Beverages
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Organic Air Air Miscellaneous Apparel MiscellaneousChemicals
Air P'aper & Books Air Miscellaneous Air Air Vegetable Air Air Fertilizers
Pixel Array #1, Row 4
Air Air Fertilizers Air Air Wood Fertilizers Air Air Fertilizers
Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air | Air | Air | Air Air Organic Fertilizers Air Miscellaneous AirChemicals
Air Air Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Plastics Organic AiChemicals
Air Beverages Air Air Vegetable Fruits Air Air Vegetable Paper & Books
Pixel Array #1, Row 5
Fertilizers Organic Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Plastics Miscellaneous AirChemicals
Air Air Air ir Inorganic Air Air AirAir MiscellaneousChemicals
Air Air Beverages Fertilizers Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air Air
Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Fish Miscellaneous Air Beverages Air
Paper & Books Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Air
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Pixel Array #1, Row 6
Organic __Organicl Air Air Stone Air Air Air Air Air AirChemicals
Miscellaneous Air ArOrganic
~MiscelIanous AirAir Organic Vegetable Fruits Air Air Air AirChemnicals
Air Air Air Vegetable Air Air Air Air Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Dairy Air Fertilizers Air Air Beverages Air Air
EdibleAir Paper & Books Air Fertilizers Edible Air Air Air Air Air
__ _ Preparations
Pixel Array #1, Row 7
Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Furniture Air Fertilizers Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Air
Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air
Air Miscellaneous Sugars Air Air Fruits Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Fertilizers Fertilizers Air Air Miscellaneous
Pixel Array #1, Row 8
Air Air Miscellaneous Cocoa Organtc Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air
Chemicals
Air Air Coffee Vegetable Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Apparel
___________ Fats/Oils
Miscellaneous Air Air Plastics Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Iron/Steel Bulk Air Air Air Air Air Air Fish Air
Ar _ Organic
Air Fertilizers CmOrgaic Air Glass Air Air Air Plastics VegetableAir F ertilizers C hem icals _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Pixel Array #1, Row 9
Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air
Wood Air Air Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Air Miscellaneous
Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Fertilizers Air Air
Organic Air Air Miscellaneous Vegetable Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air
Chemicals_____,, _
Fertilizers Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air
Pixel Array #1, Row 10
Furniture Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air
Air | Air Air | Air |Miscellaneous Inorganic Edible Air Air Miscellaneous
l_________ ______ _ ___ l___ l__ Chemicals Preparations l
Miscellaneous Fruits Air Toys Air Air Air Air Air Sugars
Fertilizers Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Dairy Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Apparel
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Pixel Array #1, Row 11
Fertilizers Machinery Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Fertilizers Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Air
Plastics Air Air Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Air Vehicles
Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Air Plastics Air Air Air
Pixel Array #1, Row 12
Sugars Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Organic Air Air Air Air Air Air Beverages AirChemnicals
Air Fertilizers Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Vegetable Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Ai Air Organic Air ir Air Air Air Air
Chemicals
Pixel Array #1, Row 13
Air Air Coffee Paper & Books Air Beverages Miscellaneous Wood Air Air
Vegetable Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Furniture Inorganic Fish Air Air Air Air Air Fish AirChemicals
Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Toys Fertilizers Air Air Air
Pixel Array #1, Row 14
Air A ir Air Air Air Air Organic Air Air Air
Chemicals
Air Cereals (wheat) Air Air Air Air Air Cocoa Air Air
Miscellaneous Vehicles Air Air Fertilizers Organic Air Air Air AirChemicals
Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Miscellaneous
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Pixel Array #2, Row 1
Air Air Glass Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Fruits Air Air Air Air Paper & Books Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Beverages Beverages Miscellaneous Air Air Air
Air Miscellaneous Fruits Air Cocoa Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 2
Air Air Air Air Air Air Vegetable Air Air Air
Fats/Oils
OrganicOrganic Air Air Air Air Air Plastics Air Organic Air
Chernica__ _Chemicals Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Beverages Air Air
Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Beverages Air Air Air Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 3
Air Paper & Books Miscellaneous Air Vegetable Air Air Air Miscellaneous Stone
Air Air Air Air Air Organic Cereals (rice) Air Air MiscellaneousChemicals
Air Air Air Air Vegetable Air Air Air Organic Air
Chemicals
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Beverages
Air Wood Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 4
Air Beverages Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air
Air Ai Air Air Air Air Vegetable Air Air Cocoa
Fats/Oils
Air Air Miscellaneous Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Furniture Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Fertilizers
Pixel Array #2, Row 5
Air Air Fertilizers Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Beverages Vegetable
Air Beverages Apparel Air Fertilizers Air Fruits Air Air Glass
Air Air Fruits Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Fish
Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Vegetable Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air
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Pixel Array #2, Row 6
Cocoa Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Vegetable Fertilizers
Air Miscellaneous Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Vegetable
Fats/Oils
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous
Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Iron/Steel Bulk Air Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 7
Air Vegetable Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air
~~~~~OrAnic OrganicAir Air Organic Miscellaneous Air Vegetable Organic Air Air Air
________ _Chemicals Chemicals
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Furniture Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Cereals (wheat) Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 8
Fruits Air Vegetable Coffee Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air
Rubber Air Fertilizers Air Wood Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Iron/Steel Bulk Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Toys Air Ceramic Air Stone
Air Air _ Air Furniture Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air Air Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 9
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Plastics
Air Air Air Air Furniture Air Air Air Air Air
EdibleAir Air Vegetable Air Air Air EilAir Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Wood Plastics Air Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 10
Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Cocoa
Paper & Books Air Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Plastics Air Air Beverages Air Air Air Coffee
Fruits Air Air Air Stone Miscellaneous Air Air Cocoa Fertilizers
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Pixel Array #2, Row 11
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Miscellaneous
Air Air Plastics Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Beverages
Air Air Air Vegetable Air Miscellaneous Vegetable Air Air Air
Air Sugars Rubber Air Air Fertilizers Air Furniture Air Air
Miscellaneous Vegetable Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Fats/Oils
Pixel Array #2, Row 12
Air Air Air Air Air Beverages Air Air Air Air
Toys Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Miscellaneous Air Air Beverages Air Miscellaneous Air Air Beverages
Air Air Furniture Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous
Air Miscellaneous Air Toys Air Air Air Air Fruits Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 13
Vegetable Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Vegetable Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air
Air Air Air Air Air Fruits Air Air Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Pixel Array #2, Row 14
Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous
OrganicMiscellaneous Chegal Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Chemnicals
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
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Pixel Array #3, Row 1
Air Air Air Air Air Air Beverages Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous
Furniture Miscellaneous Air Air Air Ceramic Air Air Air Air
Air Beverages Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air
Organic Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air GlassChemicals
Pixel Array #3, Row 2
Plastics Organic Air Air Air Beverages Air Fertilizers Air Fertilizers
Chemicals
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous
Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air OrganicChemicals
Air Air Air Air Furniture Air Air Air Air Air
Vegetable Air Coffee Air Air Cereals Air Air Air Air
Pixel Array #3, Row 3
Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Vegetable Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Air Air Air
Furniture Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Vegetable Air Air Air
Air Vegetable Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Pixel Array #3, Row 4
Air Air Air Air Paper & Books Air Air Air Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Fertilizers Miscellaneous Fertilizers Air Air Wood Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Vegetable Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air
Pixel Array #3, Row 5
Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Organic Air Air
Chemicals
Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Coffee
Vegetable |Miscellaneous Cocoa Toys Air Fertilizers Miscellaneous Air Air Furniture
Fats/Oils
Fertilizers Air Air Air Paper & Books Air Air Beverages Air Air
Iron/Stee l AiFr Air Air Fruits &Ir / teel ir i irFruVtabe Fertilizers Air Fertilizers Plastics Miscellaneous
Vegetables
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Pixel Array #3, Row 6
Miscellaneous Air Organic Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air Air BeveragesChemicals
Vegetable Air Air Vegetable Air Miscellaneous Air Vehicles Paper & Books Air
Air Air Miscellaneous Air Machinery Air Air Cocoa Air Air
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air Fruits & Air Air
Vegetables
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air
Pixel Array #3, Row 7
Miscellaneous Air Air Air Beverages Air Air Air Air Dairy
Air Air Air Air Fruits & Air Vegetable Air Air Air
.. _______ _ Vegetables
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Vegetable Fertilizers Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air
Fats/Oils
Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Stone Air
Pixel Array #3, Row 8
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air
Air Cocoa Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Beverages Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Vegetable
Air Air Air Air Coffee Fertilizers Air Air Air Miscellaneous
Pixel Array #3, Row 9
Plastics Air Air Miscellaneous Beverages Iron/Steel Bulk Miscellaneous Beverages Air Air
Coffee Air | Air Air Edible Air Fertilizers Air Air Air
l________ |  __ _ |_ _I Preparations
Plastics Air Air Vegetable Air Iron/Steel Vegetable Coffee Air Furniture
Air Vegetable Air Furniture Fruits & Air Air Vehicles Air AirVegetables
Vegetable | Vegetable | Air |Miscellaneous Vegetable Plastics Air Air Air Air
Fats/Oils Fats/Oils Fats/Oi s
Pixel Array #3, Row 10
Air Miscellaneous Furniture Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Miscellaneous Fruits & Air Air Air Air Furniture Miscellaneous AirVegetables
Air Air Fertilizers Air Fertilizers Air Air Air Air Air
Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air
Wood Coffee Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
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Pixel Array #3, Row 11
Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Vegetable Air Air
Fats/Oils
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Ceramic Air Air Air Coffee Miscellaneous Air Air
Air Fertilizers Organic Air Air Air Air Miscellaneous Organic Air
_____ _ _ Chemicals Chemicals
Pixel Array #3, Row 12
Furniture Beverages Air Air Air Fruits Air Miscellaneous Air Air
Air Air Air Fumrniture Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Cocoa Air Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air
Beverages Air Air Vegetable Furniture Air Air Fruits Vehicles Air
Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air Air Air Air Air Wood Air
Pixel Array #3, Row 13
Air Air Air Air Vegetable Air Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Iron/Steel
Air Coffee Air Air Air Air Air Air Air Air
Air Miscellaneous Air Coffee Air Plastics Air Fertilizers Air Air
Pixel Array #3, Row 14
Air Air Air Air Fruits Air Miscellaneous Air Air Air
Air Air Air Air Air Coffee Air Air Air Miscellaneous
Paper & Books Air Air Air Air Air Fertilizers Fruits | Cheis Air
Chemicals
OrganicAir Organic Air Coffee Air Coffee Air Air Fertilizers Air
Chemicals
Air Beverages Air Air Vegetable Air Air Air Air Coffee
,,,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _  _ _  _  _   _ _ _ _ ________F a ts/O ils
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Appendix G: Cargo Imported to the Port of New York/New Jersey
Table G-1: Port of NY/NJ Import Material Tonnages [Harlingen, 2002]
Import Data for Port of NY/NJ
Code Cargo Metric Tons
25 Crude Fertilizers & Minerals 7,441,496
29 Organic Chemicals 2,957,632
22 Beverages 2,721,911
87 Vehicles, /Except Railway 2,139,004
84 Machinery 1,377,754
20 Prep. Vegetables 1,358,524
39 Plastics 1,350,073
94 Furniture 1,236,492
48 Paper 1,226,841
73 Iron & Steel Articles 1,196,708
68Art of Stone 1,024,583
72 Iron & Steel Bulk 898,939
8 Fruits 895,484
69 Ceramic Products 875,203
15 Animal or Vegetable Fats 867,002
18 Cocoa 723,678
44 Wood 720,008
9!Coffee 681,737
85 Electric Machinery 585,960
28 Inorganic Chemicals 569,990
17Sugars 498,905
95 Toys 476,707
70 Glass 457,304
19 Prep. Cereals 451,862
40 Rubber 444,504
62 Apparel Articles not Knit 442,346
3 Fish 366,262
4Dairy Products 348,738
61 Apparel Articles Knit 330,586
74 Copper 309,682
21 Misc. Edible Preparations 300,337
38 Misc. Chemical 273,783
64 Footwear 234,454
16 Edible Preparations 229,564
76Aluminum 199,502
12 Oil Seeds 195,294
63Textile Art 188,221
10 Cereals and Cereal Products 167,071
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7 Vegetables 165,614
32Tanning Dye 161,795
34 Soap 157,479
98 Special Class 148,342
49 Books 146,563
42 Leather 130,267
83 Misc. Base Metal 121,694
33 Essential Oils 115,397
26 Ores 107,534
35Albuminoidal Subst. 93,406
11 Milling Products 90,998
90 Optic 76,371
55 Manmade Staple Fibers 76,281
52 Cotton 75,156
82 Tool, Cutlery 72,859
56 Wadding 70,041
54 Manmade Filaments 69,307
57 Carpets 69,114
96 Misc. Articles 68,229
6 Trees 66,767
13Gum 65,259
5 Animal Origin 64,635
23Food Residues 64,119
37 Photographic Goods 57,191
81 Base Metals 53,553
53 Veg. Text. Fib. 42,744
2 Meats 40,787
47 Pulp and Waste Paper 39,366
30 Pharmaceutical Products 32,897
46 Straw 25,293
86 Railway 24,359
75 Nickel 23,141
93 Arms 22,727
67 Prep Feathers 22,314
24 Tobacco 22,136
66 Umbrellas 21,550
97IWorks of Art 21,318
41 Hides 18,056
8OTin 16,390
92 Musical Instruments 15,738
59|Text Fabrics 14,842
31 Fertilizers 11,208
60 Knitted Fabrics 11,191
65 Headgear 10,764
51 Wool 9,374
71 Pearls 8,508
89 Ships 8,243
193
91 Clocks 8,032
14 Vegetable Plaiting 7,492
79Zinc 7,434
58Woven Fabrics 6,118
78 Lead 4,565
36 Explosives 3,434
45 Corks 3,405
88Aircraft 2,660
43 Fur skins 1,930
50 Silk 260
1 Live Animals 20
Total 39,660,408
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